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ABSTRACT
In the wake of the political upheavals of the twentieth 
century, political theorists have rediscovered the 
unsentimental teachings of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes was a 
philosopher of order during a period of disorder— the 
English Civil War. He taught that sovereignty ought to be 
absolute and unchallengeable, so that order might be 
preserved. In particular, the sovereign ought to have the 
power to approve or disapprove political and religious 
teachings— in effect, to establish an unchallengeable "civil 
theology." Hobbesian sovereignty might preserve order, but 
it would also cut off political discussion and debate in 
summary fashion. In the twentieth century, political 
theorists have suspected that ideologies such as those of 
free-market capitalism, secularism, or the liberal- 
democratic welfare state might be among the components of a 
contemporary "civil theology." This dissertation will 
examine the thought of Hobbes, but will focus special 
attention on those political theorists for whom he has held 
the most fascination in the twentieth century. The 
interpretations offered by Leo Strauss, Michael Oakeshott, 
and C. B. Macpherson, all of whom have written extensively 
on Hobbes, will be examined in detail. The brief but 
perceptive contributions offered by Hannah Arendt and Eric 
Voegelin will be considered, as will the interpretation of 
Thomas Spragens, a political theorist of the postwar 
vii
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generation who has attempted to synthesize some of the main 
currents in twentieth-century philosophical and political 
thought.
To an extent, the thought of all six of the thinkers 
considered here bears upon the question of which doctrine—  
that of laissez-faire capitalism or of the liberal- 
democratic welfare state— most closely resembles a sinister 
"neo-Hobbesian" dogma which threatens to circumscribe 
political debate. This issue will be the subject of some 
concluding remarks, which will draw upon the contributions 
of the six twentieth-century thinkers while invoking the 
contrast between Hobbes and Aristotle as a central theme.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The recent commemoration of the four hundredth 
anniversary of Hobbes's birth provides an appropriate 
occasion for an examination of the treatment of the author 
of Leviathan in contemporary political thought. Hobbes's 
presence in twentieth-century political theory is 
ubiquitous; almost every major thinker comments on him to 
some extent. He was a thinker who attempted to bring order 
out of disorder; contemporary disorders, ranging from the 
totalitarian disasters of our century to the anomie of urban 
civilization, have led reflective people back to his 
thought.
Hobbes's stark, unsentimental political thought has 
attracted the attention of a number of commentators in the 
post-World War II era; despite the ready availability of the 
materials, neither the treatments of Hobbes offered by these 
thinkers nor the broader implications of these treatments 
have been treated systematically heretofore. Hannah Arendt 
critiqued Hobbes in a brief section of The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, as did Eric Voegelin in The New Science of 
Politics. More extensive treatments are offered by Leo 
Strauss (in Natural Right and Historv. The Political 
Philosophv of Hobbes, and elsewhere), Michael Oakeshott 
(including his introduction to Leviathan and the essay "The 
Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas Hobbes"), and C. B. 
Macpherson (especially in The Political Theorv of Possessive 
1
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Individualism). More recently, Thomas Spragens has offered 
a critique of "scientistic" or "technocratic" tendencies in 
modern politics in works such as The Irony of Liberal 
Reason; the culpability of Hobbes for such developments is 
considered in Spragens's The Politics of Motion.
It seems plausible to suggest that twentieth-century 
history has made Hobbes's political thought salient. The 
scenes of street fighting in prewar Germany between Nazi and 
Communist partisans, precursors of much worse things to 
come, bring to mind both the Hobbesian "war of all against 
all" and the near-anarchical situation of the English Civil 
War which eventually confronted Hobbes. For severe 
political upheavals, Hobbes prescribed a severe solution: 
the institution of a sovereign power to which no opposition 
would be allowed. This new kind of sovereign would dictate 
a "civil theology" for society; to allow dissent from this 
"civil theology" would only introduce discord. This feature 
of Hobbes's theory— its attribution to the sovereign of 
authority to judge of the admissibility of doctrines and 
opinions, political, religious, or otherwise— represents the 
central theme of this study. Some contemporary observers 
note the growth of the modern state and wonder whether it 
has not taken on a Hobbesian character already. Direct 
political coercion is not necessary for a state to take on 
such a Hobbesian character, according to several of the 
thinkers to be considered; such a "neo-Hobbesianism" could
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
be the result of the uncritical acceptance of a 
"conventional wisdom" which becomes a background assumption 
underlying all political discussion. Which modern political 
tendency represents such a new "civil theology"? Is 
capitalism the new dogma from which no dissent is tolerated? 
Or, is the new dogma not capitalism but rather "secular 
humanism" or the doctrines of welfare-state liberalism?
These are among the considerations that explain the 
fascination Hobbes has held for interpreters of the modern 
political predicament.
In addition to the intrinsic value of a consideration 
of Hobbes's fascinating albeit sobering political thought, 
his example provides a convenient connecting theme for the 
study of a set of issues that have concerned the postwar 
thinkers discussed herein. Besides the aforementioned theme 
of the Hobbesian sovereign as political censor, a subsidiary 
theme for this work will be the contrast between Hobbes and 
Aristotle. The gap between these two thinkers provides a 
convenient evaluative criterion. This contrast is relevant 
to the somewhat related questions of the legitimacy of the 
range of activities of the contemporary state and of the 
centrality of the political to human nature.
An initial concern will be a consideration of the life 
and teachings of Hobbes himself. His attraction to a 
metaphysics patterned after a mechanical, Galilean physical 
science, and the influence of this mechanistic tendency on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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his political thought (an issue that has been the subject of 
lively debate among scholars) will be considered. A 
connecting thread can be detected, joining a mechanistic 
metaphysics to a materialistic account of sensation, 
implying the Hobbesian "state of nature" in which human 
beings collide with each other like molecules in a test tube 
unless they make a covenant with a sovereign protector. The 
technical minutiae of Hobbes's doctrine are not, however, as 
central to this study as is the historical setting in which 
Hobbes found himself. As his career developed 
contemporaneously with a period of political upheaval in 
England, Hobbes developed a low regard for popular 
government, an aversion which was reinforced by the rantings 
of the sectarian extremists which grew louder with the 
approach of civil war. His low opinion of democracy may 
have resulted from his early translation of Thucydides' 
histories, in which a decadent demos hastened the decline of 
Athens.
Leo Strauss will be the first twentieth-century thinker 
whose reflections on Hobbes will be considered. Strauss 
views Hobbes as something of a culprit; he sees Hobbes, 
along with Machiavelli, as the originator of the modern 
doctrine of natural right, which represents a retrogression 
from classic natural right. Modern natural right begins 
with the individual and his passions, and proceeds to affirm 
the rights of the individual against the state and against
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
his fellows; classic natural right begins with the state and 
the citizen's duty to it, along with the state's role in 
inculcating virtuous habits in the citizenry. Modern 
natural right is reductionistic and egalitarian, while 
classic natural right acknowledges the natural distinctions 
to be found among men. Strauss acknowledges that Hobbes's 
thought tended to justify a bourgeois ethic of capitalistic 
acquisition; nevertheless, he sees the Hobbesian theory as 
of a piece with the socialist and welfare-state tendencies 
of the twentieth century. Hobbesian thought, together with 
modern liberalism and socialism, is seen as leading to the 
establishment of a "universal and homogeneous state," 
dedicated to the enlightenment and prosperity of all, which 
affirms an ecmal entitlement as a matter of right (rather 
than the right of the superior to rule the inferior), and 
which takes on a Hobbesian character as it homogenizes away 
all cultural distinctiveness and particularity.
Of all the twentieth-century thinkers, Michael 
Oakeshott probably takes the most favorable view of Hobbes. 
Oakeshott thinks that Hobbes has captured the problematical 
character of man's existence as a social being. The 
Hobbesian solution to the political problem carries special 
significance for Oakeshott as a thinker who argues that the 
scope of political activity ought to be kept strictly 
limited. Central to Oakeshott's thought is the notion of 
civitas or civil association as a political ideal.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
According to this conception, the state exists only to 
stipulate conditions to be observed by individuals (as well 
as groups below the level of the state) in their pursuit of 
whatever ends they choose. Opposed to the conception of 
societas or civitas is that of universitas. in which the 
state enlists all its subjects in the pursuit of a single 
substantive purpose. Oakeshott is attracted to the 
Hobbesian doctrine of sovereignty because, whatever its 
shortcomings, it would at least prevent political 
"busybodies" from enrolling everyone in their favorite 
projects; everyone minds his own business in the Hobbesian 
state. Hobbes therefore offers, if not a version of 
"secular salvation," at least a "second-best deliverance" 
from the human predicament with respect to politics.
C. B. Macpherson implicates Hobbes in his critique of 
"possessive market society." Macpherson sees the thought of 
Hobbes, along with that of Locke, as a component in the 
self-justificatory process of our "possessive individualist" 
society. Macpherson concedes a tentative validity to 
Hobbes, but he emphasizes that some of Hobbes's assumptions 
do not hold for man in general, but instead are appropriate 
only within possessive market society. For Hobbes's theory 
to operate, social assumptions, not just metaphysical or 
psychological ones, are required. Consider, for instance, 
Hobbes's conception of power as a "zero-sum game," in which 
power is a matter of order or rank, and one man's power
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
implies a reduction in the power of others. This assumption 
is valid for possessive market society, but it would not 
hold for the traditional society that preceded it, argues 
Macpherson. Neither would it hold for the genuine 
participatory democracy for which Macpherson holds out hope. 
Such a participatory democracy would better reflect the 
whole of man's natural capacities, he claims. He sees hope 
for the emergence of a more full-fledged democracy in the 
ideologies of some of the "Third World" nations.
Concise but perceptive critiques of Hobbes have been 
offered by both Arendt and Voegelin. For Arendt, the crisis 
of modernity consists in large part of the atrophy of the 
political; the thought cf Hobbes is held to represent the 
culmination of this development. In the Hobbesian state, 
acquiescence in the commands of the sovereign exhausts the 
political realm; wide-ranging political discussion and 
engagement throughout society would be superfluous or worse. 
From Arendt's perspective, the extent to which a thinker 
represents an antidote to the crisis of modernity depends on 
his affirmation or denial of the Aristotelian dictum that 
man is a political animal. For Voegelin, on the other hand, 
civilizational crisis is not so much political as it is 
spiritual. A central concern for Voegelin is the relation 
between religion and politics in the Hobbesian state. 
Although Hobbes takes considerable pains to emphasize that 
his doctrine is not inconsistent with the existence of a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Christian commonwealth, he holds that the sovereign must be 
the final arbiter of the admissibility of religious 
teachings; the superiority of sources outside the political 
realm, such as revelation, is denied. Hobbes has tried to 
obscure the fact that his political doctrine must claim a 
validity superior to that of Christianity; this prompts 
Voegelin to categorize the doctrine as yet another symptom 
of "modern gnosticism."
The final twentieth-century thinker to be considered is 
Thomas Spragens, who has attempted to interpret and 
synthesize a wide range of intellectual developments in 
fields ranging from political theory to philosophy of 
science to the natural sciences themselves. Spragens has 
criticized a tendency toward a "scientistic" or 
"technocratic" practice of politics, in which rulers or 
their appointees view the citizenry as a collection of 
experimental subjects to be manipulated. The thinking of 
Hobbes, whom Spragens has treated at length in his The 
Politics of Motion, must be held culpable for contributing 
to such "technocratic" tendencies, he argues. Furthermore, 
Spragens compares the "end-less," purposeless universe of 
Hobbes unfavorably to an Aristotelian world-view which sees 
all beings, including participants in politics, as directed 
toward an end in their activities.
Are the activities of the contemporary state 
legitimate, and is the realm of politics central to human
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
nature? As was suggested above, such questions have been 
highly contested by postwar political theorists. The 
Aristotelian purposiveness described by Spragens would seem 
to suggest affirmative answers to these queries. It would 
seem to be a fair conclusion that Macpherson and Arendt 
would give qualified affirmative answers as well, while 
Strauss, Oakeshott, and Voegelin would each answer with a 
qualified negative. The point of view to be pursued here is 
that insufficient attention has been given to the "neo- 
Hobbesian" character of the laissez-faire ideology, to which 
Strauss would appear at least to give aid and comfort with 
his critique of the "universal and homogeneous state." For 
example, some attention is devoted below to the affinity 
felt for Hobbes (and even for the ancient Sophists) as well 
as the hostility to both Plato and Aristotle professed by 
some of those who have taken the lead in a movement to 
revive the classical liberalism of the nineteenth century 
(see chapter 8 below, especially 288-92). Nevertheless, it 
is to be conceded that the left-leaning "vanguard" politics 
contemplated by Macpherson (and criticized trenchantly by 
Spragens) may take on the character of the sinister drive to 
build the "universal and homogeneous state" described by 
Strauss.
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CHAPTER 2; ERECTING LEVIATHAN— THE THOUGHT 
OF THOMAS HOBBES IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
With his proposal for an absolutist sovereign, Thomas 
Hobbes presented a stark and unsentimental solution to the 
problem of political upheaval and disorder. The parallels 
between the political divisions within seventeenth-century 
England and the global ideological upheavals of more recent 
times have fascinated twentieth-century political theorists; 
several thinkers have taken Hobbes's views as a motif. A 
recurring tendency has been the identification of one 
political doctrine or another as a pernicious "neo- 
Hobbesianism," an attempt to install certain crucial 
background assumptions as a "conventional wisdom" that 
effectively becomes removed from political debate.
Tendencies ranging from capitalism to secularism have been 
treated as having attained the status of "neo- 
Hobbesianisms."
Leo Strauss identified Hobbes, along with his 
predecessor Machiavelli, as the initiator of the modern 
break with the classical political tradition; he argued that 
Hobbes had lowered the sights of political philosophy by 
placing right prior to law and passion prior to reason. 
Strauss claimed that, by positing an equal natural right 
prior to obligation, Hobbes had opened the way for the 
building of a tyrannical "universal and homogeneous state" 
that would be premised on the satisfaction of men's
10
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"passions," their physical wants and needs. C. B.
Macpherson devotes about half of his The Political Theorv of 
Possessive Individualism to Hobbes; he believes that 
Hobbes's conception of power and his view of the individual 
as the owner of his capacity to labor represent ideological 
assumptions favorable to the development of modern 
capitalism. He holds that such Hobbesian conceptions have 
contributed to the passive "consumer society" of modernity, 
in which the capacities for activity required for genuine 
participatory democracy have atrophied.
If the political disputes attendant to the English 
Civil War represented a precursor to the ideological 
upheavals of the twentieth century, then Hobbes's thought 
can be taken to suggest a solution to current difficulties. 
However, recent theorists often have taken Hobbes's 
proposals more as a symptom of modernity than as a solution 
to modern difficulties. Eric Voegelin pointed out that 
Hobbes's scheme would require a pervasive censorship; while 
other peaceable civilizational pursuits would be allowed, 
there would be no freedom of political debate, and public 
discussion would be strictly regulated.^ For Hannah Arendt, 
who emphasized the centrality of the capacity for speech and 
discussion to the nature of man in works such as The Human 
Condition, modern upheavals are analyzed as consequences of
^Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics: An Introduction 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), 154-55.
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the atrophy of the political; the Hobbesian proposal amounts 
to a proposal to aggravate this very atrophy.
Throughout his career, Hobbes's thought developed in a 
context of intellectual and political upheaval. Under such 
influences, he developed a political philosophy which 
included an insistence on the absolute nature of political 
authority. Since men are passionate creatures whose desires 
for the objects of their passions overwhelm their desire for 
peace, they must, to avoid annihilating each other, make a 
covenant to establish an absolute sovereign whose 
determinations may not be resisted. The powers of this 
sovereign are to include the power to regulate the 
admissibility of political and religious doctrines. It was 
this absolutism which several twentieth-century political 
theorists have seen as threatening the integrity of the 
political.
Dissenting from this view of Hobbes's thought is 
Michael Oakeshott, who has commented on Hobbes in several 
books and essays, including an introduction to Leviathan. 
Oakeshott's view is that politics ought to be a strictly 
limited activity, concerned with enforcing the rule of law 
among persons who prefer to choose their own pursuits rather 
than having overarching purposes imposed from without. 
According to Oakeshott, Hobbes is a salutary thinker because 
he believes in keeping politics from getting out of control.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Oakeshott identifies Hobbes as the philosopher of "Will 
and Artifice"; he accepts Hobbes's account of politics as an 
artificial construction, an exacting undertaking to be 
pursued within the confines of carefully specified 
constraints. Thomas Spragens, the youngest of the political 
theorists to be considered herein, objects to this Hobbesian 
artificiality. In his monograph on Hobbes, The Politics of 
Motion, he compares an "end-less" Hobbesian metaphysics 
unfavorably to an Aristotelian conception of purposeful 
human striving (politics included) within a universe in 
which beings naturally seek the fulfillment of their 
purposes or ends. He interprets the purposelessness of the 
Hobbesian universe as part of a reductionistic tendency in 
politics and philosophy which he has criticized in works 
such as The Ironv of Liberal Reason.
Hobbes; His Life and Career 
"Fear and I were born twins," Hobbes would say, 
referring to the fact of his premature birth upon his 
mother's hearing of the approach of the Spanish Armada. 
Indeed, vestiges of his life experiences, including 
political events and intellectual encounters, are infused 
into Hobbes's thought.^
^The details of this account of Hobbes's career are taken in 
large part from Richard S. Peters, Introduction to Bodv. Man. and 
Citizen, selections from Thomas Hobbes, ed. Peters (New York: 
Collier, 1962), 5-18.
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Born in Malmesbury, Wiltshire, in 1588, Hobbes entered 
Magdalen Hall, Oxford, at age fourteen. Peters notes that 
he appears to have been bored by his Aristotelian tutors, 
although he was a proficient student. This is the first 
indication of a persistent aversion to Aristotelian thought, 
including scholasticism, which he saw as providing an 
intellectual pretext for "seditious" doctrines that 
threatened civil authority. He came of age at a time when 
the traditional philosophical, political, and religious 
wisdom of the past, especially that of Aristotle, was coming 
to be questioned.
William Cavendish, Earl of Devonshire, hired Hobbes as 
tutor to his young son in 1608. The position gave Hobbes 
the opportunity to travel in cosmopolitan European circles; 
it was the beginning of a lifetime of polemical, 
philosophical, and literary activity. Trips to continental 
Europe would be crucial events in Hobbes's career. Peters 
notes that he had "encountered the growing dissatisfaction 
with the Aristotelian system of thought when he visited the 
continent in 1610." Here he encountered reports of the work 
of Kepler and Galileo, and his contempt for Aristotelianism 
was confirmed. Peters remarks further that Hobbes's anti- 
Aristotelianism probably was reinforced by his acquaintance 
with Francis Bacon, a pioneer in the inductive method of 
modern science, from Bacon's retirement in 1621 until his 
death in 1626.
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Hobbes's first scholarly endeavor was a translation of 
Thucydides' history into English, published in 1628. His 
career as a philosopher did not begin until his second 
Continental journey, which commenced the following year. It 
was during this trip that Hobbes became intrigued with 
Euclidean geometry as a paradigm for all knowledge, 
scientific as well as philosophical. It was on his third 
Continental trip (1634-1637) that Hobbes made a pilgrimage 
to Italy to visit Galileo. His encounter with Galileo 
prompted the development of a complete conceptual scheme.
The idea of motion as first cause would provide the paradigm 
under which both natural and moral philosophy could be 
subsumed. His philosophical interests always went beyond 
the political. His first philosophical work, the Little 
Treatise, provided a mechanistic explanation of sensation. 
Jones contends that Galilean natural philosophy and the 
experience of the English Civil War are the two decisive 
influences on Hobbes's thought.^
Upon his return to England, Hobbes found the country in 
a state of political turmoil, prompting him to shift his 
attention to political philosophy. His first political 
work. Elements of Law, was published in manuscript form in 
1640. Hobbes's political thought emphasized the absolute 
authority of the sovereign; ironically, throughout his
^W. T. Jones, ed., Machiavelli to Bentham. vol. 2 of Masters 
of Political Thought (Cambridge, Mass.; 1941), 87-91.
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career he had to consider whether his life was in danger 
because his doctrines might be offensive to the regime. In 
1640, after the seating of the Long Parliament, he fled to 
Paris in fear for his life. There he completed several 
philosophical works under the patronage of the Abbé 
Mersenne, including the Latin version of De Cive, which 
represented an expansion of the second part of Elements of 
Law.
With an increasing number of Royalist émigrés present 
in Paris, Hobbes soon found himself drawn into political 
controversy again. By 1651 he felt it safe to return to 
England, having already prepared Leviathan, a forceful 
statement of his political views, for publication. Skinner 
notes that all of Hobbes's major political works appeared in 
English in rapid succession from 1650 to 1651: Elements of 
Law was published for the first time, in two sections which 
appeared three months apart, in 1650, followed the next year 
by an English translation of De Cive (under the title 
Philosophical Rudiments) and Leviathan.̂
Hobbes lived out the remainder of his life in England, 
remaining active as a scholar until his death in 1679 in 
Hardwick, Derbyshire. The final decades of his career were 
not without controversy. Warrender notes that the critical
^Quentin Skinner, "Conquest and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and 
the Engagement Controversy," in G. E. Aylmer, ed., The 
Interregnum: The Quest for Settlement. 1646-1660 (London: 
Macmillan; Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, Archon Books, 1972), 
94.
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reaction to Hobbes was ambivalent; there was a tendency to 
condemn his theories while following them in practice, and 
he was always hounded by an army of opponents. Both Oxford 
and the Vatican prohibited his books. Hill notes that 
Hobbes withheld publication of Behemoth. his account of the 
history of the English Civil War, because he was afraid that 
the bishops would have him burned. A pirated edition 
appeared upon the lifting of censorship in 1679; the 
official version was published only posthumously, in 1682. 
Hobbes's views potentially were as offensive to Anglican 
divines as to Presbyterians or "Papists.
Hobbes and Thucvdides 
It was noted above that Hobbes inaugurated his 
scholarly career with a translation into English of 
Thucydides' history. It was his view that the purpose of 
history was to instruct, as he observed in a brief note "To 
the Readers," inserted at the outset of the translation:
"For the principal and proper work of history being to 
instruct and enable men, by the knowledge of actions past, 
to bear themselves prudently in the present and providently 
towards the future: there is not extant any other (merely 
human) that doth more naturally and fully perform it, than
%oward Warrender, Introduction to Hobbes, De Cive: The 
Latin Version, ed. Warrender (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Clarendon Press, 1983), 17-20; Christopher Hill, The Century of 
Revolution: 1603-1714. Norton Library History of England (New 
York, 1982), 214.
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this of my author." For Hobbes, Thucydides' account of the 
turmoils of the Greek democracy represented a confirmation 
of his own reservations about democratic government and a 
warning of the upheaval which England was to experience 
during the seventeenth century. Schlatter argues that 
Hobbes's encounter with Thucydides was responsible for the 
crystallization of an attitude toward politics that would 
manifest itself through all his political works. "In his 
autobiography Hobbes tells us that from his first encounter 
with the classics Thucydides had been his favorite author 
because Thucydides had taught him that democracy was absurd 
and that one man is wiser than a multitude," he observes. 
Thucydides disliked democracy; Hobbes, in Behemoth. cited 
democratic theory as one of the causes of the English Civil 
War. ®
Thucydides' history deals with the Great Peloponnesian 
War (431-404 B. C.). This war marked the temporary end of 
Athenian democracy and the permanent end of Athenian 
imperial preponderance. The belligerent policy of the 
demagogic ruler Alcibiades, in pursuit of imperial 
domination over Sparta in the Peloponnese, contributed to 
the downfall of Athens. Under his leadership the Athenians
^Hobbes, English Works, ed. William Molesworth (London: John 
Bohn, 1839), 8:vii; Richard Schlatter, Introduction to Hobbes's 
Thucvdides. ed. Schlatter (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers 
University Press, 1975), xviii-xix; Hobbes, English Works 6:192- 
93. See also Hobbes's comments about democracy in Rudiments 
fEnglish Works 2:131-140), and in Leviathan (English Works 3:173- 
75) .
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became notorious for atrocities such as the slaughter of the 
city of Melos. An overambitious expedition against Sicily 
led to Athenian military humiliation. Soon after the 
expedition departed, Alcibiades defected to Sparta; 
subsequently the Athenian fleet and army were nearly 
destroyed, the city was reduced to near-starvation, and the 
Spartan naval commander Lysander dictated humiliating terms.
"So that, though overcome by three the greatest things, 
honour, fear, and profit [emphasis added], we have both 
accepted the dominion delivered us and refuse again to 
surrender it, we have therein done nothing to be wondered at 
nor beside the manner of men." So spoke the Athenian 
ambassadors to the Lacedaemonians in Book I of Thucydides' 
history, in just one of several passages of which echoes can 
be heard within the political philosophy of Hobbes. The 
great theorist of absolutism appears to have borrowed many 
of his notions about political man from this account of the 
Great Peloponnesian War. For instance, in a continuation of 
the passage above, the Athenian ambassadors note that they, 
the Athenians, had "been reputed contentious" by the 
Corinthians. In fact, however, such men as the Corinthians, 
"if they lose anything which they think they should not, 
either by sentence or by the power of our government, they 
are not thankful for the much they retain but take in worse 
part the little they forego, than if at first, laying law 
aside, we had openly taken their goods by violence. For in
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this kind also they themselves cannot deny, but the weaker 
must give wav to the stronger [emphasis added].
As the above remark reveals, Hobbes took a starkly 
unsentimental view of claims of natural right. In his 
thought, statements about good and evil had no objective 
validity other than as statements of the preferences of the 
speaker; natural right was simply the right of the 
conqueror. Thucydides presented a dramatization of such a 
view in book 5 of the history, in the so-called Melian 
Dialogue. With Athenian forces bearing down on the city of 
Melos, the Athenian commanders met with the Melian 
magistrates in an attempt to obtain a surrender. The 
Melians pleaded that theirs was a neutral city that had no 
quarrel with Athens, but the Athenians would have none of 
it. "But out of those things which we both of us really do 
think, let us go through with that which is feasible; both 
you and we knowing, that in human disputation justice is 
then only agreed on when the necessity is equal; whereas 
they that have odds of power exact as much as they can, and 
the weak yield to such conditions as they can get." The 
Athenians' views on honor and justice were similar to those 
that Hobbes would put forward in various works ; men "hold
^Hobbes, English Works 8:82-84. Compare, for instance. 
Leviathan. ch. 13 [English Works 3:110-116).
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for honourable that which pleaseth, and for just that which 
profiteth."®
As has been remarked, one of the strongest influences
of Thucydides upon Hobbes was his dismissive opinion of
democracy. Thucydides provided a lively account of the
tendencies of the multitude in council in book 3 of the
history, in a speech which he attributed to Cleon, a
predecessor of Alcibiades as Athenian ruler, in an
appearance before the Athenian assembly. The reversal of a
prior decision to destroy the conquered city of Mytilene
irritated Cleon, and he upbraided the gathering.
You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech 
of a new strain, but backward to follow any tried 
advice; slaves to strange things, contemners of things 
usual. You would every one chiefly give the best 
advice, but if you cannot, then you will contradict 
those that do. You would not be thought to come after 
with your opinion; but rather if any thing be acutely 
spoken, to applaud it first, and to appear ready 
apprehenders of what is spoken, even before it be out; 
but slow to preconceive the sequel of the same. You 
would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our 
life is conversant in; and yet you sufficiently 
understand not that that is before your eyes. And to 
speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you 
are rather like unto spectators sitting to hear the 
contentions of sophisters, than to men that deliberate 
of the state of a commonwealth.
®Hobbes, English Works 9:99-104. See also Rudiments 
fEnglish Works 4:32): "Every man, for his own part, calleth that 
which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil 
which displeaseth him"; see also Leviathan fEnglish Works 3:41): 
"But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, 
that is it which he for his part calleth good: and the object of 
his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and 
inconsiderable."
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These were points well taken by a theorist who would go on 
to argue in Leviathan "that a monarch cannot disagree with 
himself, out of envy, or interest; but an assembly may; and 
that to such a height, as may produce a civil war.
Hobbes took the case of the Sicilian expedition as a 
paradigmatic example of the dissolution into which a 
democratic regime could fall easily. Thucydides noted at 
the outset of book 8 that when news of the defeat came, the 
Athenians "were mightily offended with the orators that 
furthered the voyage: as if they themselves had never 
decreed it." The demagogic rhetoric of the ambitious 
Alcibiades had swayed them into approving the foolhardy 
expedition. Hobbes feared that this episode in ancient 
Greek history might represent a precursor of the tumultuous 
period that England appeared to be entering. Fools and 
demagogues were coming to the fore as the nation was 
becoming divided over questions of religious orthodoxy and 
constitutional legitimacy.
The Contemporarv Context: The English Civil War 
The upheavals of seventeenth-century England would 
prompt Hobbes to publish his reflections on politics. The
^Hobbes, English Works 8:302-03, 3:175. See also Rudiments 
fEnglish Works 2:133): "Wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, 
no men can undeservedly suffer but such as are known to him, 
namely, courtiers. . . . But in a popular dominion there may be 
as many Neros as there are oratours who sooth the people."
l°Hobbes, English Works 9:322-23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
23
religious and ideological divisions of the English Civil 
War, while not pursued with the violence that would attend 
more recent revolutions, may be seen as harbingers of the 
catastrophes of the twentieth century's "Age of Ideology."
The period was one of fundamental change in English life.
If a total democratic revolution was not accomplished, there 
was at least a revolution in thought that was a prerequisite 
for subsequent democratization. According to Hill, the 
alteration amounted to a civilizational change, in which 
England went from being a medieval to a modern state. Over 
the course of the period, claims of Divine Right lost their 
power. Politics became a rational pursuit, discussed in 
terms of utility and common sense. Astrology and alchemy, 
held in high repute even by educated men at the beginning of 
the century, had fallen into disrepute by the end. A 
scientific, atomistic world-view gained ground during the 
period at the expense of a theistic, hierarchical view. The 
changes manifested themselves in all aspects of intellectual 
life, including politics, economics, religion, literature, 
and the arts. According to Morrill, the role played by 
religious divisions in the upheavals of the period prompted 
a "depoliticized" attitude toward religion by the end of the 
century. The religious content of English civilization was 
diluted, so that people were less eager to apply religious 
claims directly to the political realm. The result was a
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move in the direction of a secularized society in which 
religion was "unthreatening.
In the controversies that divided seventeenth-century 
England, religious, political, and economic matters were 
intertwined. "This impossibility of shutting off 
'religious', 'constitutional', and 'economic' causes of the 
Civil War corresponds to the complexity of life in 
seventeenth-century England, and to the confusion in the 
minds of men who lived in it," notes Hill. The immediate 
precipitant of the conflict was a dispute over the taxes 
levied by Charles I in order to finance an expensive foreign 
policy; some scholars interpret the dispute as a clash of 
conflicting economic interests, in which a rising merchant 
class objected to being compelled to finance the King's 
ambitions. However, questions of fiscal and military policy 
were overlaid with a controversy over constitutional 
legitimacy. Were certain levies to be legitimated on the 
basis of royal prerogative, or had Parliament the right of 
approval over any proposed charges? Furthermore, all these 
matters took on a religious coloration. The Crown's foreign 
entanglements, along with certain activities at court, 
raised suspicions that the King and his supporters and 
courtiers were "closet Papists." There developed a tendency
^%ill, Centurv of Revolution. 3-4; John Morrill, "The 
Stuarts (1603-1688)," in Kenneth 0. Morgan, ed., The Oxford 
Illustrated Historv of Britain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984), 346-47.
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for divisions on political and constitutional matters to run 
along religious l i n e s . 2̂
In religion, a tendency toward sectarian fragmentation 
marked the period. Unable to count on the support of all 
economic and social classes, the Crown had to grant a 
measure of religious toleration as a matter of political 
necessity. Toleration could be a matter of degree; members 
of a sect or denomination might be allowed to practice their 
religion openly while being denied the right to hold office 
or participate in politics. The matter of a religious 
settlement, of exactly what beliefs would be tolerated or 
admitted into public life, became a central political issue. 
Several sects had political claims to make. Hobbes cited 
Papists, Presbyterians, Independents, Anabaptists, and 
members of "divers other sects" as being among the 
"seducers" of the people. The preaching of revolutionary 
and democratic doctrines from the pulpits, in opposition to 
strict obedience to sovereign authority, alarmed Hobbes.
Hill characterizes the religious atmosphere as one of a 
"riot of competing sects" tending to anarchy. Most extreme 
were the Fifth Monarchists, "who sought in the sixteen- 
fifties to bring about by military revolt the long predicted 
reign of Christ. . . . The duty of the elect was to 
eliminate hindrances to Christ's rule on earth. This often, 
in political terms, became 'overturn, overturn, overturn', a
^^Hill, Centurv of Revolution. 86.
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doctrine of anarchism.” For all their extremism, the Fifth 
Monarchists represented only a more radical version of a 
more widely disseminated Puritan millenarian moral 
compulsion. To Hobbes, these developments represented 
nothing less than the first stages of an anarchistic 
political catastrophe.^^
Upon taking the throne in 1625, King Charles felt 
compelled to convene a succession of Parliaments in order to 
secure financing for the military (especially naval) buildup 
that his foreign policies required. The legislature was 
thus given a pretext for claiming a more prominent 
constitutional position; controversy over the exact nature 
of this position finally led to civil war. Complicating the 
King's position was the suspiciously Anglo-Catholic 
character of the "Laudian counterreformation" initiated by 
Archbishop of Canterbury William Laud. After King and 
Parliament exchanged a series of ultimatums, the last coming 
in 1642, the war was on. Opposition to royal authority 
coalesced under the leadership of the New Model Army, 
commanded by Oliver Cromwell. Charles was captured and 
eventually executed on January 30, 1649. There followed a 
period of "Commonwealth” or republican government in which 
Cromwell held effective executive power. However, a 
succession of Parliaments proved too radical for Cromwell,
^^Hobbes, English Works 6:167; Hill, Centurv of Revolution. 
144-45.
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and he dismissed them; he finally proclaimed a 
"Protectorate" government with himself holding the office of 
lord protector. Upon Cromwell's death in 1658 his son 
Richard succeeded him, but the younger Cromwell resigned the 
following year. An alliance of royalists invited Charles 
II, son of the executed king, to return to England; he 
assumed the throne in 1660, completing the Restoration.
The "War between the Pens"
In Behemoth. Hobbes observes that "a kind of war 
between the pens of the Parliament and those of the 
secretaries, and other able men that were with the King" 
attended the English Civil War. The conflict often took on 
the character not so much of a military engagement as of an 
exchange of propagandistic salvoes between parties seeking 
to establish the legitimacy of their stances with the 
public. The periodic issuance of "declarations" and 
"remonstrances" may illustrate that partisan divisions had 
not yet reached the extremes associated with twentieth- 
century ideologies. Opponents who attempted to engage each 
other in debate must have felt that they still shared at 
least some common ground. In any case, a look at some of 
the political manifestoes of the period should prove 
illustrative of what was at issue during the period.^'*
^^Hobbes, English Works 6:265.
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Many of these manifestoes take the form of claims made 
against the sovereign on behalf of Parliament or the people. 
The earliest one of importance was the Petition of Right, 
issued to the King by Parliament as constitutional conflict 
over taxation was coming to a head. The Petition was an 
expression of several grievances that would be heard again 
in the following century, during the American Revolution, 
including taxation without consent, imprisonment without 
cause, and billeting of soldiers in private homes; 
protections against some of these abuses would be enacted 
into the United States Constitution under the Bill of 
Rights. The King's acceptance of the Petition represented a 
crack in the edifice of absolute sovereignty.
After 1640, as civil war loomed, the rate of issuance 
of manifestoes accelerated. The Grand Remonstrance of 1641 
received only a slim majority in Parliament, reflecting a 
cleavage between the incipient Presbyterian and Independent 
parties; it addressed religious issues. The Remonstrance 
asserted a Parliamentary right of approval over government 
advisors, and it called for an international synod (to 
involve bishops from both England and Scotland) to address 
the question of a religious settlement. (If the Petition of 
Right anticipates the United States Constitution, then the 
Remonstrance, with its list of political and religious 
grievances, may be taken as anticipating Jefferson's 
Declaration of Independence.) The following year, with war
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approaching. Parliament issued an ultimatum to the King in 
the form of the Nineteen Propositions, which made demands 
similar to those of the Remonstrance. The King issued a 
surprisingly moderate reply to the Nineteen Propositions, 
invoking not absolutism but a "mixed" theory of government 
that included King, Lords, and Commons. Perhaps this was an 
indication of how precarious his position had become.
By 1647, with the King in military custody, the New 
Model Army proposed a new constitution for England. The 
document that the army drew up, the Agreement of the People, 
anticipated the United States Constitution in some important 
respects. It called for popular sovereignty, with the 
legislature to hold power as a public trust. The people 
held certain civil and religious rights in reserve from 
government, the document declared. The Agreement reflected 
the influence of the radical Leveller party, some of whom 
wanted to extend suffrage to the whole populace without 
regard to property.
Hobbes must have been alarmed by the character of the 
"war between the pens," since sovereign authority was on the 
defensive throughout. It is unlikely that Hobbes could ever
i^These and other manifestoes of the period are discussed in 
Hill, Centurv of Revolution, and Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., 
Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution. 1625-1660. 3d 
ed., rev. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 
1906). For Charles I's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions, see 
Corrine Comstock Weston, "Beginnings of the Classical Theory of 
the English Constitution," Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Societv 100(April 1956): 133-144.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
have brought himself to support any claim of right of 
revolution on the part of subjects against their sovereign. 
While it has been suggested that Hobbes's views were 
convenient to the interests of the wealthy, Thomas notes 
that he viewed the middle classes' opposition to the Crown 
as foolhardy; their own best interests should have dictated 
support for sovereign authority. However, as Skinner 
observes, Hobbes had his political works published during 
the Commonwealth period, after the King's execution.
Skinner characterizes Hobbes as a de facto theorist who 
affirms the authority of the "powers that be," no matter 
which party is in power. Justification is to be based not 
on providence but on the practical needs of the political 
realm, which requires order rather than disorder. Thus,
Hobbes is a theorist of the status quo. The writers of the 
"war between the pens" have no standing upon which to base 
their claims as far as he is concerned. He feared those who 
preached against oppression. Such people tended to make 
their case before "the common people, who would easily 
believe themselves oppressed, but never oppressors."^®
Hobbes's Science of Politics 
The nature of the times prompted Hobbes to publish his 
reflections on politics. From 1640 to 1651 he presented
^®Keith Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political 
Thought," in K. C. Brown, ed., Hobbes Studies (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965), 214-16; Skinner, "Conquest and Consent," 
93-98; Hobbes, English Works 6:196.
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three political works which represented a continuing 
elaboration of a single argument. Elements of Law, first 
circulated in 1640, contained the entire argument in 
compressed form. Scholars cite its first section in 
particular as the best statement of Hobbes's psychology and 
his view of human nature.
The political implications of the argument were not 
stated explicitly until De Cive, which appeared in Latin in 
1642 with an English translation (under the title 
Philosophical RudimentsI in 1650. De Cive was to have been 
the third part of a trilogy on the subjects of "body, man, 
and citizen," with the previous two parts to be entitled De 
Corpore and De Homine. The first two sections appeared 
eventually, but political events compelled Hobbes to 
complete De Cive first. Hobbes hoped that De Cive would 
prove sufficiently congruent with men's political 
experiences that it could stand alone, without benefit of 
the other two sections: "Therefore it happens, that what was 
last in order, is yet come forth first in time. And the 
rather, because I saw that, grounded on its own principles 
sufficiently known by experience, it would not stand in need 
of the former sections.Finally, the whole argument was 
elaborated in the forceful polemical statement of Leviathan 
(1651).
^^Hobbes. English Works 2:xx.
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Metaphysics
Hobbes became convinced that the natural science of the 
Enlightenment, especially Galilean mechanics, could provide 
the conceptual framework for an encyclopedic account of 
human knowledge. In the ninth chapter of Leviathan he 
presents a typology of the sciences which classified 
physics, mathematics, geometry, and civil and moral 
philosophy as providing "knowledge of consequences." The 
natural sciences provide knowledge of "consequences from the 
accidents of bodies natural"; the moral sciences, "of 
politic bodies."^®
Since mechanics is the study of matter, the choice of 
mechanics as the paradigmatic form of scientific knowledge 
has metaphysical implications. Indeed, the core tenet of 
Hobbes's metaphysics is that everything that exists is 
matter, or body; or, at the very least, that no knowledge 
can be had of that which is not body. Scientific knowledge 
consists of knowledge of bodies and their motions.
Scientific laws describe the behavior of bodies as they 
collide with each other. All knowledge is knowledge of 
bodies in motion and of the causal relationships that obtain 
among bodies as they impact upon each other. Hobbes 
maintained that even his psychological and social theories 
were of this nature, although several observers have
^®Hobbes, English Works 3:71-73.
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questioned whether his account of man and society is 
genuinely mechanical.
How could Hobbes maintain that men are just like 
billiard balls? He did it by employing a "resolutive- 
compositional" method. Complicated phenomena are to be 
explained by resolving them into their simplest components 
and then recomposing them. One employs the resolutive 
method to argue from effects to causes; to move from causes 
to effects, simply employ the compositional method, which is 
the converse of the resolutive. In this way, complex 
phenomena such as man and society can be broken down into 
their simplest components for scientific purposes.
Ultimately, the most complicated phenomena are revealed to 
be nothing more than aggregations of smaller bodies and 
their motions.^0
Nominalism
Hobbes adhered to nominalism, the doctrine that names 
are the ultimate reality, but that, at the same time, the 
content of names is completely arbitrary. Hobbes began his 
version of nominalism with the suggestion that names serve 
as signs, marks, or "notes of remembrance." Apparently, he 
believed that names have no meaning apart from that given to
Jones, Machiavelli to Bentham. 88-89; Hobbes, English 
Works 1:10-11.
Jones, Machiavelli to Bentham. 88-89; Hobbes, English 
Works 1:65-72.
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them by the community of speakers of a language. He denied 
that names can be thought of as derived from nature. The 
names of the animals were "taught by God himself," but even 
they were "arbitrarily imposed." Over time, names can be 
found "growing everywhere out of use"; they are "invented 
and received by men at pleasure." He denied the existence 
of essences. Even the existence of universal names does not 
indicate the presence of essences, "there being nothing in 
the world universal but names; for the things named are 
every one of them universal and singular." Some names 
indicate things "truly existent"; so-called "universal" 
names point to that which is "only feigned." Peters notes 
that Hobbes could employ the nominalist doctrine most 
conveniently in polemics. "Negatively he used it to launch 
polemics against the doctrines of the Schools whose 
adherence to Aristotelian essences not only, in Hobbes's 
view, fuddled men's minds with metaphysical vaporings, but 
were also a positive threat to peace by their encouragement 
of extra-mundane systems of beliefs and of the superstitions 
by means of which the priests maintained such a stranglehold 
on the population.
Since names have no meaning apart from that which men 
give to them, the matter of definitions becomes crucial.
Men properly place definitions at the "beginning of their
2%obbes, English Works 3:19-21, 1:16-18; Peters, 
Introduction to Bodv. Man. and Citizen. 15.
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reckoning." Furthermore, scientific error can most often be 
attributed to those who "begin not their ratiocination from 
definitions; that is, from settled significations of their 
words." In the political realm, it will fall to the 
sovereign to provide the crucial definitions of things 
political. "Moreover, if a controversy be raised of the 
accurate and proper signification, that is, the definition 
of those names or appellations which are commonly used, . .
. the determination will belong to the city." In Hobbes's 
political scheme, the sovereign becomes the "Great 
Definer."^2
Human Nature
Applying a mechanistic paradigm to human psychology, 
Hobbes sought the causes of sensation. He determined that 
"the cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which 
presseth the organ proper to each sense," either immediately 
or mediately. Whether the sensation is of pleasure or of 
pain is determined by whether the pressure created by the 
external body helps or hinders "that motion which is called 
vital," that is, the circulation of the blood through the 
body. The passion of appetite is associated with pleasant 
sensations; unpleasant sensations lead not to appetite but 
to aversion. These passions of appetite and aversion are 
the determinants of human behavior, according to Hobbes.
22Hobbes, English Works 3:24, 33; 2:269.
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Thus, Hobbes held that man is essentially passionate. Man's 
appetites may be identified with his self-interest, his 
aversions with fear; self-interest and fear are held by 
Hobbes to be the basic motivations of human behavior.^3
Hobbes did not shrink from the conclusion that human 
behavior is completely determined by the play of the 
passions. Freedom cannot mean freedom from passion; the 
only relevant sense of freedom is freedom from external 
constraint. Freedom in this sense is consistent with 
complete determinism. It follows that there is no such 
thing as an independent will; "will" is simply the last 
appetite to manifest itself in deliberation.24
Political disputes are about good and evil in the 
political realm; Hobbes derived his understanding of the 
significance of claims about good and evil from his account 
of sensation. To call something good or evil amounts to 
nothing more than an expression of human appetite or 
aversion. "Every man, for his own part, calleth that which 
pleaseth. and is delightful to himself, good; and that evil 
which displeaseth him." Good is subjective, not objective; 
it inheres in men and not in the things that men value, so 
that the good will vary from person to person. "Nor is
23Hobbes, English Works 3;1-2. 4:31. 
24gee Hobbes, English Works 3:38-51.
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there any such thing as absolute goodness, considered 
without relation.
Physically, human beings are roughly equal, argues 
Hobbes. Some are stronger than others, but with a weapon 
the weakest could kill the strongest, "since there needeth 
but little force to the taking away of a man's life." It is 
in their capacities for passion that men differ most 
dramatically; the object of one's passion might be material 
wealth, physical safety, or famous reputation.
Respectively, men are driven to seek these objects by 
competition, diffidence, and glory, which Hobbes calls the 
"three principal causes of quarrel." While some people will 
be relatively tranquil, others will be fanatical in the 
passionate pursuit of the objects of their desires. Self- 
interest inclines to contentiousness in the pursuit of the 
objects of our desires; fear inclines us to seek peace, but 
the tendency to struggle outweighs the inclination to peace 
unless the balance is manipulated artificially.
State of Nature and Right of Nature 
Hobbes conceived of the state of nature as one in which 
there is no sovereign authority to constrain the passionate 
pursuit of desire. He spoke of a "right of nature" which is 
tantamount to a right to what one can get away with. To
2%obbes, English Works 4:32; see also 3:38-42.
2%obbes, English Works 4:82 (see also 2:6-7); 3:110-112.
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have such a "right" means to be compelled, on account of 
being unable to do otherwise; it is the capacity to do what 
one cannot help doing. This "right of nature" does not 
appear to require that others recognize a moral obligation 
to respect it, as in more conventional interpretations of 
right; it is an "amoral" conception of right.
Since Hobbes at several points asserted that claims 
about good and evil are mere expressions of subjective 
preference, his amoralism has often been taken for granted. 
However, in Rudiments he did appear to ground his political 
doctrine on an appeal to experience rather than on his 
psychological theory; on this basis, some scholars have 
speculated that Hobbes's political theory is independent of 
his reductionistic psychology, so that it is consistent with 
a conventional understanding of moral obligation. This is 
the so-called "Taylor thesis" of Professor A. E. Taylor.
For a time, Hobbes scholarship was dominated by a discussion 
of this "Taylor thesis," but it has not won universal 
acceptance. For instance, while Hobbes may have wished to 
convey the impression that his was a genuinely moral theory, 
Jones argues that he "never really appeals to anything but 
utility."27
Hobbes's concept of "right of nature" or "natural 
right" is not moralized or sentimentalized. In other
27a . E. Taylor, "The Ethical Doctrine of Hobbes," in Brown, 
ed., Hobbes Studies. J5-55 [first published in Philosophv 13 
(1938): 406-24]; Jones, Machiavelli to Bentham. 113-14.
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theories, government and civilized society are to secure for 
the individual what is his by right of nature. For Hobbes, 
on the other hand, the full exercise of men's right of 
nature would bring not the fulfillment of a civilized 
condition but its very opposite, a state of war. To 
overcome this state of war requires the supersession of the 
right of nature. The right of nature, understood as the 
right to use absolutely any means to defend oneself in a 
state of nature, is nothing but a description of that which 
it would be prudent for one to do in such a state; it might 
even be psychologically impossible for someone to renounce 
self-defense in such a state of war. As such, this 
conception of the right of nature lacks any moral content, 
although Hobbes's language may sometimes obscure this.
Hobbes's view of law may be contrasted with his view of 
natural right. While natural right can be seen as a 
reflection of a compulsion, at least it is a compulsion 
generated from within the individual, not imposed from 
without; in this sense, "law is a fetter, right is freedom, 
and they differ like contraries." This doctrine of law was 
expounded further in the Dialogue between a Philosopher and 
a Student of the Common Laws of England, a work composed 
late in Hobbes's career. At issue is whether law partakes 
essentially of command or of reason. Hobbes's "Philosopher" 
contends that if the latter is the case, then everyone will 
be entitled to ratiocinate about law, and the law's ability
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to compel will be lost. Thus, law consists essentially of 
command, or "fetter.
"It is therefore a right of nature, that every man may 
preserve his own life and limbs, with all the power he 
hath." Everyone would be entitled to judge for himself 
what steps were necessary; the "right of nature" can be 
reduced to a right of self-defense. Only for the very 
strongest would the passionate pursuit of desire be 
unconstrained. For everyone else, Hobbes's most famous 
formulation would apply: life would be "solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short." Whatever other passions they 
harbor, there is one that would become predominant for most 
men— fear, particularly the fear of a violent death.
Hobbes thought that it would be irrational for men to 
continue in this state of nature. Even if all they care 
about is the fulfillment of their desires, men ought to be 
able to recognize that their desires usually will be 
frustrated in these circumstances. To observe the laws of 
"civil society" would be rational. The "catch" is that 
while men still find themselves in a state of nature, anyone 
who proclaimed his disinterested adherence to a set of rules 
would be vulnerable to those willing to take advantage.
28Hobbes, English Works 2:186, 6:1-160.
29Hobbes, English Works 4:83 (see also 2:9 and 3:117); 3:113.
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Erecting Leviathan; The Covenant
The law of nature, which demands that men seek peace, 
requires that the right of nature be set aside. The 
exercise of the right to self-protection by absolutely any 
means leads to a state of unceasing war, a state in which no 
rational man would want to remain. However, left to their 
own devices, men will remain slaves to their passions, 
unable to attain the peace that their reason recommends to 
them. The situation must be weighted artificially to favor
For Hobbes, then, sovereignty was not to be established 
by an appeal to the right of nature, but by the overcoming 
of this selfsame right. Once the free exercise of the right 
of nature obtains, it issues in the warlike state of nature, 
from which rational men must necessarily escape through the 
institution of the office of the sovereign. Hobbes was not 
concerned with whether this state of nature ever really 
existed. The argument is hypothetical, and the state of 
nature is a heuristic device. Ultimately, the argument may 
be seen as a logical exercise which is intended to 
demonstrate the non-optional character of political 
obligation. Hobbes held that men ought to behave as though 
they had had a "right of nature" and then agreed to give it 
up. It is as though men agreed to combine all their wills 
into one will; they have agreed to give up their natural 
right to their sovereign. Men enter not into a contract but
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a covenant. a relationship of trust that extends into 
perpetuity. This arrangement is wholly a work of artifice; 
men are not political by nature. If men's natural 
inclinations are given free play, they may kill each other 
in the pursuit of their desires.
The Office of the Sovereign and Its Powers 
Hobbes was unique in that he invoked a form of social- 
contract theory not to protect people from absolute 
political authority but to affirm absolutism itself. The 
sovereign is an "artificial person"; the covenant 
establishes an office, which is not to be confused with the 
"natural person" of those who hold the office. Since the 
office of sovereign does not exist prior to the covenant, 
the sovereign is not bound by it; the subjects are obligated 
to the sovereign, but the converse does not hold. The 
subjection of the subjects to the sovereign is absolute, 
hence sovereign authority is absolute. There is no right to 
rebel, at least none that sovereign authority can affirm; a 
successful rebellion may be described as such only ex post 
facto. Furthermore, for the subjects to grant anything less 
than absolute authority to the sovereign would be 
irrational, since absolute power is required to enforce the 
social covenant by means of which a state of war was
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:116-130, 4:86-94. See Hobbes's 
Introduction to Leviathan (English Works 3:ix-xii) for a 
disquisition on the state as an "artificial man."
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escaped; it is irrational to will an end without willing the 
means to that end. Since the sovereign represents the 
multitude, it is as though all the subjects are the authors 
of all the acts of the sovereign; for the subjects to resist 
sovereign authority in any way would be self-contradictory, 
as though they were resisting themselves. The subjects 
cannot complain of the injustice of sovereign authority, 
because justice and injustice have no meaning apart from the 
establishment of sovereign authority and the exercise of 
sovereign command. Nevertheless, Jones notes that it 
appears that, at least when sovereign authority is 
established by institution or agreement rather than 
acquisition or conquest, men can establish that authority 
while placing limits on it at the same time.
The Nature of Power 
In the first instance, Hobbes's notion of power 
signifies nothing more than possession of the means to 
attain an end. However, with respect to relations among 
men, power takes on a coercive aspect; it consists in the 
ability to compel a subject to act according to the will of 
the one who compels him, rather than the subject's own will.
As such, power is something that is exercised upon other 
men; the MiIlian conception of power as one's own capacity 
for self-development, or the Aristotelian notion of power as
Jones, Machiavelli to Bentham, 117-128.
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the actualization of one's undeveloped but potential 
talents, is lost. A relationship involving power is a 
"zero-sum game"; the exercise of one person's power is 
always at someone else's expense. Consider, for instance, 
Hobbes's statement in Leviathan, chapter 10, that "the 
Value, or WORTH of a man, as is of all other things, his 
price; . . . honour consisteth only in the opinion of 
power." In estimating each other's power, men are like 
competitors in a open marketplace. Their estimates of each 
other's power are constantly fluctuating; they must consider 
not only everyone's actual power, but everyone's estimate of 
everyone else's power. Genuine power consists in the margin 
of one's power over that held by other men; effectively, one 
is powerless unless one's power is superior to that of 
others. As long as others seek ever greater power, one must 
play the "power game" just to preserve one's own position.
It is a conception of power that would seem to dictate a 
ruthlessly competitive society, and it has made Hobbes the 
target of critiques from the modern political left.
Sheldon Wolin, for instance, has criticized Hobbes for 
holding an oversimplified, excessively negative conception 
of power. In Hobbes's account of the institution of 
sovereignty, the subjects agree not to act; they refrain 
from acting in order to clear a "right of way" for the 
sovereign. Subjects renounce their natural right and leave
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:74-84.
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the field of action open to the sovereign. Wolin argues 
that this conception of political power will turn out to be 
hollow. "The power to act required only the elimination of 
hindrances rather than the active enlistment of the private 
power and support of the citizens. The citizens had simply 
to stand aside and not interfere. If sovereign power were 
effective because it induced withdrawal, how could the 
sovereign ever hope to join his subjects' wills to his in 
the pursuit of a common endeavor?" Actually, the removal of 
hindrance was incomplete as long as there remained 
consolidations of private power in the form of privately 
held property. Hobbes's sovereign, once established, would 
still require the active support of private power; to expect 
the sovereign "to overawe the wealthy by waving the sword" 
would be unrealistic.
The Special Problem of Religion:
The Battle against the Ministers
Power considerations governed Hobbes's assessment of 
the political situation of contemporary England, but the 
source of "private" power with which Hobbes was most 
concerned was not the economic power identified by Wolin but 
rather ecclesiastical power. England was riven by 
challenges to sovereign authority in the name of religion. 
Sovereign power had to be asserted to preserve the peace.
33gheldon S. Wolin, Politics and Vision; Continuitv and 
Innovation in Western Political Thought (Boston; Little, Brown 
and Co., 1960), 281-285.
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The situation dramatized the general need for absolute 
sovereign authority. Whether a single person or an 
assembly, the sovereign ought to have absolute legislative 
and judicial power, power to make war and to punish. There 
may be no appeal from the decisions of the sovereign 
representative; that would be tantamount to anarchy.
One important power of the unchallengeable sovereign 
representative is the power to judge what doctrines will be 
admissible in the commonwealth. Disagreement over doctrines 
is one of the most frequent occasions for impassioned 
conflict; to allow it would be to countenance a lapse into 
something like Hobbes's warlike state of nature. The 
subjects of the Hobbesian commonwealth cannot be allowed to 
endanger the public safety by indulging in political debate. 
"For doctrine repugnant to peace, can no more be true, than 
peace and concord can be against the law of nature.
"Doctrines repugnant to peace," religious in 
derivation, were rampant in the England of the Civil War, in 
Hobbes's view. He found himself in an awkward and 
ambiguous position with respect to religion. The English 
state as understood by most Englishmen was bound up with the 
established church; the ruler was also the "defender of the 
faith." Religious faith could be a component of political 
unity. The seventeenth century showed that faith could 
contribute to political disruption as well. At the outset
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:163-65; see also 2:78-79.
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of Behemoth. Hobbes presents a bill of indictments against 
those responsible for the corruption of the English people; 
Christian ministers, including "Papists," Presbyterians, 
Independents, Anabaptists, "Fifth-monarchy men," and 
ministers of "divers other sects," were at the head of the 
list.35
Hobbes sought to legitimate the union of temporal and 
ecclesiastical power in the civil sovereign, so that the 
declarations of the sovereign would be taken as 
authoritative on all doctrinal matters. In the seventeenth- 
century environment he saw that, on the contrary, religious 
claims were being put forward as competitors for 
authoritativeness against the civil sovereign. "Our rebels 
were publicly taught rebellion in the pulpits," cried 
Hobbes, whereas they should have been taught "the grounds of 
their duty" instead.35
Chapter 12 of Rudiments and the corresponding chapter 
29 of Leviathan include a listing of "seditious opinions" 
that "tend to the dissolution of a commonwealth." Prominent 
among these are "that the judgement of good and evil belongs 
to private Persons," and "that the Supreme Power may be 
divided." The spread of these seditions corresponded with 
the proliferation of new religious sects. Puritans and 
Dissenters were bold enough to go about claiming that they
35Hobbes, English Works 6:166-67. 
35lbid., 343.
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had been moved by the spirit of God; it seemed as though 
everyone felt himself authorized to claim that God was 
speaking through him. In a climate of religious anarchy, 
everyone was claiming to be a religious authority, or so it 
seemed. In secularized language, it seemed that everyone 
was claiming an absolute right of conscience, such right 
having priority even over the commands of the civil 
sovereign. To Hobbes, it looked like a return to the "war 
of all against all" of his state of nature. Everyone was 
claiming the authority that properly belonged to the 
sovereign; if everyone acts like a sovereign, it will be as 
though no one is sovereign. "Papists" would place the 
ecclesiastical authority in a Pope who resided outside the 
realm, creating the potential for a conflict with the 
temporal authority. Protestant sectaries went beyond this, 
authorizing everyone to act as a Pope unto himself.
Ultimately, the source of the sedition was to be found 
in the theories of the ministers. Unsound, subversive 
theology could undermine the polity; civil order required 
control over the pulpits. Of course, theologies were not 
created ex nihilo. They originated in the seminaries and 
the universities. Here we find an interesting parallel with 
contemporary political events. "The Universities have been 
to this nation, as the wooden horse was to the Trojans." 
Intellectual pretexts for the subversion of civil authority
^^Hobbes, English Works 2:150; 3:308; 2:150, 155.
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had found a home in academia; most dangerous were the
doctrines of scholasticism. Rebellious men were being
"furnished with arguments for liberty out of the works of
Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, and out of the histories
of Rome and Greece, for their disputation against the
necessary power of their sovereigns." Hobbes's advice to a
new ruler would be to make the universities the first
targets of reform.
The core of rebellion, as you have seen by this, and 
read of other rebellions, are the Universities; which 
nevertheless are not to be cast away, but to be better 
disciplined: that is to say, that the politics there 
taught be made to be, as true politics should be, such 
as are fit to make men know, that it is their duty to 
obey all laws whatsoever that shall by the authority of 
the King be enacted, till by the same authority they 
shall be repealed . . . that the King owes his crown to 
God only, and to no man, ecclesiastic or other; and that 
the religion they teach there, be a quiet waiting for 
the coming again of our blessed Savior, and in the mean 
time a resolution to obey the King's laws, which also 
are God's laws; to injure no man, to be in charity with 
all men, to cherish the poor and sick, and to live 
soberly and free of scandal; without mingling our 
religion with points of na irai philosophy, as freedom 
of will, incorporeal substance, everlasting nows, 
ubiquities, hypostases, which the people understand not, 
nor ever care for. When the Universities shall be thus 
disciplined, there will come out of them, from time to 
time, well-principled preachers, and they that are now 
ill-principled, from time to time fall away.
Thus, Hobbes had not given up all hope for the universities ;
they could not be dispensed with, no matter what their
recent shortcomings.^8
^^Hobbes, English Works 6:213, 233, 236-37.
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Against the "Papists"
In the absence of the necessary censorship of higher 
education, Hobbes set out on his own to do the work of an 
intellectual policeman. He saw the Presbyterians and the 
"Papists" as the major threats; both gave legitimacy to an 
authority that could challenge that of the sovereign. The 
Presbyterians abetted anyone who claimed to be moved by the 
"spirit of God"; once it is granted that the spiritual 
inspiration is genuine, any claims made are beyond normal 
means of evaluation. Pocock remarks: "Hobbes, then, set out 
to destroy 'enthusiasm,* . . .  a doctrine that must place 
the authority of prophetic utterance at the disposal of any 
man who might claim it on grounds that could not be 
evaluated by his fellows." "Papism" might be a more direct 
threat; it places the ecclesiastical authority outside the 
realm, in the person of the Pope. Hobbes could not 
countenance this. "Which being thus, most manifest it is, 
that those subjects who believe themselves bound to 
acquiesce to a foreign authority in those doctrines which 
are necessary to salvation, do not per se constitute a city, 
but are the subjects of that foreign power."-®
3®J. G. A. Pocock, "Time, History, and Eschatology in the 
Thought of Thomas Hobbes," in Pocock, Politics, Language, and 
Time: Essavs on Political Thought and History (New York:
Atheneum, 1971), 182 (originally published in The Diversity of 
History: Essavs in Honour of Sir Herbert Butterfield. J. H. 
Elliot and H. G. Koenigsberger [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; 
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970]); Hobbes, English 
Works 2:294.
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The heart of Hobbes's challenge to "Papism" is found in 
chapter 42 of Leviathan. "Of Power Ecclesiastical." Here he 
controverted the views of the Italian Cardinal Bellarmine, 
author of a tract defending the temporal power of the Pope. 
Hobbes argued that Bellarmine had improperly derived a 
coercive power from the power to teach. Properly 
understood, excommunication should carry no civil sanction; 
it is a simple refusal to associate. Similarly, kings may 
receive recommendations from Christian divines, but they are 
not to be commanded by them. Preachers, therefore, "are our 
schoolmasters, not our commanders, and their precepts not 
laws, but wholesome counsels."^®
Hobbes found several of the doctrines of the Roman 
church to be conducive to the subversion of the civil 
authority; "they had many fine points in their 
ecclesiastical policy, conducing to the same end," he 
remarks. The doctrine of excommunication represents a 
significant challenge, since temporal authority "can only 
kill the body [not the soul]." Another abuse is the 
doctrine of transubstantiation, which amounts to "the 
turning of consecration into conjuration, or enchantment."
It attributes a kind of magical power to the clergy, beside 
which kingly authority pales. Most threatening of all are 
priestly celibacy and the claim of authority to judge the 
authenticity of marriages. From these it follows, first.
4°Hobbes, English Works 3:485-584, esp. 490.
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that civil and ecclesiastical authority can never be united, 
and, second, that the clerics will have the authority to 
judge the legitimacy of the royal succession. "Do you not 
see, that by this the King must of necessity either want the 
priesthood, and therewith a great part of the reverence due 
to him from the most religious part of his subjects, or else 
want lawful heirs to succeed him: by which means, being not 
taken for the head of the Church, he was sure, in any 
controversy between him and the Pope, that his subjects 
would be against him?
Against the Presbvterians: "Mortalism"
Yet another opinion "tending to the dissolution of a 
commonwealth" is "that faith and sanctity, are not to be 
attained by study and reason, but by supernatural 
inspiration, or infusion." Hobbes had to take this stance 
in order to defeat the Presbyterians. "Which granted, I see 
not why any man should render a reason of his faith; or why 
every Christian should not be also a prophet; or why any man 
should take the law of his country, rather than his own 
inspiration, for the rule of his action.
By denying the reality of spiritual inspiration, Hobbes 
could defeat not just Presbyterianism but any form of 
Puritan religious extremism. To make this a coherent
^^Hobbes, English Works 6:183, 173; 3:610, 692; 6:180. 
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:311.
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position, Hobbes must adopt what Pocock describes as a novel 
form of religious heterodoxy called "mortalism." Mortalism 
denies the existence of spirit in the conventional 
understanding of the term. God cannot be experienced by an 
infusion of spirit; God is only experienced when he speaks 
to us, directly or indirectly. God is to be known only by 
his words. Spirit, or soul, exists only alongside body; it 
dies when the body dies, and is revived only when the body 
is resurrected; it is to be understood as a subtle form of 
corporeal body. This mortalist doctrine is applied to such 
doctrinal matters as eschatology and the existence of angels 
in part 3 of Leviathan. especially chapters 34 and 38.^^
The "Foundation of Faith"
Hobbes was determined to resist the "seditious" 
tendencies of both "Papism" and Presbyterianism. At the 
same time, he was aware that a component of the legitimacy 
of the English state was its religious character. While he 
sought to place a limit on the application of religious 
claims in the political sphere, Hobbes insisted that his 
views were compatible with orthodox Christianity. Although 
Hobbes's views were heterodox, Pocock argues that it would 
be a mistake to classify him as an atheist.
43Pocockr "Time, History, and Eschatology," 182-93; Hobbes, 
English Works 3:380-396, 437-461.
44pocock, "Time, History, and Eschatology," 160-62.
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According to Hobbes, our obligation to God is to 
acknowledge his power. It is not part of our compact with 
the sovereign to refrain from doing this; the sovereign may 
not prevent us from making this acknowledgement. However, 
we have abandoned our right to judgement about right and 
wrong in the temporal sphere to the sovereign; this includes 
the right to make judgements about what forms of 
acknowledgement of God's power are appropriate. As far as 
we are to be concerned, that which gives honor to God is 
simply whatever is taken for such in the civil society in 
which we live. In the past, it had fallen to Adam, Abraham, 
and Moses to make such judgements; now, when whole civil 
societies are Christian commonwealths, this function is to 
be performed by the sovereign. The "one essential" of 
salvation is to acknowledge "that Jesus is the Christ," in 
whatever form is accepted in the civil society in which we 
live. Beyond this, individuals may not ratiocinate about 
such matters.'*®
Hobbes had another argument for his view of the 
relationship between civil and ecclesiastical authority 
based on the definition of a church. A church is a group of 
people who are united in their adherence to a single 
religious dispensation. As such, a church must have an 
authoritative interpreter of scripture and doctrine at its
4®Hobbes, English Works 3:584-602; see also 322-343, 461- 
475, and 2:203-319.
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head. Each Christian commonwealth thus constitutes a 
church, with the civil sovereign of each commonwealth at the 
head of each church. As long as nations are sovereign and 
there is no international civil authority, there will be as 
many churches as there are nations; hence, there can be no 
universal C h u r c h . ^6
"Officially," at least, Hobbes's doctrines remained 
consistent with Christian belief. At best, however, this 
was an uneasy coexistence. Pocock's view that Hobbes was 
not an atheist is a minority persuasion. More common is the 
view that his writings conveyed a high degree of skepticism 
or irony regarding religion. The fundamental intention 
appeared to be to subordinate religion so that it would not 
present a threat to civil order.
Such was the interpretation of Leo Strauss, who saw a 
parallel between the stance of Hobbes and that of the modern 
liberal state. Like the Hobbesian sovereign, the modern 
state has its own purposes, and if objections to these 
purposes are raised from a religious standpoint, then the 
state must subordinate religion. The modern state could 
even be interpreted as putting forward a justificatory 
doctrine that represents a "secular religion." Unobstructed 
progress, including widespread economic prosperity and the 
abolition of war, are the promises of universalistic
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:458-61; see also 2:277-283. 
47jones, Machiavelli to Bentham. 140-142.
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ideologies that tend to sweep aside all vestiges of the more 
modest, particularistic world-views that they encounter. To 
satisfy these expectations, the modern ruler must endear 
himself to his subjects, even if this requires the sacrifice 
of constitutional legitimacy. Strauss thus argues that the 
modern "universal and homogeneous state" represents a 
latter-day Hobbesianism that is as intolerant of opposition 
as is Hobbesian absolutism.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 3: LEO STRAUSS— CLASSIC NATURAL 
RIGHT AND THE MODERN HOBBESIAN STATE
The contribution of Hobbes was of central importance to 
the thought of Leo Strauss, who has become a leading figure 
in contemporary political theory. Strauss directed his 
critical attention first to Spinoza, then to Hobbes, next to 
the ancient Greek writer Xenophon, and finally to 
Machiavelli as he sought to ascertain the nature of the 
breakdown of political order that European civilization had 
experienced, and, especially in the study of Xenophon, to 
recover an alternative to the tendency which had led Europe 
to initiate a disastrous political experiment, strauss 
presented his basic teaching in Natural Right and Historv. 
in which he upholds classic, inegalitarian natural right 
against the modern, egalitarian version. In classic natural 
right, virtue takes precedence over freedom, obligation is 
upheld in preference to claim, and reason predominates over 
passion. Strauss attributed contemporary political 
disorders to the supplanting of the classic natural right 
teaching by the modern version. Spinoza, Machiavelli, and 
especially Hobbes prepared the groundwork for this reversal, 
which manifests itself in the efforts of the modern liberal 
regime to build a "universal and homogeneous state" for the 
purpose of universal prosperity and enlightenment.
Strauss joined the exodus of German-speaking 
intellectuals to the United States before the onset of World
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War II. Before that, as a young Jewish student in Germany 
during the Weimar Republic period, a pressing concern became 
what he frankly called "the German-Jewish problem" (which 
was but a symptom of a more general predicament).  ̂ He 
scrutinized the contribution of Spinoza, who as a Jew in the 
Netherlands during the seventeenth century confronted a 
similar period of political and religious upheaval (similar 
to the upheaval faced by Hobbes, Spinoza's English 
contemporary, as well). Ultimately, Strauss found Spinoza's 
solution unsatisfactory; furthermore, he viewed Spinoza's 
position as derivative from the thought of Hobbes. His 
confrontation with Hobbes led Strauss to understand the 
contemporary crisis as a manifestation of the conflict 
between the classic and modern natural right teachings.
Strauss finally traced the origins of this conflict all the 
way back to the thought of Machiavelli, but he continued to 
regard Hobbes as the most systematic exponent of the modern 
version of natural right.
In Hobbes's presentation, the sovereign dictates the 
interpretation of holy scripture and the details of 
religious observance. In the modern world, religion has 
become a private matter, but Strauss nevertheless perceives
^Strauss provided an intellectual biography of sorts in the 
Preface to the English version of his study of Spinoza, entitled 
Spinoza's Critique of Religion, trans. E. M. Sinclair (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1965), 1-31 (originally published in German as 
Die Reliaionskritik Spinozas als Grundlage seiner 
Bibelwissenschaft [Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1930]).
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a tendency for the modern state to impose an insidious view 
of man's place in the world. Instead of a religious 
orthodoxy, the state insists on loyalty to the goal of 
universal enlightenment and affluence for all. Modern 
science is to seek mastery of nature for the relief of man's 
estate. The state debases education by taking control of 
the educational apparatus for the purpose of the 
unrestricted development of technology; the university 
becomes a technical training center rather than the seat of 
civilization and culture.
Strauss suggested that the modern state's promotion of 
unlimited technical progress represented a kind of "nec- 
Hobbesianism," an unacknowledged and yet unchallengeable new 
doctrine. He detected the potential for a uniquely modern 
form of tyranny in this new doctrine of progress. He became 
convinced that the classical Greek writer Xenophon had 
anticipated the possibility of a tyranny based on applied 
science in a work entitled Hiero or Tvrannicus; Strauss 
sought to recover an appreciation of this ancient 
interpretation of tyranny. Upon the publication of his 
interpretation of the Hiero. Strauss became embroiled in an 
exchange with Alexandre Kojéve. Kojéve contended that 
historical trends pointed to the attainment of a "universal 
and homogeneous state" which would solve the problem of the 
good regime. Strauss found Kojéve's terminology apt, but he 
discerned that the notion of a "universal and homogeneous
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
State” captured the essence of a new form of tyranny. 
Strauss thought its attainment unlikely; furthermore, if 
attained, it might well be destructive of man's humanity.
Strauss's criticism of the modern state corresponds to 
the anti-government tendency of contemporary American 
conservatism; although Strauss surely might not approve of 
popularized versions of his thought, many right-leaning 
politicians and intellectuals have cited his influence. 
Dinesh D'Souza, of the Heritage Foundation publication 
Policv Review, provides a thumbnail sketch of Straussian 
influence in American politics.
Yet this unassuming bespectacled man left an 
indelible mark on students who would go on to 
distinguish themselves in the American academy— such men 
as Harvey Mansfield at Harvard, [Allan] Bloom and Joseph 
Cropsey at the University of Chicago, Werner Dannhauser 
at Cornell, Harry Jaffa at Claremont McKenna College, 
and Walter Herns at Georgetown University. . . . 
Prominent Straussians include: Paul Wolfowitz, former 
assistant secretary of state, now a U. S. ambassador; 
Gary McDowell, associate director of the Department of 
Justice ; William Kristol, chief of staff for Education 
Secretary William Bennett; and Carnes Lord, director of 
security at the National Center for Public Policy. 
Speechwriters for Chief Justice William Rehnquist and 
Defense Secretary Weinberger identify themselves as 
Straussians. Jack Kemp and Lewis Lehrman are 
politicians of the right who derive their Straussian 
perspective from Strauss protege Harry Jaffa.
D'Souza concludes that the followers of Strauss constitute
"the most rigorous conservative force in political theory,
with increasing influence on public policy.
^Dinesh D'Souza, "The Legacy of Leo Strauss,” Policv Review, 
no. 40 (1987), 36.
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The Core of Strauss's Teaching
The heart of Strauss's doctrine was put forward in 
Natural Right and Historv in a few pages within chapter 4, 
entitled "Classic Natural Right."
According to Strauss, the classic natural right 
teaching took for its starting point a critique of hedonism. 
"The thesis of the classics is that the good is essentially 
different from the pleasant, that the good is more 
fundamental than the pleasant." Since pleasure is 
associated with the satisfaction of wants, the wants must be 
prior to the pleasures. Wants and the striving for their 
satisfaction are the primary facts. Furthermore, there is a 
natural order of the wants, reflective of the natural 
constitution of the being in question. In human beings we 
encounter the common-sense distinction between body and 
soul; everyone admits that the capacities connected with 
soul are higher than those associated with body. The 
capacity for speech, reason, or understanding distinguishes 
man from the other animals and permits us to speak of man's 
having a soul. According to nature, a truly human existence 
will consist of the highest possible development of these 
uniquely human capacities. "Therefore, the proper work of 
man consists in living thoughtfully, in understanding, and 
in thoughtful action.
^Leo Strauss, Natural Right and Historv (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1953), 126-27. Among other references, Strauss 
refers here to Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.1098a8-17.
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Strauss allowed that the thesis that the most excellent 
life for human beings is the thoughtful life could be 
defended on hedonistic grounds, but he contended that the 
classics would object to this. Hedonism would make reason 
the handmaiden of pleasure, and would detract from the 
intrinsic value of the excellent human life. "We know that 
it is a vulgar error to identify the man of excellence with 
one's benefactor. We admire, for example, a strategic 
genius at the head of the victorious army of our enemies.
There are things which are admirable, or noble, by nature, 
intrinsically.
The contention that human nature is social is derived 
from the distinctive human capacity for reason. Reason 
manifests itself in speech, and speech is essentially 
communicative. Spoken communication, the essentially human 
act, necessarily implies reference to others; "fellow- 
feeling" is implied in the communicative act. Communication 
through speech therefore provides the natural basis for 
justice in the sense of consideration of others. "Man 
refers himself to others, or rather he is referred to 
others, in every human act, . . . His sociality does not 
proceed, then, from a calculation of the pleasures which he 
expects from association, but he derives pleasure from 
association because he is by nature social." The necessity 
to take into account the other's point of view in spoken
'^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 128.
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communication so that agreement may be secured means that 
freedom is necessarily limited. There is a sense that, 
concerning one's fellows, all things are not permitted. The 
power of speech conveys a great freedom, but this freedom is 
accompanied by a sense of restraint. "Restraint is 
therefore as natural or primeval as freedom," argues 
Strauss.^
The derivation of the human essence from the capacity 
for reason, speech, and communication suggests the model of 
the city, or civil society, as the ideal form of human 
association; "Man cannot reach his perfection except in 
society or, more precisely, in civil society." Not just any 
city will suffice; the ideal city necessarily will be small. 
along the lines of the ancient Greek polis. This society is 
to be kept together by mutual trust, which requires 
acquaintance; while it may not be necessary for everyone to 
be acquainted with everyone in the city, everyone should at 
least know an acquaintance of everyone else. The pursuit of 
human excellence requires the supervision of manners ; if the 
society can be kept small enough to permit intimate 
acquaintance, this supervision can be maintained without 
resort to despotism. In any case, the modern metropolis 
falls far short of this classic ideal of civil society; "In
^Ibid., 129-30. Strauss refers here to Aristotle, Politics 
1.2.1253a7-18 and 3.6.1278bl8-25; Nicomachean Ethics 8.11.1161bl- 
8 and 9.9.1170bl0-14; and Rhetoric 1.13.1373b6-9.
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a very large city, in 'Babylon,' everyone can live more or 
less as he lists."®
An essential point is that this ideal civil society 
would be a closed society. Strauss holds that the 
attainment of human excellence is a matter of chance; it is 
unlikely that all societies could attain it at once. "The 
probability that all human societies should be capable of 
genuine freedom at the same time is exceedingly small."
This is a decidedly inégalitarian principle; societies will 
differ in the degree to which they approximate excellence.
The chances of realizing human excellence are best if a 
multiplicity of independent societies, each maintaining a 
particular way of life, is permitted. To attempt to 
incorporate all societies into a universal or all- 
comprehensive state would likely result in a civilization of 
the least common denominator which could not sustain the 
achievements of the higher societies. "An open or all- 
comprehensive society will exist on a lower level of 
humanity than a closed society, which, through generations, 
has made a supreme effort toward human perfection," 
concludes Strauss. "If the society in which man can reach 
the perfection of his nature is necessarily a closed
®Strauss, Natural Right and History. 130-31. Strauss refers 
to Nicomachean Ethics 8.6.1158al0-18 and 9.9.1170b20- 
9.1Q.1171a20, and Politics 3.3.1276a27-34.
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society, the distinction of the human race into a number of 
independent groups is according to nature."^
The best chance for the attainment of human excellence 
is provided by the maintenance of a multitude of independent 
societies. Within each of these societies, the pursuit of 
excellence will involve the exercise of constraint, since 
excellence involves freedom exercised within limits. Self- 
restraint, or self-discipline, is best, but it cannot always 
be relied upon. Therefore, the promotion of excellence 
within each society will require the exercise of rulership, 
which will include a modicum of force and coercion.
"Justice and coercion are not mutually exclusive; in fact, 
it is not altogether wrong to describe justice as a kind of 
benevolent coercion." The standpoint of classic natural 
right cannot affirm anarchy, the absence of rule, as a 
political ideal. The good ruler will exercise power in 
moderation, but the application of political authority will 
sometimes be necessary. Political excellence consists in 
finding a mean between power and restraint; virtuous rule is 
distinguishable from despotism because it is directed toward 
excellence, not the interest of the ruler. The political 
art consists in the moderate exercise of power over men who 
vary widely in their capacity for excellence. Natural right 
is necessarily inegalitarian; those who are entitled to 
exercise political power are superior in right to those who
^Strauss, Natural Right and History. 131-32.
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are subject to that power. "While all men, i.e., all normal 
men, have the capacity for virtue, some need guidance by 
others, whereas others do not at all or to a much lesser 
degree. . . . Since men are then unequal in regard to human 
perfection, i.e., in the decisive respect, equal rights for 
all appeared to the classics as most unjust."®
From the perspective of classic natural right, 
political power is to be exercised on behalf of a particular 
way of life. Each civil society seeks to establish and 
maintain a politeia. a term often translated as 
"constitution." However, "constitution" or politeia in this 
sense refers not just to a document prescribing abstract 
legal principles, but to the particular way of life of a 
society, not limited to the legal or political. Politeia 
might better be translated by "regime," understood in a 
broad sense. A constitution or regime in the classic sense 
does not require the ruler to respect the right of the 
citizens to live in just any way they wish; the ruler is 
entitled to promote a certain way of life, to command and 
forbid particular things. This constitution or regime is a 
substantive arrangement, not just a legal document. It 
permits the ruler to act in such a way as to influence the 
tone or character of the society, the habits or attitudes
®Ibid., 132-35. Strauss refers to Nicomachean Ethics 
5.1.1129b25-1130a8 and 10.9.1179b7-1180al0, and Politics 
1.5.1254a29-31, 1.6.1255a3-22, and 7.3.1325b7 ff., among other 
passages.
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that the society considers most respectable. It might even 
be conjectured that a society cannot avoid exercising such 
influence; if it were to attempt to maintain a strict 
neutrality concerning ways of life, it might find that it 
had erected the standard of the "common man" or "mass man" 
as authoritative by default. "When the authoritative type 
is the common man, everything has to justify itself before 
the tribunal of the common man; everything which cannot be 
justified before that tribunal becomes, at best, merely 
tolerated, if not despised or suspect.
Strauss emphasizes that, according to the teachings of 
the classics, the best regime will be attainable only under 
the best conditions, and the existence of these conditions 
will be a matter of chance. When these conditions do not 
obtain, we shall have to settle for the best feasible regime 
rather than the simply best regime. To attempt to actualize 
the best regime when the requisite conditions are not 
present might require the politician to resort to unjust or 
ignoble measures; the abolition of human imperfection, 
requiring a miraculous change in human nature, is not 
feasible and should not be sought. The best feasible 
regime, which will be the best that can be done in most 
circumstances, is equivalent to the legitimate regime; 
whereas only one regime can be simply best, there might be a
^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 135-37. Strauss refers 
to Nicomachean Ethics 10.9.1181bl2-23, and Politics 3.6.1278bll- 
13, 3.17.1288a23-24, and 4,1.1289al2-20, among other passages.
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variety of legitimate regimes, depending on circumstances. 
The legitimate regime will be imperfect; it will be just, 
but not noble. "Noble actions require, as Aristotle says, a 
certain equipment; without such equipment they are not 
possible.
The simply best regime would consist of the absolute 
rule of the wise; however, formidable obstacles to its 
attainment compel us to separate the question of the best 
regime into its theoretical and practical aspects. "The few 
wise cannot rule the many unwise by force," notes Strauss. 
"The unwise multitude must recognize the wise as wise and 
obey them freely because of their wisdom." However, the 
wise may be unable to persuade the unwise. "What is more 
likely to happen is that an unwise man, appealing to the 
natural right of wisdom and catering to the lowest desires 
of the many, will persuade the multitude of his right; the 
prospects for tyranny are brighter than those for rule of 
the wise." Since we can apprehend that to try to realize 
the simply best regime directly may result in tyranny, we 
must, as a practical matter, temper the absolute right of 
the wise to rule with a requirement for consent.
^^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 138-40. Strauss 
refers here to Nicomachean Ethics 5.7.1135a5, and to several 
passages from Politics, including 2.6.1265al8-19, 4.1.1288bl0 
ff., 4.11.1295a25-30, and 7.12.1331bl8-23.
^^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 140-41. Strauss 
refers to Politics 2.2.1261a38-b3 and 2.9.1270b8-27, among other 
passages.
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As a practical matter, the solution to the problem of 
the best regime is the establishment of a mixed regime. A 
wise legislator would draft a legal code to which the 
citizenry would consent freely. The code should be altered
as little as possible; its implementation should be
entrusted to wise legislators who will administer it in the 
spirit in which it was drafted. The classics held that such 
a government could best be entrusted to a landed
aristocracy, made up of "gentlemen." The gentleman, while
not a wise man or a philosopher, partakes of nobility and 
detachment from the vulgar to a sufficient extent that he 
can be trusted to be a wise administrator. One form of such 
a government would be a mixed regime consisting of 
democratic, aristocratic, and democratic components, with 
the aristocratic part in the central position. "The mixed 
regime is, in fact— and it is meant to be— an aristocracy 
which is strengthened and protected by the admixture of 
monarchic and democratic institutions.
Aristotelian Natural Right 
Strauss next distinguishes three versions of natural 
right: the Socratic-Platonic, the Aristotelian, and the 
T h o m i s t i c . ^ 3  According to Strauss, Aristotelian natural 
right is distinguished by its respect for the particular as
^^strauss. Natural Right and Historv. 141-42. Strauss 
refers to Politics 2.6.1265b33-1266a6, among other passages.
^^Strauss, Natural Right and Historv. 146.
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opposed to the general or the universal. This distinction 
is relevant to Strauss's attitude toward Spinoza, toward 
Hobbes, and toward the contemporary state.
Aristotelian natural right lacks the emphasis on the
divergence between the requirements of philosophy and
politics found in the Platonic-Socratic version. According
to Strauss, Aristotle in his treatment of justice never
diverts his attention from the concrete manifestations of
the just and the unjust as they occur in public life.
A right which necessarily transcends political society, 
he [Aristotle] gives us to understand, cannot be the 
right natural to man, who is by nature a political 
animal. . . . Plato eventually defines natural right 
with direct reference to the fact that the only life 
which is simply just is the life of the philosopher. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, treats each of the various 
levels of beings, and hence especially every level of 
human life, on its own terms. When he discusses 
justice, he discusses justice as everyone knows it and 
as it is understood in political life, and he refuses to 
be drawn into the dialectical whirlpool that carries us 
far beyond justice in the ordinary sense of the term 
toward the philosophic life.
Justice as it is understood in political life is not
equivalent to fully developed philosophy, but it retains its
validity nonetheless. In an important sense, natural right
is not the exclusive property of philosophy, but is part of
political right, in that political life represents the full
development or completion of natural right. While we may
speak of relations of justice between complete strangers,
"only among fellow-citizens do the relations which are the
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subject matter of right or justice reach their greatest 
density and, indeed, their full growth.
A second aspect of the "particularism" of Aristotelian 
natural right, which distinguishes the Platonic-Socratic as 
well as the Aristotelian doctrine from the Thomistic, is its 
insistence on the mutability of natural right. Strauss 
interprets this to mean that for Aristotle natural right 
manifests itself in concrete decisions in which the faculty 
of phronesis is exhibited, not in abstract principles.
General principles may be derived from all such concrete 
decisions, but for Aristotle all such general principles are 
corrigible. Another way of putting it would be that general 
principles are valid only ceteris paribus. Principles such 
as those of commutative and distributive justice are 
posterior to the pursuit of the common good, the nature of 
which is such that it cannot be expressed in terms of a 
priori principles. According to Strauss, Plato and 
Aristotle both hold that "there is a universally valid 
hierarchy of ends, but there are no universally valid rules 
of action.
Strauss on Spinoza 
Natural Right and Historv represents a concise 
statement of a political teaching whose origin may be traced
l^ibid., 156-57. 
ISibid., 157-63.
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back to Strauss's first scholarly undertaking, a study of 
Spinoza which he completed before he left Germany. Strauss 
understood Spinoza's thought within the context of the 
recurring "Jewish problem" which had plagued European 
politics through the centuries. The problem of finding a 
religious and political settlement that would provide a 
secure existence for European Jewry manifested itself in 
Spinoza's day, just as it would almost three centuries 
later, when the young Strauss would confront the political 
upheavals of Germany during the nineteen-twenties. Strauss 
detected an "Epicurean motive" in Spinoza's thinking, an 
effort directed toward establishing social calm and 
political comity. An important element of such an 
accommodation would be an understanding of some kind between 
Christians and Jews.
In his philosophy, Spinoza conceives of God simply as 
the totality of everything that exists in the universe. He 
presented this doctrine as part of a posture in which he 
feigned a sympathetic attitude toward Christianity, urging 
Christians to purge their faith of outmoded Jewish relics. 
Strauss argued that Spinoza was simply accommodating the 
prejudices of predominantly Christian Dutch society; 
actually, he was a thoroughgoing skeptic with respect to
^®See Gerhard KrUger, review of Die Reliaionskritik Spinozas 
als Grundlage seiner Bibelwissenschaft (German title of Spinoza's 
Critique of Religion), by Leo Strauss, in Deutsche 
Literaturzeitunq 51 (20 December 1931): 2408.
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religion, and his doctrines could be turned against anv 
orthodoxy. Spinoza was trying to reconcile both 
Christianity and Judaism to the modern project, providing a 
doctrine to which both Christians and Jews could assimilate 
themselves. However, in doing so he had sacrificed 
everything essential to both faiths, argued Strauss. In 
practice, the criticism of religious orthodoxy was 
demoralizing and inimical to societal excellence. Strauss 
viewed Spinoza's philosophy as another instance of the 
modern reductionistic tendency directed against those 
particularistic beliefs and practices by which individuals 
and societies orient themselves.
Spinoza's doctrines did not hold Strauss's attention 
for long. Despite differences between the two, he regarded 
Spinoza's efforts essentially as derivative from those of 
Hobbes. In the history of the break between classic and 
modern natural right, the thought of the English philosopher 
was the "main event."
Strauss on Hobbes 
Originally, Strauss identified Hobbes as the initiator 
of the break between the classic and modern conceptions of 
natural right. Later, he came to view Machiavelli as the 
founder of the modern, but the example of Hobbes remained
^^Strauss, Preface to Spinoza's Critique of Religion. 15-21; 
see also W. T. Jones, Hobbes to Hume, vol. 3 of A Historv of 
Western Philosophv. 2d ed. (New York; 1969), 196-202.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
74
central to his thought. Strauss's most extensive statement 
on Hobbes is found in the monograph The Political Philosophv 
of Hobbes.
For Strauss, the crucial feature of Hobbes's political 
philosophy, that which distinguished it from classic natural 
right, was its inversion of the proper relationship between 
right and law. "For Hobbes obviously starts, not, as the 
great tradition did, from natural 'law', i.e. from an 
objective order, but from natural 'right', i.e. from an 
absolutely justified subjective claim which, far from being 
dependent on any previous law, order, or obligation, is 
itself the origin of all law, order, or obligation. . . .
For, by starting from 'right' and thus denying the primacy 
of 'law' (or, what amounts fundamentally to the same, of 
'virtue'), Hobbes makes a stand against the idealistic 
tradition." Hobbes's "natural right" occupies an 
intermediate position between the classic understanding of 
right and a purely natural principle; it lacks the character
^®Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes, trans. Elsa 
M. Sinclair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press, 
1936; reprinted, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952). 
Strauss updated and corrected his account of Hobbes in a section 
of chapter 5 of Natural Right and Historv (166-202), and in a 
review of Politique et philosophie chez Thomas Hobbes by M. 
Raymond Polin which appeared in the French journal Critique (10 
[1954]: 338-62); the English version (trans. Mme. Simone Midan) 
appeared in Strauss's volume What Is Political Philosophv? and 
Other Studies (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1959) under the 
title "On the Basis of Hobbes's Political Philosophy" (170-196).
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of a natural "law," but at least it remains a "juridical 
conception.
In Strauss's presentation, Hobbes begins his political 
philosophy with two "postulates of human nature”: natural 
appetite on the one hand, and reason on the other. Appetite 
is rooted in man's animal nature; insofar as he is an 
appetitive creature, man does not differ from the beasts. 
Hobbes distinguishes man from the other animals with his 
second postulate, that of reason; reason confers upon man 
powers that the other creatures lack. However, unlike the 
classics, Hobbes places reason in a position subordinate to 
appetite. "Human appetite is thus not in itself different 
from animal appetite, but only by the fact that in the case 
of man appetite has reason at its service."^0
Acting in the service of appetite, reason suggests that 
self-preservation, the preservation of life, is a primary 
good. It does not represent a summum bonum in the sense 
that it provides satisfaction or repose to the spirit, but 
it is at least the prerequisite for the satisfaction of all 
other wants. Hobbes speaks more often of "avoiding death" 
than of "preserving life"; the goodness of self-preservation 
occurs to the reasoning capacity only, but the aversion to 
death receives reinforcement from the passions. Men fear 
death more passionately than they desire life. Furthermore,
-'Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes, viii-ix. 
20ibid., 8-9.
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it is not the mere fact of death that constitutes the summum 
malum, but an agonizing death, especially a violent death at 
the hands of other men, that men find truly fearsome. The 
fear of violent death is irrational and emotional by nature, 
but at least it is rational in its effects. Hobbes suggests.
In fact, he proposes to make this fear the basis of the 
political. He goes so far as to deny the moral value of any 
political impulse that does not spring from the fear of 
violent death.
Man requires companions to ward off those who would put 
him to death violently. Such companions could be obtained 
by force or by agreement. The former approach constitutes 
despotism, and in a sense it is the more natural of the two; 
the superior man seizes his opponents and places them in his 
service rather than killing them. Hobbes holds non-despotic 
rule to be unnatural. It occurs only when two or more men 
reach an agreement to perform a mutual abnegation; they 
recognize the threat of death, rather than each other, as 
the true enemy.
The fear of violent death thus provides the impetus for 
the remainder of Hobbes's political philosophy. It enables 
him to distinguish between justice and injustice, preventing 
his philosophy from becoming wholly naturalistic. To act 
out of fear of violent death is just; to act from other
21ibid., 15-18. 
22ibid., 21-22.
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motives, such as fear of punishment or fear of loss of 
reputation, is unjust. These latter motives constitute 
"vanity," while the motivation provided by fear of death is 
true "modesty." This contrast of vanity and modesty may be 
seen as a secularized version of the contrast of pride and 
humility in Christian thought. Without the distinction 
between vanity and modesty, Hobbes would be left with no 
conception of justice.
For Strauss, Hobbes's political philosophy represents a 
lowering of the sights with respect to the classic 
conception of natural right. Not reason but impassioned 
fear of violent death is the basis of the political.
Wariness of one's fellows, not sociability, is natural for 
humans. The non-despotic state is not natural but 
artificial. A many-faceted reductionistic tendency 
manifests itself. Bourgeois morals drive out aristocratic 
virtue; religion is to be subordinated to the state; history 
threatens the primacy of philosophy; the study of politics 
becomes a naturalistic science of the passions.
A Political Science of the Passions
Strauss has gained a reputation for emphasizing the 
timeless significance of a philosopher's thought, to the 
neglect of considerations of social and historical context.
In The Political Philosophv of Hobbes he deviated from this
23jbid., 23-28.
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tendency; his intent was historical and biographical. He 
sought to downplay the influence of Galilean natural science 
on Hobbes's political philosophy. He identified two 
tendencies in Hobbes's thinking, the first the development 
of a new moral attitude which is present from the beginning 
of his career, and the second a growing attraction to the 
new physics and mathematics accompanied by an explicit 
rejection of the philosophical tradition. However, the two 
tendencies were independent of each other, and they 
overlapped; the break with tradition was incomplete even 
when Hobbes first encountered Euclidean geometry at about 
age forty. "But the new moral attitude is one thing, and 
the consciousness of its novelty and the rebellion against 
tradition, which is the concomitant of that consciousness,
is another."24
Once Hobbes's career as a political philosopher and 
controversialist was underway, his break with Aristotle was 
nearly complete, but nevertheless he held back from 
condemning Aristotle's Rhetoric. Strauss detects the 
influence of the Rhetoric in Hobbes's anthropology as 
expressed in such passages as chapter 10 of Leviathan.
Whatever the differences between Aristotle and Hobbes might 
be (concerning the priority of reason as opposed to passion, 
or law as opposed to right, for instance), the account of 
human passions in the Rhetoric corresponds to Hobbes's
24Ibid., xi-xii, 136.
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reductionistic tendency to some extent, since Aristotle 
seems to account for all the passions in terms of pain and 
pleasure. Anger, for instance, is described by Aristotle as 
a pain caused by a slight to an individual or his friends; 
pity is a pain attending the suffering of an evil by someone 
who does not deserve it. "It would be difficult to find 
another classical work whose importance for Hobbes's 
political philosophy can be compared with that of the 
Rhetoric." claimed Strauss; "the use and appreciation of 
Aristotle's Rhetoric which may be traced in Hobbes's mature 
period are the last remnants of the Aristotelianism of his 
youth."25
Hobbes's political science consists of the 
classification and criticism of the passions, especially 
that of vanity, and of the opinions that these passions 
generate. One thing that Hobbes does have in common with 
the classics is that he draws a clear distinction between 
reality and appearance, or between knowledge and opinion; 
fear is the foundation of political reality, vanity of 
misguided opinion ("For vanity is the force which makes men 
blind, fear is the force which makes men see"). Hobbes 
seeks to criticize the prevalent but incorrect political 
opinions that spring from vain passion; Strauss describes 
his theory as an "exact and paradoxical political
25%bid., 30-43. See also Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans. Lane 
Cooper (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1932), esp. 2.2-11.
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philosophy" which aims at purging the polity of all vestiges 
of pre-scientific morality. However, to the extent that 
this exact, scientific philosophy partakes of reason, its 
source is fear, and not the reasoned speech that Strauss
cites as the source of the political in the tradition of
classic natural right. For Hobbes, the attempt to ground the 
political in the capacity for speech partakes of vanity.
Hobbes's political science differs from the classics in 
its insistence on applicabilitv. He rejects the classical 
insight that the realization of the best regime is a matter 
of chance. Strauss remarks that while Hobbes may seek to
remove all vestiges of vain passion, in the end he insists
that the standard arrived at by reason be in accord with the 
passions. Hobbes insists on applicability in all cases, 
even when the circumstances for the realization of political 
excellence are most unfavorable. To be applicable in such 
extreme cases, political science must come to imitate a 
technical procedure. The polity is to be understood as an 
artificial body, and the political scientist's function is 
akin to that of a mechanic who attends to keeping a machine 
running. If the machine is kept in proper working order, it 
should not run out of control, no matter how much friction 
is generated by the violent passions actualized within it. 
Hobbesian political science can have no higher goal than
2®Strauss, Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 130, 136-39, 142- 
45; see also Natural Right and Historv, 129-30.
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keeping the political mechanism under control. "The aim of 
the state is for him as a matter of course peace, i.e., 
peace at any price." Political science understood as such a 
technical undertaking cannot, of course, have anything to 
say about virtue and vice, rightness and w r o n g n e s s . 27
Strauss concluded that Hobbes's contribution amounted 
to a lowering of the standards of political philosophy to 
such an extent that its application could only bring 
political disintegration. By placing right prior to law and 
reward prior to obligation, modern natural right threatens 
to submerge political order in a cacophony of competing 
claims. If all differences in reasonableness among men are 
denied, it becomes impossible to solve the problem of 
sovereignty by proposing that the rational ought to rule the 
irrational. The renunciation of the possibility that human 
nature might provide a rational standard implies the 
abolition of the distinction between the good and the 
necessary; the necessary becomes the only standard.28
Historv versus Philosophy 
The renunciation of a rational standard in political 
science suggests a reduced role for philosophy relative to 
history in the study of politics. Hobbes's attitude, as 
Strauss interprets it, is that "philosophy lays down
27gtrauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 150-55. 
28%bid., 157-61, 165-70.
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precepts for the right behavior of men. But precepts are 
not nearly so effective as examples." Hobbes, for instance, 
preferred to teach political prudence and the dangers of 
democracy by means of a translation of Thucydides' history 
rather than a philosophical tract. Such a preference 
reveals that Hobbes took his bearings from how man actuallv 
lives rather than how he ought to live. Strauss held that 
the preference for history implied a disparagement of 
reason. "As Hobbes doubts the effectiveness of precept 
altogether— does he not assert the impotence of reason with 
reference to all men, that is, as a principle?— must we not 
conclude that the impotence of reason was established for 
him even before he engaged in natural science?"^^
Strauss invoked Aristotle's authority to argue that the 
shift from philosophy to history, or at least from 
metaphysics to politics, reflected a denial of the existence 
of an order transcending man, suggesting instead that man is 
the highest being in the universe. Man and not an eternal 
order became the central theme. The philosophical ideal of 
a life devoted to contemplation and understanding was to be 
replaced by what Strauss called "a more popular ideal.
Hobbes's thinking eventually led him back from history 
to philosophy, but he returned not to the philosophical 
tradition but to his own political philosophy, which he held
29jbid., 79-81. 
30jbid., 90-91.
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to be both more valid and in particular more applicable than 
that of Aristotle. Strauss describes Hobbes's procedure as 
the replacement of a morality of obedience with a morality 
of prudence— which, of course, raises the question whether 
it has any truly moral content. Hobbes's teaching is 
strictly instrumentalist; it is concerned with finding an 
effective means to a desired end. Whether there ought to be 
any constraints on the utilization of just any means to a 
desired end is a neglected question. "Hobbes lets us see 
that even if there were an eternal order, he would take into 
consideration only the actual behavior of men, and that his 
whole interest is centered on man, on application, on the 
'use of means
Strauss contends that the subiect of Hobbes's political 
philosophy is history. A comparison with Aristotle is 
instructive. For Aristotle the development of a polity has 
a rational end; the study of the political has the notion of 
a stable, perfect order as its connective thread. The 
perfect order provides an objective standard for judging the 
political. For Hobbes, on the other hand, "the subject of 
at least the fundamental part, and precisely of that 
fundamental part, of his political philosophy, is an 
history, a genesis, and not an order which is static and 
perfect." The state of nature, or that which develops from 
it, is not to be understood by a standard found outside of
31lbid., 98-102.
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it; all we need do is understand fully the state of nature 
itself. History provides its own standard, instead of being 
judged by a standard set up beforehand. Since history 
"tests itself," the philosopher is relieved of the task of 
judging it.^^
Religion Subordinated to the State 
Strauss concluded that Hobbes's preference for history 
over philosophy would commit him to a disparagement of the 
idea of an eternal order; this disparagement was made 
manifest by the subordination of religion implied by the 
Hobbesian doctrine of sovereignty. The prominence given to 
the matter of sovereignty places civil authority on a 
collision course with religious commitment in Hobbes's 
thought. One of the best-known features of his theory is 
his insistence on the absolute nature of sovereign 
authority. Out of mutual fear, men are persuaded to 
substitute a limited, avoidable danger— that of state 
authority— for an immeasurable, unknowable danger. A high 
price is paid for this concession to absolutism, however; 
the possibility of any external standard by which to judge 
the legitimacy of authority is removed. Strauss contended 
that this feature made it impossible for Hobbes's political 
science to distinguish between despotism or tyranny and 
virtuous rule (an incapacity shared by contemporary
32ibid., 104-06.
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behavioristic political science, Strauss would add).
Strauss drew the fateful conclusion that Hobbes's "final 
theory is that every effective rule is eo ipso 
legitimate.
In order that sovereign authority might be effective, 
Hobbes's theory stresses that no division of authority can 
be tolerated; otherwise, civil disobedience and disorder 
would be legitimated. As has been shown from the discussion 
of the English Civil War above, Hobbes regarded the 
religious sphere, especially the Christian tendency to 
distinguish between temporal and ecclesiastical power, as 
harboring the potential for political division and sedition. 
In a brief section on Hobbes within his study of Spinoza, 
Strauss emphasized the tension between religion and the 
Hobbesian conception of the state; "Obedience to the 
established power is never sin. Rather, rebellion against 
established authority is sin." To Hobbes, Christianity 
inverted the proper relation between religion and the state. 
To Strauss, this meant that all devotion or commitment 
without a specifically political origin, especially the 
religious impulse, would tend to be subordinated in a 
Hobbesian regime. "Hobbes's is the first doctrine that 
necessarily and unmistakably peints to a thoroughly
33ibid., 67-68.
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•enlightened,' i.e., a-religious or atheistic society as the 
solution of the social or political problem.
Hobbes's doctrine requires political supervision of the 
religious; the sovereign dictates the interpretation of holy 
scripture and religious dogma. Political authority must 
keep religion under control; otherwise, the fear and promise 
of the eternal might subvert the effectiveness of the fear 
of the violent death. "Hobbes's personal attitude to 
positive religion was at all times the same; religion must 
serve the State and is to be esteemed or despised according 
to the services or disservices rendered to the state,"
Strauss remarked. He detected reflections of this Hobbesian 
attitude in the modern state's treatment of r e l i g i o n . ^5
Bourgeois over Aristocratic Morals 
The disparagement of religion had its counterpart in 
the vulgarization of manners and morals in the Hobbesian 
polity. Keith Thomas has argued that over the course of his 
career Hobbes displayed an attraction for an aristocratic 
ideal, in his personal life if not in his political theory; 
he lived a detached, solitary existence devoted to 
contemplation.^® Whether or not this was the case, Strauss 
argues that at the level of political philosophy we see in
^^strauss, Spinoza's Critique of Religion. 95-96; Natural 
Right and Historv. 198.
^®Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 74.
3®Thomas, "The Social Origins of Hobbes's Political Thought."
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Hobbes a movement from an aristocratic to a bourgeois ethic. 
He came to realize that his most fundamental premises could 
not provide a foundation for an aristocratic politics; the 
polity was to be based on fear, not honor or virtue. 
"Hobbes's criticism of aristocratic virtue thus does not 
mean the replacement of honour by prudence. It is rather 
justice and charity which take the place occupied before by 
honour. These virtues, which in Hobbes's view, are the only 
moral virtues, have, however, their ultimate foundation in 
fear of violent death." It would seem that to so 
distinguish between justice or charity and prudence might be 
to draw a distinction without a difference. As has been 
noted above, Hobbes's theory does not rise above the level 
of utilitarianism or instrumentalism, raising the guestion 
whether it has any authentic moral content. Whether 
Hobbes's politics is a moral theory or a mere counsel of 
prudence, its motive force comes from the fear of violent 
death. "Precisely, this attempt to give a foundation to 
utilitarian morals by having recourse to a force which 
imperatively compels prudence, is the peculiarity of 
Hobbes's political philosophy.
The description of England as a "nation of shopkeepers" 
is recalled by Strauss's account of the character of the 
society that Hobbes's philosophy would dictate. Strauss 
refers to Rudiments in attributing to Hobbes the opinion
^^Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 116.
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that material goods and the means to their acquisition are 
the only real goods; "Along with peace at home and abroad, 
freedom for individual enrichment is the most important aim 
of corporate life.” Strauss anticipates Thomas's judgement 
about Hobbes's stance on the English Civil War; he was not 
an opponent of the English middle classes, but he argues 
that they were acting against their own best interests by 
opposing sovereign authority.
Strauss's description of Hobbes's account of man's
place in the universe anticipates his judgement that the
impulse to dominate nature is characteristic of modernity.
In contrast to Aristotle's thesis of the benevolence of
nature, Hobbes appears to posit something resembling the
scarcity hypothesis of modern economics. Man "experiences
only force, and not kindness" from nature.
Constantly aware of the desperate seriousness of his 
situation, it will not occur to him to be proud of his 
freedom, and, therefore, he will, above all, be on his 
guard against taking that freedom as the object of his 
speculations, against contemplating himself in his 
freedom and taking pleasure in it. . . . Not grateful 
contemplation of nature, and still less vain 
contemplation of man, is fitting to man's situation, but 
the utilization and cultivation of nature. For man can 
assert himself only by increasing and improving nature's 
deceptive and niggardly gifts by his labour and 
exertions; . . . Because Hobbes's point of departure is 
that man is at the mercy of nature, he distrusts good 
fortune and the fortunate, distrusts their gratitude and 
their gaiety, distrusts, in particular, in spite of all 
personal affection, the aristocracy, whose virtues are 
only 'virtues of nature'.
3®Strauss, Political Philosophv of Hobbes. 118-19. See 
also Chapter 2, 29-30 above.
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Thus Hobbes is not merely the partisan of the new money­
making classes; he expresses the spirit of a society in 
which enrichment would be the motivation not of just a 
single class but of everyone. Aristocratic virtue cannot 
provide the foundation for a polity; the true foundation 
will not be revealed until political philosophy lowers its 
sights. Furthermore, the affluence that a bourgeois society 
may achieve should not deceive us; the society may appear to 
be flourishing on the material level, but the society of 
which this great economic machine is a part is based on 
fear. "In the movement from the principle of honour to the 
principle of fear, Hobbes's political philosophy comes into 
being.
Strauss on Machiavelli 
Strauss turned his attention from Spinoza to Hobbes and 
later to Machiavelli; by the time of the appearance of the 
American edition of The Political Philosophy of Hobbes.
Strauss had changed his opinion about the origin of the 
break between classic and modern natural right. "Hobbes 
appeared to me as the originator of modern political 
philosophy. This was an error; not Hobbes, but Machiavelli, 
deserves this honor." He concluded that Machiavelli's
^^Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. 125-28.
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reserve, in contrast to the audacity of Hobbes, had led him 
to underestimate the radicalism of the Florentine thinker.^0 
Strauss condemned Machiavelli on the same grounds that 
he denounced Hobbes. Both suggested that a desirable end 
justifies any means; neither distinguished between how men 
actuallv live and how they ought to live. In the Prince. 
Machiavelli deliberately adopted a posture of indifference 
to the distinction between king and tyrant. "If it is true 
that only an evil man will stoop to teach maxims of public 
and private gangsterism, then we are forced to say that 
Machiavelli was an evil man," declared Strauss in his 
Thoughts on Machiavelli.^^
The parallels that Strauss detected between the 
theories of Machiavelli and Hobbes led him to view the 
thought of the former as an intimation of the latter. Both 
thinkers maintained an unsentimental view of man as a 
creature of the passions; a ruthless political authority was 
required to keep men's passions from getting the better of 
them. Machiavelli did not even resort to the device of a 
putative social covenant among men to justify the state; he 
asserted simply that political morality was built on a
^^Strauss, The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. Preface to 
the American Edition, xv-xvi.
4igtrauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Glencoe, 111.: Free 
Press, 1958), 9; see also On Tvranny. revised and enlarged ed. 
(Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, Agora Editions, 1963; reprint, 
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, Cornell Paperbacks, 
Agora Paperback Editions, 1968), 22-23.
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foundation of immorality or at least amorality. Strauss's 
presentation of this justification of political authority 
sounds distinctly Hobbesian.
Necessity makes men not only virtuous but good as 
well. Men in general have no natural inclination toward 
goodness. Therefore they can be made good and kept good 
only by necessity. Such necessity is brought upon men 
originally by non-human nature, by the original terror.
But the quasi-original goodness is inseparable from 
defenselessness and want. Men are therefore compelled 
to form societies in order to live in peace and 
security. The security afforded by society would remove 
the necessity to be good if the primary necessity to be 
good were not replaced by a necessity to be good which 
stems from laws, i.e., from punishment or threat of 
punishment— by a necessity originating in men.
We might note the intimation of a Hobbesian, "positivist"
conception of law in the equation of law with punishment.
Order is to be kept through the exercise of a civil
authority who exercises a kind of "virtue" unrestricted by
considerations of law or morality. "Immoral modes" would be
resorted to only in "extraordinary cases"; Strauss remarks
that "Machiavelli's view of the relation between moral
virtue and the common good . . . abolishes the essential
difference between civil societies and bands of robbers,
since robbers too use ordinary modes among themselves
whenever p o s s i b l e .
Machiavelli insinuated that Christianity left men with
too much of a guilty conscience to exercise the necessary
political ruthlessness. Strauss contended that in this
respect his intention was identical to that of Hobbes;
^Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli. 249, 259.
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religion had to be subordinated to the political realm. "We 
no longer understand that in spite of great disagreements 
among those thinkers, they were united by the fact that they 
all fought one and the same power— the kingdom of darkness, 
as Hobbes called it; that fight was more important to them 
than any merely political issue." Both thinkers had to be 
circumspect, since they were confronted with pious Christian 
opinion. Machiavelli appealed to a prejudice in favor of 
classical antiquity to gain a hearing. He claimed to favor 
a revival of classical virtue, thereby disparaging 
Christianity indirectly. His explicit statements on 
Christianity were inconsistent, so that his teaching can be 
interpreted plausibly as consistent with the established 
religion. Hobbes took a different approach in the second 
half of Leviathan, offering an explicit apology for the 
consistency of his doctrine with religious orthodoxy.
Strauss contended that because of the politically awkward 
situation in which each thinker found himself, neither could 
state his true views explicitly. He argued, for instance, 
that Machiavelli often contradicted himself intentionally, 
so that complicated interpretive rules are needed to 
ascertain his genuine views; furthermore, he would indicate 
his dismissal of a widely held view by refusing to mention 
it. Strauss held that both Hobbes and Machiavelli were 
opponents of religion, but that theirs were esoteric
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teachings whose true meanings could be ascertained only by 
"reading between the lines.
Although he finally felt compelled to attribute the 
origin of modern political philosophy to Machiavelli rather 
than to Hobbes, Strauss continued to view the British 
philosopher as the paradigmatic example of the break with 
classic natural right. Machiavelli had only initiated that 
which Hobbes would bring to systematic fruition. "It was 
Machiavelli, that greater Columbus, who had discovered the 
continent on which Hobbes could erect his structure.
Strauss on Xenophon 
After completing his study of Hobbes, Strauss directed 
his attention away from modernity and toward an ancient 
Greek text. He undertook a critical explication of Hiero or 
Tvrannicus by Xenophon, who is best known for having 
supplemented Plato's account of the life of Socrates.
Strauss believed that in the Hiero he had found a clue to 
the nature of the type of tyranny that threatened to engulf 
modernity. Xenophon provides an intimation of a beneficent 
form of tyranny which struck Strauss as capturing perfectly 
a kind of "neo-Hobbesianism" into which contemporary 
political practice threatened to lapse. He published his
43ibid., 231. Strauss's fullest statement on the necessity 
of esoteric interpretations is to be found in the title essay of 
Persecution and the Art of Writing (Glencoe, 111.: Free Press, 
1952), 22-37.
44gtrauss, Natural Right and History. 177.
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reflections on the Hiero in an essay entitled "On Tyranny" 
which appeared in a volume bearing the same title, along 
with a new translation of the Hiero commissioned for the 
occasion. The revised and enlarged edition of this volume 
contained Alexandre Kojéve's response to Strauss's original 
reflections in an essay entitled "Tyranny and Wisdom," along 
with a rejoinder by Strauss entitled "Restatement on 
Xenophon's Hiero."
The Hiero takes the form of a dialogue between the 
title character, a tyrant of antiquity, and Simonides, a 
poet reputed to be a wise man, who has come to visit him. 
Strauss remarks that "the intention of the Hiero is nowhere 
stated by the author." The dialogue contains little 
narration other than the phrases "Simonides said" or "Hiero 
said" at the appropriate places; we do not know whether 
either of the characters speaks for the author. Strauss 
believes that this ambiguity is a deliberate tactic on the 
part of Xenophon; "The dialogue that deserves the name 
communicates the thought of the author in an indirect or 
oblique way," he remarks. "Society will always try to 
tyrannize thought."̂ *5
Commenting on the dramatic action of the dialogue,
Strauss states that the conversation "is likely to take 
place in an atmosphere of limited straightforwardness." The 
tyrant is especially likely to have an opinion of the wise
45gtrauss, On Tvrannv. 26-29.
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man that partakes of the vulgar. He fears that the wise man 
seeks to subvert his tyrannical rule; he confuses wisdom 
with the ability to become a tyrant. Although Simonides 
would not appear to be able to threaten Hiero's rule, he 
faces the problem of gaining the tyrant's confidence. He 
must adopt the "hardboiled" posture of the "real man" in 
order to convince Hiero that he is unscrupulous enough to be 
competent to advise a tyrant. He appears to win Hiero's 
trust gradually over the course of the dialogue.
At first glance, the action of the dialogue appears 
simple enough; it can be divided roughly into two parts. In 
the first part (chapters 1-7) Hiero holds forth on the 
unhappiness of the tyrant's life. In the second part 
(chapters 8-11) Simonides suggests measures that can be 
taken so that the tyrant can be the happiest of men. Thus 
the dialogue would appear to be a relatively straightforward 
endorsement of beneficent tyranny. We should not hasten to 
make a summary judgement on this matter, however.
In chapter 1, Simonides induces Hiero to admit some 
unpleasant facts about his life as a tyrant. The poet 
suggests that the tyrant is, in a sense, wiser than he is, 
since the tyrant is in a position to evaluate the merits and 
demerits of the tyrannical life compared with that of the 
private man. Hiero protests that tyrants have fewer
46lbid., 40-42, 53-57. 
47ibid., 28-9.
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pleasures and more pains than private men. They go on to 
discuss several species of physical pleasure, including 
visual spectacles, food, the pleasures of marriage, and 
finally homosexual pleasure. Hiero contends that the tyrant 
is in an inferior position to the private man with respect 
to all these, especially the last. "To the private man it 
is immediately a sign that the beloved grants favors from 
love when he renders some service, because the private man 
knows his beloved serves under no compulsion. But it is 
never possible for the tyrant to trust that he is loved." 
Hiero has won only a rhetorical victory here; he defeats 
Simonides' suggestion that the tyrant's life is superior in 
pleasures, but at the price of being forced to reveal his
own d e s p a i r . ^8
At the outset of chapter 2, Simonides adopts an 
unsentimental pose in response to Hiero's remarks. 
Inferiority in the enjoyment of physical pleasures would 
seem to him to be a trivial matter, since the tyrant's life 
is superior in the decisive sense that he is "most capable 
of harming your private enemies and benefiting your 
friends." Hiero responds that this is an appearance that 
may seem obvious to the multitude. "Now tyranny displays 
openly, evident for all to see, the possessions which are 
held to be of much value. But it keeps what is harsh hidden
Xenophon, Hiero or Tvrannicus. trans. Marvin Kendrick, in 
Strauss, On Tvrannv. 1-6.
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in the tyrants' souls, where human happiness and unhappiness 
lie concealed." From this point until the end of chapter 6, 
Simonides remains almost completely silent while Hiero 
describes the unhappiness of the tyrant's life in matters 
transcending physical pleasure.
For the tyrant, all the lands he surveys are hostile 
territory, even his own city, Hiero declaims; even at home, 
the tyrant is surrounded by jealous rivals. The tyrant 
cannot even brag about his nation's martial conquests as the 
private man can; he must try to minimize these, lest they 
seem unjust. Furthermore, the tyrant is hated by those who 
ought to be inclined by nature to love him, including 
children, wives, brothers, and comrades. Everyone knows 
that tyrants have themselves killed these, and that tyrants 
have also perished at the hands of same.®°
The tyrant cannot even trust his own food and drink, 
since rivals may attempt to tamper with them; the tyrant 
requires a servant to sample his food and drink before he 
himself does. Cities have been known to honor those who 
kill the tyrant. The tyrant's needs and desires are much 
harder to satisfy than those of the private man, since they 
are of such a large scale; the tyrant's greatest expense of
49ibid., 6.
SOibid., 6-9.
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all is that of guarding his own life, which forces him to 
resort to plunder.
The tyrant must fear the brave, the wise, and the just, 
who may seek to overthrow tyrannical rule; he can trust only 
the unjust, the incontinent, and the slavish. One of his 
few pleasures is found in the arming of mercenaries, who are 
to terrorize the citizens of the tyrant's own city. The 
tyrant has slaves instead of friends; he is deprived of 
pleasant intimacy. The tyrant cannot even allow himself a 
pleasant night's sleep, lest his enemies set upon him in the 
night. Fear spoils all the tyrant's pleasures; he cannot 
even trust his own guards.
Simonides takes the conversational lead at the outset 
of chapter 7. He suggests that the tyrant bears all the 
burdens that he does for the sake of honor. "Accordingly, 
it seems to me that you probably endure all these things you 
bear in the tyranny because you are honored beyond all other 
human beings." Hiero objects that honor, like erotic love, 
is not genuine unless given freely. Why not give up 
tyranny, then? But merely to give up tyranny would not 
suffice to make amends for all the crimes committed by the 
tyrant. "Rather, if it profits any other man, Simonides, to
Sljbid., 9-10. 
52ibid., 11-13.
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hang himself, know . . . that I myself find this most 
profits the tyrant."53
Strauss contends that the transition from chapter 7 to 
chapter 8 is the turning point of the dialogue. In a sense, 
Simonides has the tyrant in his power; conceivably, he could 
induce Hiero to commit suicide by agreeing with his 
despairing assessment at this point. However, he does not 
do so; he thereby shows that he has no ulterior motive, and 
this effects a change in Hiero's attitude. The remainder of 
the dialogue is taken up with Simonides's suggestions for 
measures that the tyrant could take to win the affection of 
his subjects. He should leave punishment to others, and 
should reserve the giving of rewards to himself.
Honorariums could be offered to the best farmer or merchant 
in the city, for example. "To sum it up, if it should 
become clear with respect to all matters that the man who 
introduces something beneficial will not go unrewarded, he 
would stimulate many to engage in reflecting on something 
good." Additionally, the tyrant could instruct the 
mercenaries to act as protectors of all the citizens, rather 
than terrorizing them. Finally, the tyrant should spend a 
portion of his private fortune on public works for the 
common good. "Augment the city, for you will attach power 
to yourself. Acquire allies for it. Consider the 
fatherland to be your estate, the citizens your comrades.
53jbid., 13-14.
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friends your own children, your sons the same as your life, 
and try to win victory by benefiting all these.
According to Strauss, the position of Xenophon cannot 
be identified with either Simonides or Hiero. Xenophon's 
Simonides presents suggestions for the improvement of a 
radically faulty order; that order remains faulty even after 
it is improved. Simonides discusses the pleasant effects of 
the tyrant's kind actions; in order to avoid giving offense, 
he pays no regard to how the tyrant came to power, or to his 
previous misdeeds. A mitigated tyranny is still a tyranny. 
Strauss notes that Simonides never refers to Hiero as a 
king. Hiero thus lacks a valid title; tyrannical rule, in 
opposition to kingship, lacks legitimacy.^5
Strauss interprets Xenophon as being in agreement with 
his own position regarding the philosophical justification 
for constitutional government. In theory, the absolute rule 
of the wise would be best; Xenophon acknowledges the weight 
of objections to the "blindness" of "merely" legal justice 
that places the letter of the law over its spirit. In 
practice, however, the establishment of the absolute rule of 
the wise is likely to partake of tyranny; as a practical 
matter, constitutional government, or "kingship," is best.
54gtrauss, On Tvrannv. 59-60; Xenophon, Hiero or Tvrannicus. 
in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 14-20.
^^Strauss, On Tvrannv. 60-65.
56ibid., 74-77.
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"Tyranny is defined in contradistinction to kingship: 
kingship is such rule as is exercised over willing subjects 
and is in accordance with the laws of the cities; tyranny is 
such rule as is exercised over unwilling subjects and 
accords, not with laws, but with the will of the ruler.” 
Tyranny could be improved so that the subjects willingly 
acquiesce in it, but it would still partake of tyranny in 
that it would remain lawless rule; the subjects might be 
treated like comrades instead of children, but they are not
free.57
The Koiéve-Strauss Exchange 
Alexandre Kojéve, a philosopher of Russian origin who 
spent most of his career in France, responded to Strauss's 
interpretation of the Hiero in his essay "Tyranny and 
Wisdom"; the ensuing exchange gave Strauss the opportunity 
to expound further on the relation between modern 
totalitarianism and the tyranny intimated by Xenophon.
Kojéve is best known for his interpretation of Hegel's 
Phenomenoloav of Spirit, especially with regard to chapter 
4, section A of that work, which deals with the so-called 
"master-slave dialectic." This interpretation revolves 
around the central concept of recognition; Kojéve contends 
that it is man's nature to seek recognition. Furthermore, 
Kojéve would argue that it is only through a dialectical
57ibid., 69-72.
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procedure in which representatives of different viewpoints 
seek recognition from each other, rather than an "Epicurean" 
intellectual isolation and detachment, that any degree of 
objectivity can be attained in either philosophy or 
statesmanship. This dialectical procedure often takes the 
form of a struggle in which a superior overcomes an inferior 
in a process akin to a master's subjugation of a slave; in 
the Hiero. Kojéve would interpret Simonides as the "master" 
and Hiero as the "slave." The concept of recognition 
provides the perspective from which Kojéve criticizes 
Strauss's interpretation of the H i e r o .^8
Kojéve remarks that the measures comprising the 
"beneficent tyranny" proposed by Simonides in the last three 
chapters of the Hiero have become an "almost banal reality" 
in the modern world; modern tyrants have already constructed 
this "utopia." However, Kojéve believes that a tyranny 
confined to one country could never fulfill completely the 
tyrant's lust for recognition. Total satisfaction could 
consist only in the construction of the "universal and 
homogeneous state," a worldwide regime of universal 
enlightenment and equality. "The fact is that the political 
man acting at the prompting of his desire for 'recognition'
5®Kojéve, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 148, 
162-73. Kojéve's full discussion of Hegel's Phenomenoloav of 
Spirit is to be found in Kojéve, Introduction to the Reading of 
Hegel: Lectures on the "Phenomenoloav of Spirit", assembled by 
Raymond Queneau, ed. Allan Bloom, trans. James H. Nichols, Jr. 
(Ithaca, N. Y.; Cornell University Press, 1969).
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(or for 'glory') will be fully 'satisfied' only when he is 
at the head of a State, not only universal but politically 
and socially homogeneous as well (taking account of 
irreducible physiological differences); of a State, that is, 
which is the end and the end product of the common labor of 
all and of each." Such a state, Kojéve claims, would 
represent "the realization of the supreme political ideal of 
mankind.
In Kojéve's view, it is not at all problematical for 
the philosopher to attempt to advise the tyrant. In fact, 
history reveals that philosophical ideals are often 
realized, "sooner or later" if not directly and immediately. 
For instance, Alexander the Great realized the ideal of 
universality in an empire; St. Paul realized it with the 
establishment of a church. Hegel would cite these as 
examples of "historical verification" of a philosophical 
impulse. The "universal and homogeneous state" would 
provide "historical verification" of the Christian ethic, 
albeit in secularized form. Kojéve appears satisfied that 
the establishment of such a state would represent the 
solution to the problem of the good regime.®®
In his response to Kojéve, Strauss upholds the ideal of 
wisdom or virtue, in opposition to recognition, as man's
5®Kojéve, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 146-
55.
®®Ibid., 180-88.
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natural end. In claiming to have synthesized classical and 
Biblical morality, Hegel and Kojéve actually have 
constructed a lax morality out of two moral codes which made 
very stringent demands. They would justify the doing of 
that which the self-respecting man would not do— the 
establishment of a tyranny. Strauss found it unsurprising 
that the Hegelian synthesis would have this result, 
because— and this is a crucial point— he regarded the 
Hegelian master-slave dialectic as nothing more than a 
sophisticated version of the reductionistic Hobbesian state- 
of-nature theory; instead of providing an external standard, 
it justifies whatever history produces. "Kojéve knows as 
well as anyone that Hegel's fundamental teaching regarding 
master and slave is based on Hobbes' doctrine of the state 
of nature.
Strauss concedes the need for intersubjective 
verification in philosophy in order to avoid sectarianism. 
However, he prefers the sect to a relativistic Republic of 
Letters in which all opinions are treated as equal, none are 
taken too seriously, and there is no conception of virtue or 
excellence other than a "middle-of-the-road" consensus.
Such a stance may have political as well as philosophical 
significance; the relativistic Republic of Letters may be 
identified with contemporary liberalism, while the
Glstrauss, "Restatement on Xenophon's Hiero," in On Tvrannv. 
203-05. See also The Political Philosophy of Hobbes. 57-58 and 
104-06, on the relation between Hobbes and Hegel.
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independence of mind associated with the outspoken sectarian 
may correspond to the self-image of contemporary 
conservatism. The lackluster consensus of the "least common 
denominator" is likely to be the result if the philosopher 
goes to the marketplace with the idea of participating too 
directly in efforts toward the best regime. "Indispensible 
philosophical politics" consists of persuading the city to 
tolerate philosophy, not in building the best regime 
directly; philosophy has been relatively successful at 
achieving the former task. The philosopher, however, "does 
not expect salvation or satisfaction from the establishment 
of the simply best social order.
Strauss believed that the attempt to actualize the 
universal and homogeneous state would be "possible only on 
the basis of unlimited technological progress with all its 
terrible hazards"; if technology should not progress 
sufficiently, the result would be permanent revolution and 
political chaos. Furthermore, he felt the Kojéve had "an 
unfounded belief in the eventually rational effect of 
movements instigated by the passions." In any case, he held 
that "men will have very good reasons for being dissatisfied 
with the universal and homogeneous state." On Kojéve's own 
principles, if man's humanity can be fulfilled only by 
striving for recognition, then in such a state onlv the 
chief of state would find it. The only truly humanizing
^^strauss, "Restatement," in On Tvrannv. 207-14.
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thing left for men to do would be to attempt a political 
assassination or coup d'etat. If we assume that the 
unlimited development of technology represents the end of 
History, then in the universal and homogeneous state all 
striving is superfluous and man's humanity is lost. If, on 
the other hand, dissatisfaction remains, the only remedy for 
it would be political violence. Either way, the 
actualization of the universal and homogeneous state would
be tragic.®3
Strauss on the Character of Modern Liberalism 
Strauss believed that the contemporary liberal regime 
partakes of the tyrannical "universal and homogeneous state" 
to some extent. The Hobbesian nature of this "universal and 
homogeneous state" is established by the observation that 
its Universal and Final Tyrant would "be forced to suppress 
every activity which might lead people into doubt of the 
essential soundness of the universal and homogeneous state: 
. . .  In particular he must in the interest of the 
homogeneity of his universal state forbid every teaching, 
every suggestion, that there are politically relevant 
natural differences among men which cannot be abolished or 
neutralized by progressing scientific technology." This 
mention of the necessity for the tyrant to suppress certain 
teachings recalls the powers attributed to the absolute
®3ibid., 207, 222-26.
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sovereign by Hobbes, especially in light of the contemporary 
religious upheavals associated with the English Civil War 
which concerned Hobbes.
Any doubt about the Hobbesian character of Strauss's 
"universal and homogeneous state" may be set aside by a 
consideration of Strauss's brief discussion of Hobbes in his 
essay on the Nazi ideologist Carl Schmitt. Here Strauss 
interpreted Hobbes's understanding of the salus populi as 
nothing more than defense against internal and external 
enemies, "the enjoyment of innocuous freedom," and "the just 
and modest acquisition of wealth by the individuals . . . 
which is promoted in particular by the cultivation of the 
sciences of mechanics and physics." According to Strauss,
[T]hese principles cannot but lead to the ideal of 
civilization, i. e., to the demand for the rational and 
universal society as a single "union of consumers and 
producers." Hobbes is to a much higher degree than, 
say. Bacon the originator of the ideal of civilization.
By this very fact he is the founder of liberalism. The 
right to the securing of bare life, i. e., the only 
natural right that Hobbes recognizes, has the character 
of an inalienable right of man, i. e., of a claim of the 
individual which precedes the State and determines the 
purpose and the limits of the State. The manner in 
which Hobbes lays the foundation for the natural right 
to the securing of bare life suggests the whole system 
of the rights of man in the liberal sense, even assuming 
that it does not make these indispensible.
Strauss held that Hobbes differs from "full grown
liberalism" only by virtue of positing "man's natural
malice," rather than "corrupt institutions or the ill will
®^Ibid., 226. See also chapter 2 above, 45-56.
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of a ruling stratum," as the obstacle to the attainment of 
the liberal ideal.^5
Strauss believed that modern liberalism seeks to 
harness the apparatus of the state for the sake of the 
promotion of unlimited technological progress, and that it 
tends to suppress in Hobbesian fashion any opinion that 
"might lead people into doubt of the essential soundness" of 
this activity. According to Strauss's understanding of 
classic natural right, the state ought not to give its 
unqualified endorsement to just any innovation in 
technology. "The classics were for almost all practical 
purposes what now are called conservatives. In 
contradistinction to many present day cciiscr^;atives however, 
they knew that one cannot be distrustful of political or 
social change without being distrustful of technological 
change. . . . They demanded the strict moral-political 
supervision of inventions; the good and wise city will 
determine which inventions are to be made use of and which 
are to be suppressed."®®
®5gtrauss, "Comments on Per Beariff des Politischen by Carl 
Schmitt," in Spinoza's Critique of Religion. 337-38. The 
original version (in German) of Strauss's essay appeared in 
Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 67 (no. 6, 
August-September 1932): 732-49. A reprint appeared in an English 
translation of Per Beariff des Politischen (Schmitt, The Concept 
of the Political, trans. George Schwab [New Brunswick, N. J.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1976]), 81-105.
®®Strauss, "Restatement," in On Tvrannv. 226; Thoughts on 
Machiavelli. 298.
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A "Hobbesian" (or "neo-Hobbesian") political tendency
would have the effect of cutting off political debate in
summary fashion, either by force or by persuasion; in the
latter case, what happens is that everyone takes the
veracity of the "neo-Hobbesian" doctrine for granted.
Strauss believed that the modern liberal state takes on a
"neo-Hobbesian" character when it shunts aside
"particularist" objections to the universalist state and its
promotion of technology.
Conservatives look with greater sympathy than liberals 
on the particular or particularist and the 
heterogeneous; at least they are more willing than 
liberals to respect and perpetuate a more fundamental 
diversity than the one ordinarily respected or taken for 
granted by liberals and even by Communists, that is, the 
diversity regarding language, folk songs, pottery, and 
the like. Inasmuch as the universalism in politics is 
founded on the universalism proceeding from reason, 
conservatism is frequently characterized by distrust in 
reason or by trust in tradition which as such is this or 
that tradition and hence particular.
Despite his disagreements with Kojéve, Strauss would
probably not dissent from the definition of tyranny which he
proposes: "In fact, it is tyranny (in the morally neutral
sense of the word) when a fraction of the citizens (it
matters little whether it be a majority or a minority)
imposes its ideas and acts on all the other citizens, which
are determined by an authority which it recognizes
spontaneously but which it has not succeeded in making the
others recognize; and where it does so without 'coming to
terms' with these others, without seeking any 'compromises'
with them, and without taking into account their ideas and
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desires (determined by another authority recognized by these 
others)."^7
Kojéve goes on to suggest that such a tyranny could be 
established "only through force or terror." Strauss would 
probably dispute this; he would incline to the view that a 
kind of tyranny could come about "by default," as it were, 
as a result of the phenomenon of "taking for granted" 
described above on the part of the majority. (Undoubtedly, 
Strauss would also dispute whether there can be a "morally 
neutral sense" of the word "tyranny"!) Strauss suggests 
that the modern liberal state partakes of tyranny when it 
places its institutional weight behind a "universalist" or 
"cosmopolitan" perspective without taking into account or 
"coming to terms" with the ideas and desires of the 
"particularist" or "parochial" fraction of the citizens.
Thomas Spragens attributes to "technocratic" liberalism an 
"analytical division of society into two 'classes' of people 
who are radically distinguishable in their relationship to 
the mode of production of knowledge (to put it in quasi- 
Marxist form) and who are therefore conceived as radically 
distinguishable in their mode of being— the 'knowers' being 
depicted as free, rational actors, the 'nonknowers' as 
causally determined functions of their environment."
Spragens also speaks of the distinction between the
®^Strauss, Preface to Liberalism Ancient and Modern (New 
York: Basic Books, 1968), vi; Kojéve, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in 
Strauss, On Tvrannv. 153.
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"enlightened” and the "unenlightened" as being functionally 
equivalent to that between the "knowers" and the 
"nonknowers." There can be no question that in Strauss's 
view contemporary liberalism partakes of a kind of tyranny 
of "enlightened," "universalist," "cosmopolitan" opinion 
over an "unenlightened," "particularist," "parochial" world­
view.®®
In contemporary American politics, this division 
between the particularist and the universalist manifests 
itself in those sociocultural issues associated with 
"single-issue politics," especially those which involve a 
collision between secularist and religious world-views.
Dinesh D'Souza gives voice to the frustration felt by 
conservatives over their inability to get a hearing for the 
questioning of "enlightened" opinion (note particularly the 
reference to sex education):
Liberalism, Strauss argues, adopts the values of 
positivism and historicism, not consciously, but at the 
level of cliche. This is best seen in slogans and 
formulations that have become commonplace in our time;
"You can't legislate morality." "You're trying to turn 
back the clock." "How can you believe that? This is 
1987?" The way liberals typically apply historicism is 
as follows: first, they decide what political program 
they favor; second, they identify inevitable historical 
movement toward that program; third, they maintain that 
since things are headed in that direction anyway we 
might as well make the transition as painless as 
possible; fourth and finally, they label anyone who 
opposes their preferences— which are, by now, historical 
laws— regressive, dogmatic, and worthy of derision and
®®Kojéve, "Tyranny and Wisdom," in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 153; 
Thomas A. Spragens, Jr., The Ironv of Liberal Reason (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 128.
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contempt. This pattern of reasoning is very familiar 
with respect to liberal views on sex education, welfare 
programs, arms control, and a host of other items.
Without doubt, the conservatives would cite the rhetorical
approach described above as an instance of liberal "neo-
Hobbesianism. " On matters such as sex education (now
including the question whether to promote the use of condoms
to prevent the spread of AIDS) the liberal state interposes
itself between religiously devout parents, who seek to teach
the chaste morals sanctioned by orthodoxy, and their
children. Typically, debate sinks to a low level, owing to
the sensitivity of these matters; liberals often put
themselves in the position of portraying the parents' views
as "worthy of derision and contempt." On these and related
matters, it would not be hard to find examples of
contemporary polemic portraying the conservative position
simply as being "behind the times.
It is not clear whether Strauss regarded the
"secularist" or the "technocratic" aspect of modern
liberalism as more fundamental. Undoubtedly, an important
feature of the modern "corporate state" is its utilization
of educational institutions for the development of
technology. Concomitantly, education comes to be thought of
as nothing more than technical training. Strauss believed
that such a conception of education depended on the
assumption that all men are equally capable of attaining
69d 'Souza, "The Legacy of Leo Strauss," 40.
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wisdom. The result, however, is not universal wisdom, but 
the degradation of education and culture (of which 
secularization may also be a component). Concern about the 
subordination of liberal education to technical training is 
reflected in contemporary polemic about the state of 
education (including one work by a student of Strauss, Allan 
Bloom). Strauss feared that the modern liberal state would 
drive out the ideal of liberal education. "Last but not 
least, liberal education is concerned with the souls of men 
and therefore has little or no use for machines. If it 
becomes a machine or an industry, it becomes 
undistinguishable from the entertainment industry unless in 
respect to income and publicity, to tinsel and glamour."^®
Strauss! Philosopher or Ideologue?
Strauss's description of the dangerous tendencies 
within the contemporary liberal state added up to such a 
rhetorically powerful indictment of liberalism that 
political partisans have been tempted to try to appropriate 
it. As was noted above, several prominent American 
conservatives either exhibit Straussian influence or 
describe themselves explicitly as followers of Strauss. A 
typical tactic in conservative polemic has been the 
identification of the "universal and homogeneous state" with
^°Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1987); Strauss, "Liberal Education and 
Responsibility," in Liberalism Ancient and Modern. 25.
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the welfare state. Ironically, such a tactic has the effect 
of cutting off political debate in a summary fashion, more 
severely even than the "cosmopolitan" liberal disparagement 
of "parochial" views, since no one would want to be 
identified with a regime which is totalitarian or proto- 
totalitarian in tendency.
Such an identification, if tenable, would place 
philosophy squarely on one side of the contemporary left- 
right or liberal-conservative political division. Those who 
are not prepared to concede that such an abrupt end to 
political and philosophical debate is appropriate will 
wonder whether such an identification is not based on a 
tendentious leap of interpretation. For instance, a 
Straussian may adopt the posture that we ought to be able to 
apprehend immediately, perhaps by means of intuition, that 
certain proposals would be put forward by the minions of a 
sinister "universal and homogeneous state." A less 
indiscriminate interpretation might reveal that such a 
conclusion does not follow so immediately. Consider, for 
instance, Strauss's own remarks to the effect that, given 
the impossibility of the "universal and homogeneous state," 
political society must maintain the character of a 
"particular society . . . whose highest task is its self- 
improvement," or his acknowledgment that modern democracy 
affirms not absolute equality but "equality of opportunity, 
which implies that differently gifted people are supposed to
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do very different things with the opportunity offered." Is 
the welfare state really an intimation of the sinister 
"universal and homogeneous state," or is it justifiable on 
legitimate grounds of "self-improvement" or "equality of 
opportunity"? Is it legitimate to argue that all measures 
touching on the economy serve the ends of the "universal and 
homogeneous state"? Indeed, if it is true that, as Strauss 
suggests, modernity has erred in leaving technology free 
from moral and political supervision, we might well ask 
whether the unregulated economy is not a form of technology, 
and whether the welfare state is not a proper instance of 
moral and political supervision of the economy.
Furthermore, it represents something of an extrapolation 
from the thought of Hobbes to say that the welfare state 
represents a form of "neo-Hobbesianism," since Hobbes's 
absolute sovereign is intended in the first instance to 
perform the functions of the "night-watchman state," along 
the lines of a minimalist, Nozickian "dominant protective 
association" rather than a "universal and homogeneous 
state.
Yet another instance of tendentiousness might be 
Strauss's esoteric interpretation of a thinker such as
^^Strauss, "Political Philosophy and the Crisis of Our 
Time," in George J. Graham, Jr., and George W. Carey, eds., The 
Post-Behavioral Era: Perspectives on Political Science (New York; 
David McKay Co., 1972), 221, 232; reprinted from George Spaeth, 
ed., The Predicament of Modern Politics (Detroit: University of 
Detroit Press, 1964).
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Xenophon. Such an interpretation requires an intricate 
succession of claims and arguments, each of which could be 
considered plausible in isolation; however, such a long 
chain of steps is required that one is given to wonder 
whether there are no weak links. Dallmayr suggests that the 
whole procedure is inimical to political and philosophical 
debate; he argues that "once esoteric and exoteric meaning 
become infinitely exchangeable, we enter into a terrain of 
quasi-Derridean playfulness— a terrain momentarily 
entertaining but tedious in the end." If it is assumed that 
the greatest minds have deliberately obscured their true 
teachings, then debate in political philosophy will be 
closed to all except those who have privileged insight into 
the correct esoteric interpretations. As Dallmayr argues,
"By endorsing esotericism, Strauss's approach (in my view) 
jeopardizes political philosophy— by ultimately pitting 
philosophy against politics, and politics against 
philosophy. Immunized against worldly politics, philosophy 
becomes a self-contained enterprise, while politics is
emptied of intrinsic meaning.
Strauss may have deemed it legitimate to deploy such an 
esoteric argument against the contemporary state in the face 
of the "neo-Hobbesianism" of a "vanguard" politics such as 
that discussed by C. B. Macpherson (see chapters 4 and 8
^^Fred Dallmayr, "Politics against Philosophy: Strauss and 
Drury," Political Theorv 15(August 1987): 328, 332.
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below). Nevertheless, the confusion attending Strauss's 
stance toward liberal democracy provides an illustration of 
the pitfalls of his esotericism. His followers take umbrage 
at the suggestion that he was anything but a staunch 
defender of liberal democracy against totalitarianism. 
Nevertheless, he drops hints to the effect that a political 
philosopher may not be able to make his true teaching 
explicit. Is liberal democracy just one step below the 
simply best regime, or is it only one step above political 
bestiality? Although he professes to admire the practical 
wisdom of the American founders, he maintains that liberal 
democracy seeks to establish the "universal and homogeneous 
state" no less than does communism. Was he merely 
flattering vulgar American opinion when he offered remarks 
in defense of liberal democracy? He and his followers 
railed against such an interpretation. Their protests may 
be sincere, but Strauss left himself open to such a 
treatment through his insistence on esotericism.^^
^^See, for instance, the exchange between S. B. Drury, "Leo 
Strauss's Natural Right Teaching," and Harry V. Jaffa, "Dear 
Professor Drury," Political Theorv 15(August 1987); 299-315, 316- 
325.
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CHAPTER 4: C. B. MACPHERSON— THE HOBBES IAN 
PREMISE OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM
Whereas Leo Strauss identified the phenomenon of the 
"universal and homogeneous state" as the contemporary 
manifestation of Hobbesianism, for C. B. Macpherson it is 
the assumption of "possessive individualism" that played 
this role. The two concepts differ in status; while Strauss 
thought that, at least in some cases, the "universal and 
homogeneous state" was being built by tyrants who knew 
exactly what they were doing, for Macpherson "possessive 
individualism" takes on the character of a hidden or 
implicit premise, held not by conscious advocates but by 
those who absorb it unconsciously as a part of the 
"conventional wisdom."
A central component of Macpherson's possessive 
individualism is the notion of self-ownership or "property 
in oneself." The individual is the proprietor of his 
capacities, including those which might be held to be 
essential to his humanity. Since these capacities are 
understood as property, they are all thought of as 
alienable; they may be bought, sold, or traded in the same 
way as one might dispose of a piece of material property.
Macpherson holds the assumptions of possessive 
individualism to be culpable for a condition in which 
contemporary man has come to think of himself as essentially 
an acquirer and consumer of material goods. The conception
118
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of man as active. which he finds in both Aristotle and Marx, 
has been shunted aside. The capacity to be an actor is not 
seen by contemporary man as being particularly important; 
furthermore, it is alienable, just like anything else. 
Macpherson suspects that those of us who work in the employ 
of other people have alienated our active capacity. A 
conception of man as essentially consumptive rather than 
active has come to prevail.
Hobbes is the first of a succession of English-speaking 
political thinkers whom Macpherson identifies as 
incorporating possessive-individualist assumptions. In his 
The Political Theorv of Possessive Individualism he examines 
several such thinkers who appeared during the seventeenth 
century, with most attention devoted to Hobbes and Locke; 
Harrington and the "Levellers" of the English Civil War 
period are also treated. In The Life and Times of Liberal 
Democracv this examination is extended into the eighteenth, 
nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. Macpherson finds that 
the assumptions of possessive individualism prevail to a 
greater or lesser extent in the thought of Jeremy Bentham,
John Stuart Mill, and the "equilibrium theorists" of 
twentieth-century political science, such as Robert Dahl and 
Joseph Schumpeter.
In these works and elsewhere, Macpherson dissects 
possessive individualism and presents what he takes to be 
its deleterious effects. One such effect has been the
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development of a version of democracy which he believes does 
not generate sufficient participation, at least not from the 
perspective of the teachings that provided the foundations 
of democracy before the rise of the liberal state. In works 
such as Democratic Theorv; Essavs in Retrieval and The Rise 
and Fall of Economic Justice he argues that the ethical 
demands of the Western political tradition require a form of 
democracy that provides for more extensive participation 
than exists presently, and he explores the implications of 
such a participatory democracy for politics in the 
industrialized world. In The Real World of Democracv he 
puts forward the view that the nations of the "Third World" 
have developed a notion of democracy that draws upon the 
concept's pre-liberal roots; a renewal of democracy may 
result from a confrontation between the "First World" and 
the "Third World."
Macpherson's Critique of Modernitv 
Macpherson does not object to being categorized as a 
"social democrat." This category would include the 
political parties of the European Left, which favor 
modifications of the market economy that go beyond those 
upheld by the Democratic Party in the United States.
Macpherson includes himself among "the bulk of contemporary 
social democrats and those socialists who do not accept the 
whole of the Marxian theory," who "accept the humanistic 
values read into liberal democracy by Mill and the
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idealists, but who reject present liberal democracy as 
having failed to realize those values." These socialists 
and social democrats, while not accepting Marxian theory in 
all its particulars, draw upon what they see as the ethical 
core of Marxism, with its echoes of an Aristotelian notion 
of human potentiality to be actualized. They affirm "that 
the human essence is to be realized fully only in free, 
conscious, creative activity," and they hold that a
capitalist economic system threatens to frustrate the
realization of this human essence. Such a critique places 
the matter of society's economic organization at the center 
of politics, extending the political realm to an extent not 
allowed for by a theorist such as Hobbes. "The death of the 
concept of economic justice may be said to have been
proclaimed by Thomas Hobbes in 1651 . . . Hobbes set the
tone of all subsequent liberal theories.
According to Macpherson, "The driving force of Marx's 
whole thought was the belief that man had it in him to be a 
freely creative being." Macpherson's critique of modernity 
is that this free creativity has been driven out by an 
economic organization that incorporates a "vision of 
inertia."
It is almost incredible, until you come to think of it,
that a society whose keyword is enterprise, which
Ĉ. B. Macpherson, "Do We Need a Theory of the State?", 
chapter 5, The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice and Other Papers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 55-65; "The Rise and 
Fall of Economic Justice," chapter 1, The Rise and Fall. 9.
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certainly sounds active, is in fact based on the 
assumption that human beings are so inert, so averse to 
activity, that is, to expenditure of energy, that every 
expenditure of energy is considered to be painful, to 
be, in the economist's term, a disutility. . . .  To see 
the hollowness of this vision, one need only ask what we 
shall all do when automation, cybernation, and new 
sources of non-human energy, have made the system of 
working for material rewards quite out-of-date and 
useless. What then shall we do except expend our energy 
in truly human activities— laughing, playing, loving, 
learning, creating, arranging our lives in ways that 
give us aesthetic and emotional satisfaction?
The problem is that the "truly human activities" have
atrophied in the face of the necessity to "make a living."
The work that people do to provide for their material
subsistence has become so exhausting and time-consuming that
people are either unwilling or unable to expend much energy
outside of the workplace. Leisure activities consist of
little more than passive consumption, including escapist
entertainment.2
For Macpherson, man is a being who has latent powers
and capacities that ought to be actualized rather than left
undeveloped. He opposes this ideal to the utilitarian
notion of man as maximizer of utilities, a reductionistic
view that admits only differences in the quantities of
utility that each man accumulates without admitting
qualitative distinctions between ways of life that may or
may not be fit for a human being. Macpherson argues that
the rise of market society has allowed an older conception
^Macpherson, The Real World of Democracv (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Clarendon Press, 1966), 13, 38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
123
of man as an active developer of his capacities to be driven
out by a utilitarian view of man as passive consumer.
From Aristotle until the seventeenth century it was more 
usual to see the essence of man as purposeful activity, 
as exercise of one's energies in accordance with some 
rational purpose, than as the consumption of 
satisfactions. It was only with the emergence of the 
modern market society, which we may put as early as the 
seventeenth century in England, that this concept of man 
was narrowed and turned into almost its opposite. Man 
was still held to be essentially a purposive, rational 
creature, but the essence of rational behaviour was 
increasingly held to lie in unlimited individual 
appropriation, as a means of satisfying unlimited desire 
for utilities. Man became an infinite appropriâtor and 
an infinite consumer; an infinite appropriator because 
an infinite desirer.
The political philosophy of Hobbes reflected a tendency to
view man as a consumer of utilities. "A man's powers, in
this view, were not of his essence but were merely
instrumental; they were, in Hobbes's classic phrase, 'his
present means to obtain some future apparent good'." Modern
liberal democracies are torn between the utilitarian and the
Aristotelian conceptions of man. In Macpherson's view, John
Stuart Mill attempted to restore an emphasis on the
development of human capacities to liberal-democratic
theory, but his efforts were insufficient; the democratic
franchise did not alter the essential features of market
society, which reinforce the tendency for men to see
themselves as consumers of an ever-increasing volume of
utilities.^
^Macpherson, "The Maximization of Democracy," essay 1, 
Democratic Theorv; Essavs in Retrieval (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Clarendon Press, 1973), 5-6.
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Undoubtedly, the thought of Marx exercises a strong 
influence on Macpherson's view of man and of the kind of 
activity appropriate to a human being. For instance, in 
volume 1, part 3 of Capital we find a discussion of what 
constitutes "exclusively human" labor. "A spider conducts 
operations that resemble those of weaver, and a bee puts to 
shame many an architect in the construction of her cells.
But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of 
bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in 
imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of 
every labour-process, we get a result that already existed 
in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement."
This element of conscious control over the labor process 
constitutes the essence of truly human activity for Marx and 
Macpherson. Under conditions in which so many of us work as 
employees of others, the element of conscious control and 
intelligent initiative is exercised primarily by the 
employers, not the employees. Marx discusses the 
consequences of such an organization of work in a passage 
from one of his 1844 manuscripts which foreshadows 
Macpherson's critique of the predominance of the consumptive 
over the active view of man .n contemporary liberal 
democracies.
The worker therefore only feels himself outside his 
work, and in his work feels outside himself. He is at 
home when he is not working, and when he is working he 
is not at home. His labour therefore is not voluntary, 
but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not 
the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to
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satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character 
emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical 
or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like theplague.4
The Nature of Possessive Individualism 
In chapter 2 of The Political Theorv of Possessive 
Individualism. Macpherson lists the postulates that he 
contends constitute the fundamental assumptions of 
"possessive market society":
(a) There is no authoritative allocation of work.
(b) There is no authoritative provision of rewards for
(c) There is authoritative definition and enforcement
of contracts.
(d) All individuals seek rationally to maximize their 
utilities.
(e) Each individual's capacity to labour is his own 
property and is alienable.
(f) Land and resources are owned by individuals and are
alienable.
(g) Some individuals want a higher level of utilities
or power than they have.
(h) Some individuals have more energy, skill, or 
possessions, than others.
These features are all implicit in the crucial assumption of
"possessive individualism," to which Macpherson attributes
many of the deleterious tendencies of modern liberal
democracy. Such tendencies were no doubt foreshadowed by
the changes involved in the continuing rationalization of
the English economy, which preceded Hobbes's career at least
by several decades; nevertheless, in political philosophy.
^Marx, Capital, vol. 1, part 3, in The Marx-Engels Reader. 
2d ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York; Norton, 1978), 344-45; 
Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. in The 
Marx-Enqels Reader. 74.
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Macpherson first detects the explicit assumptions in the 
thought of Hobbes. He then traces the history of 
"possessive individualism" throughout the subsequent history 
of English-speaking political thought, up to and including 
the modern political science of the twentieth century. 
Possessive individualism consists essentially of the 
assumption of "self-ownership," the notion of the individual 
as proprietor of his own capacities. Under possessive 
individualist assumptions, freedom comes to be looked upon 
as a function of possession, an absence of dependence on the 
wills of others. The capacities most central to the human 
essence are treated as commodities, in the same way that we 
might treat material objects that we own; they can be 
bought, sold, or traded on the marketplace. People come to 
think of society as consisting of exchange relations, and of 
political society as a device for the maintenance of orderly 
exchange. Perpetual exchange produces an unequal 
distribution of wealth in which land and capital become 
concentrated in a few hands; most people find themselves in 
the position of having to work for other people in order to 
earn a living. Macpherson's view is that this situation 
amounts to a net transfer of power to the capitalists; most 
people have lost access to the means of making their labor 
productive. Almost all are compelled to sell their energies 
in the labor market; they have been drawn into the universal
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Hobbesian competition for power, from which none can opt 
out. 5
Macpherson implicates the assumptions of possessive 
individualism in his critique of modern liberal democracy, 
in which we find a "curiously limited . . . vision of human 
excellence that has got built into our society and that we 
have made do with up to now. It is a vision that is 
inextricably linked with the market society." The notion of 
human nature as essentially active, which he would attribute 
to both Marx and Aristotle, has atrophied under a set of 
assumptions in which man comes to think of his capacity for 
action as just one among many alienable possessions. The 
Hobbesian approach to power reflects this "vision of 
inertia" as opposed to activity. "A man's powers, in this 
view, were not of his essence but were merely instrumental: 
they were, in Hobbes's classic phrase, 'his present means to 
obtain some future apparent good.'" We find no trace of the 
Aristotelian conception of human powers as talents or 
potentials to be actualized, such that the increase of one 
man's powers would be a benefit to all. The Aristotelian 
concept of developmental power is replaced by a view of 
power as extractive; each man finds himself in a struggle to 
extract from his fellows the best bargain that he can in the 
marketplace. As a result, we find workers who see work as
^Macpherson, The Political Theorv of Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
Clarendon Press, 1962), 1-4, 53-61.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
128
drudgery rather than as an opportunity for development, and 
who rush into escapist activities as soon as the working day
A man whose productive labour is out of his own control, 
whose work is in that sense mindless, may be expected to 
be somewhat mindless in the rest of his activities. He 
cannot even be said to retain automatically the control 
of whatever energies he has left over from his working 
time, if his control centre, so to speak, is impaired by 
the use that it made of him during his working time.
Any such diminution of a man's control over his extra- 
productive activities is clearly a diminution of his 
power over and above the amount of the transfer.
The critique of possessive individualism clearly recalls the
Marxian concept of alienation. To alienate means to place
something in the power of another. An extreme version of
alienation would be found in a society that allowed people
to sell themselves into slavery, as is contemplated by
Robert Nozick in his libertarian political tract, Anarchv.
State, and Utopia. Such an arrangement would strike many
people as a violation of a deeply held moral intuition. It
might be argued that there is a right to freedom of the
person that is an inalienable right, that is, a right so
fundamental to what it means to be a human being that people
should be forbidden to forfeit it voluntarily. Macpherson
would contend that an arrangement such as Nozick
contemplates is only a more extreme version of what is
allowed already under capitalism, in which most people are
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employees of others, so that their control over their 
creative powers is compromised.®
Hobbes's Possessive Individualist Assumptions 
Hobbes is the first of a succession of English-speaking 
thinkers in which Macpherson detects the assumptions of 
possessive individualism. According to Macpherson, Hobbes's 
theory is an account of the relations necessary to a 
particular kind of society; strictly speaking, the 
conclusions it draws should not be generalized beyond this 
particular society. Nevertheless, the portrait of society 
drawn by Hobbes is similar enough to our own that the theory 
remains relevant.^
Macpherson begins with a discussion of Hobbes's view of 
human nature and its relation to the account of the state of 
nature. He contends that Hobbes's statements about that 
which is innate in man, about man "as such," do not contain 
all that is necessary to argue the case for universal 
obligation to an irresistible sovereign. Hobbes's state of 
nature is not inhabited by men "as such," but by civilized 
men, as they would be within civilized society, except with 
sovereign power removed; such men have not been completelv
®Macpherson, The Real World of Democracv. 38; "Problems of a 
Non-Market Theory of Democracy," essay 3, Essavs in Retrieval. 67 
(see also "The Maximization of Democracy," essay 1, Essavs in 
Retrieval. 4-6); Robert Nozick, Anarchv. State, and Utopia (New 
York: Basic Books, 1974), 331.
^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 9-17.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
130
abstracted from society. For instance, it was necessarily 
true of men in civilized society that they would seek ever- 
increasing power over others, Hobbes assumed; Macpherson 
inclines to the view that this holds only for a certain kind 
of civilization, but he allows that some such assumptions 
had to be made.®
It might be more appropriate to speak of a "natural 
condition of mankind," which clearly refers to something to 
be found within men, rather than a "state of nature."
Behavior in the state of nature is not that of primitive 
man, but of social, civilized man; the term refers to what 
is natural to men as thev are now. In discussing chapter 13 
of Leviathan. Macpherson remarks that "the matter about 
which competition and diffidence would lead to a war of each 
with all, is the civilized matter of cultivated land and 
'convenient seats.'" The warlike state of nature is arrived 
at by taking men as they are and removing their fear of 
sovereign authority. "Take men as they now are, remove the 
fear of unpleasant or fatal consequences of their actions to 
themselves, and their present natural proclivities would 
lead directly to the state of war."®
To deduce the characteristics of the state of nature in 
this manner dictates that the state arrived at will contain 
many features of the civilized society from which sovereign
®Ibid., 17-19. 
®Ibid., 24-27.
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authority is removed in imagination. Macpherson argues that 
Hobbesian man, even in the state of nature, behaves as 
though he were an inhabitant of a competitive market 
society; he cites chapters 10 and 11 of Leviathan (in which, 
he asserts, Hobbes presents just about all he has to say 
about men in society) in support of his argument. In these 
chapters, Hobbes sets forth his definition of power. Power 
is of two types: natural and acquired. Natural power 
consists not of mere ability, but of eminence of ability; it 
is a comparative quality, consisting of an excess of one's 
capacities over those of others. Practically speaking, 
acquired power consists of one's ability to utilize natural 
power to command the services of other men. Wealth and 
reputation constitute power because they give strength 
against others. This definition takes it for granted that 
every man's power is opposed by every other man's. For 
instance, in Leviathan. chapter 10, Hobbes observes, "Nor 
does it alter the case of honour, whether an action, so it 
be great and difficult, and consequently a signe of much 
power, be just or unjust; for honour consisteth only in the 
opinion of power." Macpherson remarks that this passage 
presents "the essential characteristics of the competitive 
market." That honor consists of an opinion of power, 
independent of any standard of justice or injustice other 
than men's opinions of same, can be taken as a summary of 
the way in which the market assigns value. Market value
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determines, and is determined by, everyone's estimate or 
opinion of everyone else's power. Everyone is subject to 
this market for power; furthermore, every man's power is 
opposed by the power of every other man.^®
The conclusion that the state of nature would be 
characterized by savage competitiveness was derived, in 
Macpherson's view, from two postulates: first, that some men 
seek ever-increasing levels of power and delight, while 
others seek only to continue their present level; and, 
second, that society is so fluid that the behavior of the 
immoderate compels everyone else to enter the contest for 
power. He contests Strauss's interpretation, according to 
which Hobbes held that all men innatelv seek ever-increasing 
power; he cites passages from Elements of Law and Rudiments 
which contrast "vainglorious" and "temperate" men in support 
of his contention. "The evidence for Hobbes's position that 
only some men innately desire ever more power is clear," he 
concludes.
The related questions of the extent to which men seek 
power over others and the extent to which this desire for 
domination is innate in man is crucial to the controversy 
over Hobbes between Macpherson and his opponents. Strauss, 
for instance, appears to believe that Macpherson attributes
^®Ibid., 34-40. See Hobbes, English Works 3:80.
^%acpherson. Possessive Individualism. 40-44. See Hobbes, 
English Works 2:7, 4:82.
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too much to market society. "Yet according to Hobbes, man 
is distinguished from the brutes by the faculty of 
considering phenomena as causes of possible effects, and 
therefore by awareness of potentiality and power.
Macpherson does not even attempt to show that the natural 
antagonism of all men does not follow from the peculiarity 
of man thus understood," remarks Strauss. "Nor is Hobbes' 
view of men's natural competitiveness a reflex of the 
emerging market society; Hobbes found or would have found 
clear signs of that competitiveness not only in the market 
but in the courts of kings, in the most backward villages, 
among scholars, in convents, in drawing rooms, and in slave 
pens, in modern as well as in ancient times."^2
Strauss thus attributes to Hobbes the view that the 
desire for ever-increasing power is innate in man.
According to Macpherson, Hobbes's view is that the desire is 
natural to some men, but only an acquired behavior in 
others. Macpherson's own view is that such a desire is 
common to all men only within a possessive market society.
Both Strauss and Macpherson can cite several passages from 
Hobbes in support of their interpretation of him.
Macpherson claims that the most decisive passage cited by 
Strauss comes from a late and somewhat insignificant
^^Leo Strauss, review of Macpherson, The Political Theorv of 
Possessive Individualism; Hobbes to Locke, in Strauss, Studies in 
Platonic Political Philosophy (Chicago; University of Chicago 
Press, 1983), 230; originally published in Southwestern Social 
Science Ouarterlv 45, no. 1 (June 1964): 69-70.
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polemical work of Hobbes directed at his scholastic 
opponents. Macpherson himself refers to a passage from 
Elements of Law in which Hobbes speaks of "those men who are 
moderate, and look for no more but equality of nature," as 
opposed to "others, that will attempt to subdue them." He 
takes this passage from one of Hobbes's major political 
tracts to be decisive. "In view of the evidence it seems to 
me closer to Hobbes's intention to treat the striving for 
power and precedence which he finds to be characteristic of 
all men in society (and in the state of nature) as an innate 
striving in some men and an acquired behavior in others." 
Furthermore, if the striving is an acquired behavior in some 
men, it will be open to Macpherson to argue that market 
features of society have something to do with the 
acquisition.
It would appear that the universal obligation to obey 
an irresistible sovereign cannot be derived solelv from the 
proposition that some men seek greater and greater power 
while others are more temperate. If this is the case, then 
it could be that in the state of nature the vainglorious 
would grab for power while the temperate would acquiesce, 
and no war of all against all would follow. A second 
postulate is required in order to establish that in 
civilized society it is necessarily the case that everyone's
^^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 42-45. See Hobbes, 
English Works 4:82.
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powers are constantly invaded by everyone else's. A model 
of societv is required in which everyone is drawn into a 
competition for power. Macpherson holds that it has been 
much overlooked that Hobbes does put forward just such a 
social model, besides his model of the state of nature. The 
presence of this social model may have been obscured because 
it was not explicit. According to Macpherson, we can 
conceive at least four such possible social models. The 
first would be "customary or status society," in which power 
is allocated authoritatively instead of by the market.
Three other models represent various stages in the 
penetration of society by the market; they include "simple 
market society," "more fully developed market society," and 
finally the aforementioned "possessive market society," 
which, according to Macpherson, is Hobbes's actual model.
This final model contains the important feature that all 
goods, including land and capital, are allocated by the 
market. It follows that evervone is forced to compete in 
the marketplace in order to sustain life, meeting the 
requirement, crucial to Hobbes's theory, that everyone's 
power be opposed to everyone else's.
If we assume that Hobbes derived many of his 
conclusions about human nature from observation of his 
contemporaries, it is not difficult to comprehend how he 
came to draw the conclusions he did about the necessarv
^^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 46-61.
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features of contemporary society. The seventeenth-century 
England of Hobbes's time was rapidly developing into a full- 
fledged market society. It was not a perfect laissez-faire 
regime; mercantilist policies aimed at enhancing national 
power were pursued. However, land was being brought onto 
the competitive market, and more and more people were making 
a living as wage-earners. Hobbes's treatment of 
distributive and commutative justice suggests that he 
dismissed the standards of customary or status society in 
favor of those of the market; in chapter 15 of Leviathan he 
wrote dismissively, "As if it were injustice to sell dearer 
than we buy; or to give more to a man than he merits.
Hobbes was not totally sanguine about the prospects of 
a middle-class market society; in Behemoth he would suggest 
that bourgeois morality was responsible for the English 
Civil War. On balance, however, Macpherson concludes that 
Hobbes accepted the assumption common to educated people of 
his day that civilized society was to be equated with market 
society. "We may conjecture that the ease with which Hobbes 
attributed essentially market relations to all societies was 
due to his having shared the view, common to men of the 
Renaissance, that civilized society was limited to classical 
Greece and Rome and post-medieval western Europe. Since the 
classical societies were to some extent market societies 
they could easily be taken to fit a model drawn primarily
l^ibid., 61-67. See Hobbes, English Works 3:137.
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from the more completely market society of his own time.”
Plato and Aristotle lived in a partially commercialized 
society, Macpherson argues; Aristotle, embracing a 
traditional standard, attempted to dissuade his 
contemporaries from embracing the market. Medieval 
civilization exhibited even less market penetration, but as 
the term "Dark Ages" suggests, this can be associated with a 
civilizational breakdown. Europe did not become 
"recommercialized" until the early modern period, coinciding 
with the career of Hobbes. "Hobbes saw (and regretted) that 
market man and market society were here to stay, but he fell 
short of recognizing that this was a recent change. Now he 
saw it, now he didn't.
Hobbes's account of a ruthless competition for power in 
the state of nature, whatever its relation to a market 
system of economic organization, was essential to his 
derivation of a universal obligation to an irresistible 
sovereign. He believed that he had deduced obligation 
directly from facts about human nature and civilized 
society. The deduction represented what Macpherson calls a 
"Galilean shift" in political theory. Previous theorists 
had purported to deduce obligation from fact, but they had 
actually "smuggled in" additional premises about natural
^^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 67; "The Economic 
Penetration of Political Theory," chapter 9, Rise and Fall. 105- 
107 (see also "The Rise and Fall of Economic Justice," chapter 1, 
Rise and Fall. 5-7).
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purpose or the will of God. Hobbes, influenced by the laws 
of Galilean mechanics, was convinced that obligation could 
be derived directly from laws of "political mechanics," 
without resort to "fanciful" or "imported" notions of 
purpose. Political mechanics presents a further advantage 
in that it establishes an equal rather than a hierarchical 
natural right; by ruling out a system of values external to 
man, Hobbes had eliminated the possibility of a hierarchy of 
rights or obligations. (In this interpretation, Macpherson 
diverges from the view of Strauss by emphasizing the 
influence of the new natural science on Hobbes's political 
philosophy.)
Macpherson holds that in order to so deduce obligation 
from fact, Hobbes needed to be able to postulate an 
effective human equality. Part of the work had been done by 
the elimination of teleological considerations; Hobbes goes 
on to establish both equality of fear and equality of 
insecurity. Equality of fear follows from the observation 
that the weakest person is capable of killing the strongest. 
Equality of insecurity is based on the equal desire of each 
to preserve his life. Of course, once the dynamism of the 
market has set in over a sufficient period of time, "some 
are more equal than others" in an important respect. 
Nevertheless, it can be asserted that the market 
subordinates everyone. Macpherson believes it mistaken to
^^Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 76-78.
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think that a rational man could not reject the market.
However, if the market is indeed inescapable, then everyone 
must acknowledge the power that enforces the rules of market 
society; this is the only possible morality. Macpherson's 
only objection is to the suggestion that these 
considerations are necessary to anv civilized society; he 
holds that it would have been more proper for Hobbes to have 
claimed insight into the essential relations of his own 
society only.
Hobbes thought that his doctrine would prove congenial 
to the middle classes; their objections to it startled him. 
What the middle classes took exception to was the self- 
perpetuating nature of the Hobbesian sovereign, who would 
have the power to designate his own successor. The middle 
classes wanted a sovereign whom they could control.
Macpherson contends that Hobbes failed to realize that an 
irresistible sovereign could be maintained even if not self- 
perpetuating. Calculating men of property could see the 
advantage of having a power capable of enforcing the rules 
of the market; the non-propertied would be obedient as long 
as they saw no alternative. Hobbes acknowledged the 
presence of classes, but he underestimated their effect; he 
did not see the potential for cohesion within the propertied 
class to provide a centripetal force that would compensate 
for the centrifugal force of the dynamic market. In fact.
ISjbid., 74-78, 81-87.
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Hobbes's doctrine provides effective support to the 
propertied class in that it performs the task of primary 
capital accumulation that is necessary to the establishment 
of a possessive market society. As a mercantilist, Hobbes 
understands the accumulation of national wealth to be a 
primary state function. Macpherson mentions that he offers 
a typically "bourgeois" justification of taxation: the 
wealthy are liable to be taxed insofar as they are dependent 
on the state for enforcing the rules and otherwise providing 
the framework for accumulation on the open market. One 
limitation that Hobbes places on accumulation is that 
property is to be an absolute right against everyone except 
the sovereign; even this stipulation serves the purpose of 
accumulation, however. The sovereign must keep the right of 
"eminent domain" in reserve against any claims of right held 
over from traditional or status society that might form a 
roadblock to the establishment of the possessive market 
society.
Macpherson's attitude is that Hobbes could have headed 
off many of the criticisms of his theory by claiming less 
than universal validity for it; he could have claimed to 
have discovered the laws of the essential relations of his
^®See Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 95-100; 
"Hobbes's Political Economy," chapter 11, Rise and Fall. 133-46; 
and Introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan. ed. Macpherson 
(Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, Pelican Books, 1968; 
reprint ed., Penguin English Library [Harmondsworth, England, 
1981]), 51-60.
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own society only, or of societies of the same type. The 
objections are not so much to Hobbes's theory as to 
possessive market society and possessive individualism
themselves.20
Possessive Individualism in English- 
Speaking Political Thought
Macpherson sees English-speaking political thought from 
Hobbes to the present as permeated with possessive- 
individualist assumptions. In Possessive Individualism, and 
in a later work. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracv. he 
traces the history of the assumptions as they appear in the 
thought of leading Anglo-American thinkers from the 
seventeenth to the twentieth centuries. Harrington, Locke, 
Bentham, and James and John Stuart Mill are the more 
prominent figures treated. It turns out that Hobbesian 
assumptions are present even among the theorems of 
twentieth-century political science.
Following immediately upon his treatment of Hobbes, 
Macpherson considers a group of Hobbes's contemporaries from 
the English Civil War period. The Levellers were advocates 
of an expanded franchise during the debates among the 
republican forces following the first phase of the English 
Civil War. Macpherson emphasizes that they were not 
advocates of a universal manhood suffrage, as is often 
assumed. Instead, they favored a "non-servant franchise"
20,'Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 105-06.
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from which servants and beggars were to be excluded. Their 
rationale for this "non-servant franchise" reveals their 
possessive-individualist assumptions. They held that the 
franchise was to be extended to all who had not lost their 
birthright. Servants and beggars had lost their birthright 
by placing themselves in a position in which they were 
dependent on the wills of others. Such an argument reveals 
that the Levellers must have thought of the birthright-to- 
franchise as something that men could forfeit (or, in 
Marxian terminology, alienate). They were not, however, 
full-fledged possessive individualists. They upheld the 
natural right to the franchise for all who had not forfeited 
it, and while they viewed the individual as the proprietor 
of his own person, they did not carry this to extremes; they 
held that some rights, such as civil and religious freedoms, 
were inalienable. Nevertheless, their arguments reveal the 
influence of possessive-individualist assumptions in 
substantive political debate as well as in political
p h i l o s o p h y . 2 i
Macpherson regards James Harrington, author of Oceana. 
as a minor figure in comparison with Hobbes, but he is 
nevertheless a thinker of some importance because of his 
attention to considerations of class. Harrington viewed 
himself as what we would now call a political scientist 
rather than a political philosopher; he meant to investigate
2 1 j b i d . ,  107-157.
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the conditions necessary to political stability. Central to 
his thought was the crucial concept of "the balance." He 
believed that the distribution of political power 
necessarily corresponded to the distribution of property; 
the political regime could be a monarchy, an aristocracy, or 
a democracy, depending on whether property is held by one, a 
few, or many. Harrington intended that his principle of 
"the balance" would maintain an equilibrium among the 
nobility, the gentry, and the yeomanry, so that political 
stability would be preserved. He proposed a constitution 
that would divide power between the yeomanry and the gentry; 
the yeomanry would predominate in the lower house of the 
legislature, but most of the political class would come from 
the gentry. Harrington also placed great emphasis on an 
"agrarian law," which was supposed to prevent an 
overconcentration of property within the upper classes. 
However, the agrarian law was phrased so permissively that 
it would have permitted all the lands of England to come 
into the possession of one percent of the population. 
Essentially, Harrington believed the balance to be 
maintained despite the extreme permissiveness of the 
agrarian law because he shifted the focus of the balance 
from a balance of propertv to a balance of opportunity. 
Apparently, he thought that everyone would accept that the 
balance was still in place as long as upward economic 
mobility was possible. This version of the balance
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principle embodies possessive-individualist assumptions 
because it depends on everyone's assuming bourgeois economic 
attitudes; everyone would have to place the highest priority 
on maintaining the features of a competitive market
economy.22
Locke's Version of Possessive Individualism 
John Locke deserves a more extended treatment as a 
political theorist whose reputation is on a par with that of 
Hobbes. He was in some senses a more genuine natural rights 
theorist than Hobbes. Macpherson allows that Locke provided 
a version of natural right that was less "wholesale," hence 
more meaningful and specific, than that of Hobbes.
Furthermore, Locke provides for limited government and a 
right to revolution. Locke makes natural law prior to 
natural right, so that his natural right is limited. While 
Hobbes provided for equal natural right, his right was not 
reciprocal, since it amounted to a right to invade others. 
Locke's natural right, while reciprocal in that it required 
everyone to respect everyone else's right, was unequal in 
that it permitted unlimited accumulation in its final 
version. For Macpherson, an acceptable natural right theory 
must provide for both equal and reciprocal right; neither 
Hobbes nor Locke met this r e q u i r e m e n t .23
2 2 % b i d . , 160-193.
23Macpherson, "Natural Right in Hobbes and Locke," essay 13, 
Essavs in Retrieval. 224-37.
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A possessive-individualist assumption plays a central 
role in Locke's theory, since he establishes a right to 
appropriation through the assertion of a property right in 
one's own person. From this self-proprietorship it follows 
that one has a right to that with which one mixes one's 
labor. The right to preserve one's life and the right to 
the fruits of one's labor establish a right to individual 
appropriation, prior to government. Initially, at least, 
this right of appropriation is limited. There is the 
stipulation that one must leave "enough and as good" for 
others. Also, one may take no more than one's share, so 
that nothing perishes uselessly. Finally, there is the 
implicit limitation that one may take no more than what can 
be obtained with one's own labor. However, although Locke 
limits natural rights initially, he effectively overthrows 
the limitations in the final revision of his theory. The 
spoilage limitation is overcome by the introduction of 
money, since gold and silver do not spoil. Accumulations 
larger than a single individual could use could nevertheless 
be put to use as capital. Since men have consented 
implicitly to the use of money, capitalist accumulation is 
justified as a natural right, prior to the establishment of 
government. A commercial economy that includes the use of 
money, the suppression of the spoilage limit, and markets 
and commerce beyond the level of barter is posited as 
existing prior to the establishment of government;
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Macpherson calls this assumption historically improbable, 
but not inconceivable. There are two levels of consent, 
first to the commercial economy and second to civil society. 
From the viewpoint of a more standard interpretation of 
Locke, to posit a commercial economy prior to civil society 
appears tendentious; most interpreters hold that Locke 
justifies capitalist accumulation within civil society only, 
rather than as a natural right. For his part, Macpherson 
insists on pressing an interpretation in which the 
"difficulty of enforcement [of contracts based on 
institutions of property] is the main reason Locke finds for 
men moving to the second level of consent and entering civil 
society." The "enough and as good" limitation is overcome 
implicitly; it is assumed that increased productivity more 
than makes up for the lack of land available to others after
capitalist appropriation.24
There remains one stipulation regarding accumulation 
still to be overcome, the "implicit labor limitation." This 
limitation is transcended by means of the assumption that if 
labor is property, it is alienable. A right to labor that 
one has purchased is asserted; one's servant's labor is the 
same as one's own. It is assumed that wage labor exists in 
a state of nature. Furthermore, it can be reiterated that 
the general features of a commercial economy with unlimited 
accumulation were consented to in the state of nature.
24Macpherson, Possessive Individualism. 199-214, esp. 210.
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Unlike Hobbes, Locke at least distinguishes between property 
and life; some rights are inalienable, so that alienation of 
labor does not confer arbitrary power over life.
Nevertheless, traditional limitations on accumulation 
generally have been overturned. A limitation on 
appropriation is a feature that has been read into Locke's 
thought by modern liberals; the import of his theory is to 
turn the tables on those who would limit appropriation.^5 
After overcoming these traditional limits on 
accumulation, Locke goes on to suggest a class differential 
in rights and rationality between the propertied and 
laboring classes. The latter were viewed as not being full 
members of the body politic, since they did not live fully 
rational lives. Macpherson cites a comment in which Locke 
takes it for granted that wage laborers necessarily would 
live from hand to mouth, since they would lack opportunity 
to "raise their thoughts above that." Full rationality was 
associated not with labor, but with unlimited appropriation. 
This class differential in rationality was ascribed to the 
state of nature ; apparently, Locke observed a class 
differential in his contemporaries and read this 
differential back into the nature of man. Macpherson 
contends that the alleged difference in rationality is 
simply a difference in ability or willingness to abide by a 
bourgeois moral code. A class differential in rationality
25ibid., 214-220.
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is a bourgeois concept. When property is defined narrowly 
as consisting merely of goods and land rather than "life, 
liberty, and estate," then only those with goods and land 
can be included in civil society. The non-propertied were 
in a position similar to the Calvinist "non-elect"; they 
were to have no voice in government, despite being subject 
to its discipline. The native with no estate was to be 
treated like a foreigner. Possessive-individualist 
assumptions, together with the overthrow of any limitations 
on natural right, produce a political theory that can 
justify the effective subordination of the non-propertied.26
Possessive Individualism in the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth Centuries
The most vulgar version of possessive-individualist 
political theory is the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham, 
who built a system that provided for private enterprise and 
unlimited private property, based on a few postulates. He 
took it for granted that in an advanced society there must 
be a class of people who must labor or starve; the state 
need make no provision for their subsistence other than to 
maintain the physical incentive provided by the fear of 
starvation. After making a tentative case for an 
egalitarian distribution of wealth, he overturns this 
argument by giving security of property priority over
26jbid., 221-38. At 230, Macpherson refers to l___
Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest 
and Raising the Value of Monev. in Locke, Works. vol. 2 (1759, 19.
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equality; without security of property, there can be no 
wealth, however it is to be distributed— indeed, there can 
be no civilization. Hence, "equality must yield."
Macpherson judges the entire theory to be influenced deeply 
by bourgeois postulates. Man is viewed as a self-interested 
pleasure-maximizer. Consideration of the pleasure to be 
maximized is strictly limited to material goods. A 
Hobbesian society in which everyone opposes everyone else is
assumed.27
Bentham's model of society required government in order 
to protect the free market, but government itself could 
become rapacious. To resolve this dilemma, Bentham had to 
devote considerable attention to the extent of the 
franchise. He was not enthusiastic about a democratic 
franchise, but he was driven to it by the logic of his 
position, as well as by popular demands being put forward in 
his day. He presented a purely protective case for a 
democratic franchise; subjects require the franchise in 
order to protect themselves, since the rulers and the ruled 
form naturally opposed classes. It was a view that could be 
deduced easily from a view of human nature which sees man as 
unalterable and which acknowledges no essential political 
potential in man to be developed through participation.28
27Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracv 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 23-34.
28nacpherson, Life and Times. 34-43.
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John Stuart Mill is Macpherson's favorite among the 
English-speaking political thinkers he considers; he comes 
closest to reconsidering the view of man that is reinforced 
by possessive market society. Instead of accepting a 
reductionistic utilitarian view of man, Mill proposes a 
political ideal which political society is to attempt to 
approximate. This revision of utilitarianism was provoked 
by Mill's concern for the condition of the working class, 
which he, along with many of his contemporaries, had come to 
view as blatantly inhuman. The poor could no longer be 
consigned to living a hand-to-mouth existence; a model of 
democracy was to be adopted that would contribute to the 
self-development of all, rich or poor. The essence of man 
was to exert and develop his latent talents, including his 
political capacities. According to Macpherson, genuine 
democracy should seek improvement "in the amount of personal 
self-development of all members of the society, or, in John 
Stuart Mill's phrase, the 'advancement of community . . .  in 
intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and 
efficiency.'" Unfortunately from Macpherson's perspective, 
the younger Mill stopped short of a critical evaluation of 
capitalist institutions. He attributed the inequality he 
encountered to accident, perhaps an accidental injustice in
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the distribution of property before the establishment of 
capitalist institutions.29
Mill's twentieth-century idealist successors were even 
less realistic in their assumptions. Theorists such as 
Barker, Lindsay, and Maclver lost sight of class and 
exploitation. Any shortcomings in society could be overcome 
by liberal democracy and the welfare state. They hoped that 
the class issue would recede, or that it could be mitigated 
by the welfare state; essentially, they relied on good will. 
John Dewey was at least less indulgent than these other 
democratic theorists of the early twentieth century about 
the actual operation of liberal democracies; he held out as 
a hope what others treated as an achievement. Dewey upheld 
an experimental method, "cooperative intelligence," and 
social control of economic processes. He spoke of a 
"socialized economy," but it was not clear what he had in 
mind; he appeared to be more interested in the prospects of 
democratic liberalism than in a critical analysis of 
capitalism. Macpherson's judgment is that Dewey and the 
other twentieth-century idealist theorists were too 
optimistic about liberal democracy because they failed to 
see how the competitive party system had reduced political
29ibid., 44-56, esp. 47. Reference is to Mill, 
Considerations on Representative Government. Ch. 2, in Collected 
Works. ed. J. M. Robson, vol. 19 (Toronto and London, 1977), 392.
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responsiveness. Later theorists would discredit their 
postulate of overriding citizen rationality.30
The pluralist elitist models of such mid-twentieth- 
century political scientists as Schumpeter and Dahl actually 
represent a reversion to the "protective" democracy of the 
utilitarians. Rather than providing a means to make 
decisions about social and moral ends, democracy becomes a 
simple device for choosing governments. The only genuine 
participants are the sets of elites who compete for power as 
the representatives of the political parties. Voters do not 
decide issues, they choose men; but, this at least protects 
them from tyranny. Otherwise, the moral content of 
democracy is emptied out. Political participation lacks 
intrinsic value. A "consumer sovereignty" model of 
democracy as a simple market mechanism seemed realistic to 
these theorists. The model assumes that political demands 
are so diffuse and shifting that a device is needed to 
produce an effective majority. The possessive-individualist 
assumptions of Hobbes, transmitted via Benthamite 
utilitarianism, continue to manifest themselves in the 
supposedly sophisticated models of twentieth-century 
political science.31
30Macpherson, Life and Times. 69-76. 
3 1 l b i d . , 77-82.
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Escaping Possessive Individualism 
Through Participatory Democracv
Descriptively, the model proposed by twentieth-century 
equilibrium theory must be judged substantially adequate, at 
least as long as we operate within the assumptions of 
possessive market society. However, Macpherson cannot 
accept the claim that this theory has no justificatory 
intent. Most statements of the model imply that its account 
of democracy is the only realistic one, and also that it 
produces the self-evident goods of political stability and 
consumer sovereignty. It assumes that men's political 
capacities are a fixed datum, which Macpherson treats as a 
"claim not proven." He holds that the model provides for a 
market. but not for a democracv. It establishes an 
equilibrium in inequality; its consumer sovereignty is 
largely illusory. It registers effective political demand 
only, giving an advantage to political professionals and 
those with money. Furthermore, the system encourages 
apathy; it may even reguire it, lest stability be 
endangered. Voter demands are not independent; choice is 
shaped. Curiously, these features are held to reinforce the 
validity of the m o d e l .
Macpherson contends that such a liberal democracy 
produces a level of participation too low to meet the 
ethical requirements of democracy itself. However, it would
32ibid., 82-92.
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seem that direct democracy is out of the question; a 
representative system of some kind is required. Not even 
electronic technology can give us direct democracy; someone 
would have to formulate the questions that people would be 
asked to answer in plebiscites to be held via telephones or 
home computer terminals.^3
Whatever the form that participatory democracy is to 
take, certain conditions will have to be met before it can 
come about; these include a change in political 
consciousness and a reduction of social and economic 
inequality. We are left with a "vicious circle"; each of 
these changes seems to require the other. The changes will 
have to come reciprocalIv. with an incremental change at one 
level engendering a degree of change at the other, and so 
on. Developments during the nineteen-sixties and seventies 
(reference to which may now appear somewhat dated) provided 
Macpherson with a foundation for hope. The public became 
more aware of the ever-increasing costs of continuous 
economic expansion, including pollution and overpopulation, 
he thought. An awareness of the costs of political apathv 
engendered movements for "black power," "student power," and 
industrial democracy. The phenomenon of "stagflation" 
prompted doubts about the ability of the capitalist system 
to meet consumer expectations.
33ibid., 93-98. 
34%bid., 98-108.
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If the competitive party system is to be bypassed, some 
provision for political accountabilitv will have to be made; 
the failure of Soviet-style "democratic centralism" must be 
acknowledged. Perhaps direct democracy can be reconciled 
with the practical necessity for a representative system by 
means of a "pyramid" device, by which direct democracy would 
operate in local councils at the factory or neighborhood 
level, each of which would elect delegates to representative 
assemblies at higher levels. Failing that, perhaps a more 
participatory system could be combined with the existing 
party system by enacting a "pyramid" arrangement within each 
of the existing parties.^5
In an important sense, participatory democracy is 
likely to have a broader purview than liberal democracy; it 
is likely to reconsider property arrangements and downgrade 
market assumptions. An important component of the political 
agenda of participatory democracy might be a demand for 
economic democracy, in the form of political control or 
direction of the economy (to one degree or another) for the 
sake of "a kind of society where all persons have equal 
effective right to a fully human life," as Macpherson puts 
it. Many features of a liberal society (at least in the 
original nineteenth-century sense) are likely to be absent 
under such an arrangement. However, as long as 
participatory democracy retains the developmental ideals put
35ibid., 108-114.
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forward by John Stuart Mill, there is no reason to deny it 
to be liberal in essence, since liberalism, in a general 
sense, has always stood for the abandonment of outmoded 
restraints.
The Problem of the "Vanguard"
Macpherson remarks that the advent of participatory 
democracy will require "a change in people's consciousness 
(or unconsciousness), from seeing themselves and acting as 
essentially consumers to seeing themselves and acting as 
exerters and enjoyers of the exertion and development of 
their own capacities." If an attempt is made to carry out 
such a political program, it may prove difficult to raise 
everyone's consciousness at once. In fact, some will 
suggest that this insistence upon the necessity of 
"consciousness-raising" lends a sinister flavor to 
Macpherson's political stance. For instance, the 
problematical nature of a plebiscitary democracy was noted 
above, since the range of proposals to be settled within 
such a polity would be determined by those who posed the 
alternatives to be voted on. If left unaccountable, the 
person or body of persons who formulated the alternatives 
might come to wield the real power within the polity. Would 
this function be performed by those of a "higher
^^Rise and Fall, chapter 3, "The Prospects of Economic and 
Industrial Democracy," esp. 35-37; see also Essavs in Retrieval, 
essay 6, "A Political Theory of Property," 120-140, and The Life 
and Times of Liberal Democracv. 114-115.
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consciousness," for the benefit of those of us whose 
consciousnesses are not so elevated? Skeptics would 
conclude that such an arrangement would be the epitome of an 
Orwellian regime.37
At more than one point, Macpherson raises the dilemma 
posed here, but he sets it aside almost as soon as he raises 
it. In The Real World of Democracy, he asks, "How can the 
debasing society be changed by those who have themselves 
been debased by it? This is the problem that has faced not 
only liberal and radical, but also conservative, reformers, 
from Plato to Rousseau, from St. Thomas More to Marx. The 
debased people are, by definition, incapable of reforming 
themselves en masse." The strategies pursued by Plato, 
Rousseau, and Lenin are all problematical. "There can be no 
guarantee that Plato's authoritarian rulers, or Rousseau's 
charismatic leader, or Lenin's vanguard, will in fact use 
their power for the ends for which it was supposed to be 
used. Yet, in the circumstances we are talking about, there 
seems to be no less dangerous way." He acknowledges Sir 
Isaiah Berlin's criticism of "the doctrine that only they 
can know," yet he claims that "the terrible thing about this 
is that the postulate is often correct."38
37Macpherson, Life and Times. 99. See also p. 144 above.
38The Real World of Democracv. 19; "Berlin's Division of 
Liberty," essay 5, Essavs in Retrieval. 106-107.
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The issues raised here by Macpherson are discussed at 
length by Thomas Spragens in his The Ironv of Liberal 
Reason. Spragens diagnoses the proposal for a "vanguard 
class" as a symptom of "technocratic" liberal rationality, 
in which sociopolitical knowledge is held to be accessible 
only to a class of experts. The claim of such a class or 
political party could all too easily represent "the 
fashioning by a well-intentioned, power-seeking intellectual 
class of their own legitimacy myth." Spragens's view is 
that such a claim has dangerous and sinister implications.
He asks, "Who, in short, are the educators and who the 
educated? Who are the knowers and who the known? Who 
controls and who is controlled?"^^
Macpherson should at least be given credit for 
acknowledging the difficulties posed here. He affirms that 
"the great majority of people in the Western liberal- 
democracies place a high value on the unique characteristics 
of the liberal-democratic state," including civil liberties 
and governmental accountability. In his response to Milton 
Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom, he allows that 
institutional safeguards will be needed in the socialist 
commonwealth to offset the threat of "a ubiquitous party 
hostile to political freedom." His view, however, is that 
institutional safeguards, necessary or not, will not be 
decisive.
39,Spragens, The Ironv of Liberal Reason. 105-107.
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It is not the absence of a fully competitive labour 
market that may disable a socialist government from 
guaranteeing political freedom; it is the absence of a 
firm will to do so. Where there's a will there's a way, 
and, for all that Friedman has argued to the contrary, 
the way need have nothing to do with a fully competitive 
labour market. The real problem of political freedom in 
socialism has to do with the will, not the way. The 
real problem is whether a socialist state could ever 
have the will to guarantee political freedom.
Macpherson thinks that in socialist regimes that might come
to power in the Western world, conditions would be more
favorable to the development of a will to maintain political
freedom than in those regimes currently dominated by
communist parties. Nevertheless, as long as "consciousness-
raising" on the part of a "vanguard" is contemplated in the
place of more mundane forms of political persuasion, many
observers will be uneasy.
"Third World" versus "First World"
Conceptions of Democracv
Macpherson believes that the peoples of the
underdeveloped nations of the "Third World" are developing a
democratic theory that recalls the ancient notion of
democracy as rule by an oppressed class, even though
coercion by a "vanguard" may have been involved in the
establishment of these regimes. These peoples see
competitive market society as unnatural, something imposed
from above. They also see political competition and a
^(^Macpherson, The Real World of Democracv. 56-57; "Elegant 
Tombstones: A Note on Friedman's Freedom," essay 7, Essavs in 
Retrieval. 150-154.
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competitive party system as unnatural, since their societies 
lack class division. Since these nations are struggling to 
escape the yoke of what they call "neo-colonialism," there 
is a tendency to see any political opposition as treasonous; 
the genuine liberal-democratic achievements of civil rights 
and civil liberties are in danger of being shunted aside in 
the drive to modernize, accumulate capital, and create 
national loyalty.41
Nevertheless, the claim is made that these nations 
manifest a genuine Rousseauian "general will" that they can 
express only through a single dominant party. This notion 
of democracy is pre-liberal in that it emphasizes ends over 
means. These peoples find some aspects of Marxism 
congenial, but not the doctrine of the class state. They 
see themselves as classless already; they seek a national 
revolution, not a class revolution.42
Macpherson holds that the presence of nuclear weapons 
means that the West can no longer hope to dominate the world
41see Macpherson, The Life and Times of Liberal Democracv. 
9-10; see also The Real World of Democracv. 23-27. The claim 
that African nations lack class division may be met with 
skepticism. Such nations are often divided along tribal lines 
(which is not a class division in the strictest sense), and they 
may also exhibit a self-generated class division in that the 
members of their political and administrative apparatus may come 
to constitute a privileged elite. For a discussion of the 
prospects for democracy in Africa which emphasizes the 
possibility that non-liberal versions of democracy may become 
justifying doctrines for authoritarian regimes, see Richard L. 
Sklar, Democracv in Africa (Los Angeles: African Studies Center, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 1982).
42nacpherson, The Real World of Democracv. 27-30.
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outright; to win favor in the Third World, both superpower 
blocs will have to compete on moral grounds. This presents 
the prospect of a non-military engagement between the West 
and the Third World. Macpherson remarks that if the civil 
and political libertarianism of the West is to prevail, 
respect will have to be shown for the legitimate aspirations 
of Third World democracy. Since the Third World ideologies 
do not display the hegemonic tendencies of Marxist-Leninism, 
the West need not be implacably hostile to them, Macpherson 
argues. "In recognizing the merits of the new ideologies' 
humanism, the West would be going back to the roots of its 
own democratic tradition."43
The record of Third World governments may not lend much 
support to Macpherson's vision of a beneficent Third World 
democracy, if the accounts of numerous journalists and other 
specialists are to be believed. Furthermore, his sanguine 
attitude toward "vanguard" politics will lead many, Strauss 
among them, to suspect that Macpherson is practicing his own 
brand of "neo-Hobbesianism," in spite of his explicit 
criticism of Hobbes's "possessive individualism." In any 
case, that Macpherson is a Hobbesian can be concluded by 
implication only. He criticizes Hobbes instead of affirming 
him after the fashion of Michael Oakeshott, who lauds Hobbes
"Revolution and Ideology in the Late Twentieth Century," 
essay 8, Essavs in Retrieval. 169. See also essay 1, "The 
Maximization of Democracy," Essavs in Retrieval. 19-23, and The 
Real World of Democracv. 65-67.
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predicament.
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CHAPTER 5: MICHAEL OAKESHOTT— THE HOBBESIAN 
STRUGGLE TO DELIMIT POLITICS
Michael Oakeshott, unlike Strauss or Macpherson^ looks 
upon the political thought of Thomas Hobbes sympathetically. 
While Strauss and Macpherson take Hobbes to be a culprit of 
one sort or another, Oakeshott views him as contributing to 
a proper conception of politics. Hobbesian sovereignty is 
not a justification of an authoritarian despotism, Oakeshott 
argues; it simply is a justification of the authority that a 
duly established government ought to have. Government 
authority is to be absolute within its proper sphere, but 
this does not confer absolute power upon it. According to 
Oakeshott's interpretation, the Hobbesian theory seeks to 
give government its due, no more and no less. Governmental 
power is to be absolute within the properly understood 
bounds of politics, but this does not imply that government 
must interfere and regulate outside these carefully limited 
bounds.
Drawing upon Hobbes and other thinkers, Oakeshott seeks 
to deflate the claims of politics to an extent. Politics is 
not an all-encompassing activity; philosophy, which seeks to 
give a coherent account of the whole of experience, is the 
only such activity. Experience admits of modes, which, from 
the perspective of philosophy, represent arrests or 
distortions of experience. This does not mean that the 
modes can be avoided, especially not the mode of "practice"
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or practical activity, which is indispensible to the conduct 
of life. Each mode is legitimate within its own limits, but 
each has a tendency to present itself as universally valid, 
without qualifications; philosophy must resist these 
grandiose claims. Philosophy must criticize an activity 
such as politics when it threatens to exceed its sphere of 
legitimacy. Such was the account of philosophy and 
experience offered by Oakeshott in his first philosophical 
endeavor. Experience and Its Modes.
Oakeshott believes that contemporary tendencies are 
contributing to an understanding of politics as an 
unlimited, all-encompassing activity. Politics is becoming 
a technical, managerial enterprise concerned with satisfying 
whatever needs are most deeply felt at a particular moment, 
he argues. As such, politics tends to become a matter of 
passion rather than moderation. Such are the themes of 
Oakeshott's collection of essays entitled Rationalism in 
Politics. In a more recent work. On Human Conduct.
Oakeshott has elaborated a concept of "civil association" or 
civitas. to which, he suggests, the political realm ought to 
be limited as far as possible. Civitas would be a strictly 
formal, legalistic, rule-governed relationship which would 
not specify substantive performances, but would prescribe 
conditions which would constitute constraints to be observed 
by persons pursuing whatever substantive purposes they 
choose. This discussion of civitas is presented as an
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exacting specification of the understanding of politics 
implicit in the Hobbesian theory, in which the concern of 
the political realm is to secure its own authoritativeness, 
not to satisfy substantive wants. The legitimate concern of 
the political is so carefully delimited that it appears to 
approach the ideal of the "night-watchman state" of 
classical liberal thought. In his other political writings 
Oakeshott appears less concerned with the specific content 
of political proposals than with the tenor or spirit in 
which they are put forward; here he is less concerned with 
the construction of a minimalist state that with the 
prevention and control of political fanaticism and 
enthusiasm. An ambiguity can thus be detected, especially 
between the doctrine of On Human Conduct and the more 
diffuse short political essays; found throughout all the 
writings, however, is the influence of Hobbes as the 
philosopher who would keep the political from getting out of 
control.
Philosophy as Unqualified Experience 
In Experience and Its Modes. Oakeshott delineates his 
conception of philosophy and its relation to other 
activities. He stresses that philosophy does not consist of 
an indiscriminate pursuit of universal knowledge. The 
mandate of philosophy is nothing more than to give a 
coherent account of experience, without presupposition or 
arrest, unhindered by the partial, the subsidiary, or the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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abstract. Philosophy must take special care to maintain 
detachment from that which is extraneous to it. "Nearly 
always a philosopher hides a secret ambition, foreign to 
philosophy," Oakeshott remarks. "But we must learn not to 
follow the philosophers upon these holiday excursions."^
W. H. Greenleaf describes Oakeshott as an Hegelian 
idealist of a sort. According to Greenleaf, Oakeshott is 
dissatisfied both with a transcendentalist realism that 
placed truth only within a supersensible realm removed from 
experience and with an anti-metaphysical empiricist 
nominalism. It is to be hoped that an idealist philosophy 
can preserve the logical certainty of realism without 
refusing to acknowledge the reality of any aspect of human 
experience. To this end, Oakeshott develops a theory of 
truth in which the true is held to be that which renders our 
experience coherent. Truth and experience are not to be 
dichotomized so that one is extraneous to the other; 
coherence is to be taken as the criterion for truth, not 
vice versa.2
Just as he criticizes the separation of truth from 
experience, Oakeshott also objects to the dichotomization of 
reality into a world of ideas and an external world of 
things. This distinction has only a practical, provisional
^Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1933, reprint ed., 1966), 1-8.
2w. H. Greenleaf, Oakeshott's Philosophical Politics 
(London: Longmans, 1966), 6-16.
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validity, as does the distinction between thought and 
perception. His view of reality is derived from experience, 
as is his view of truth. To separate knowledge from 
reality, to make reality independent of experience, would 
render it unknowable. Therefore, he rejects as a vicious 
dualism any view which requires a divorce between experience 
and reality.^
Philosophy, then, represents a unified world of 
experience in terms of ideas. This unity does, of course, 
admit of diversity. The whole, however, does not consist 
simply of the sum of several different kinds of experience; 
experience admits of modes rather than kinds. The modes of 
experience are defective from the standpoint of philosophy; 
they represent defects or arrests in experience. Their 
perspective is limited or partial rather than holistic; 
philosophy must supersede them logically. Philosophy is 
unitary, concrete experience, whereas the modes do not rise 
above the merely abstract. Philosophy represents the 
completion of the modes; it is the pursuit of the 
concreteness of experience for its own sake, without 
hindrance, distortion, or presupposition.^
In Experience and Its Modes. Oakeshott designates the 
historical, scientific, and practical modes as the central 
objects of study, although this does not represent an
^Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes. 48-54. 
4ibid., 69-82.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
exhaustive listing of the modes. From the standpoint of 
philosophy, these modes are all defective because they are 
abstract and fail to achieve the character of fully 
concrete, coherent experience. They fail to overcome the 
dichotomy of the observer and that which is observed; they 
presuppose or designate the observed thing, rather than 
providing a comprehensive, exhaustive, concrete definition, 
which alone is satisfactory to philosophy.
The scientific and historical modes come closer than 
the practical to seeking experience for its own sake, but 
they still fall short. The scientific mode is concerned 
with definite, demonstrable knowledge, knowledge that is 
perfectly and unambiguously communicable; for this reason, 
science culminates in the search for quantitative knowledge. 
The scientific mode, unlike the historical and the 
practical, can admit relationships of cause and effect; the 
latter two modes deal with human beings who attribute 
significance, which is not reducible to causality, to their 
own actions. The historian, constructing an historical past 
from a set of artifacts, seeks an explanation of contingent 
relationships in terms of their significance. The historian 
projects truth and reality into the past, whereas the 
practical man projects reality into the future.^
^Oakeshott elaborates on the historical and scientific modes 
in chapters 3 and 4 of Experience and Its Modes (86-168 and 169- 
246). Further discussions of the historical mode are to be found 
in "The Activity of Being a Historian," in Rationalism in 
Politics and Other Essays (London and New York: Methuen, 1962),
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Each of these modes of experience represents a 
homogeneous world of abstract ideas; they are exclusive of 
and irrelevant to each other. Error arises when we attempt 
to argue in one mode with the vocabulary of another. For 
instance, Oakeshott believes it to be illegitimate to argue 
against a philosophical postulate on the grounds that its 
propagation might be destructive to morality or religion; 
such an argument illegitimately moves from the practical to 
the philosophical mode. Similarly, he thinks it incorrect 
to speak of applying a scientific discovery to practical 
life. Such a discovery would have to be transformed—  
perhaps from the scientific mode to the technical mode, 
which would be a species of the practical mode— before it 
could be so applied.®
"Each world of abstract ideas, we have seen, so long as 
it is content to mind its own business, is unassailable," 
remarks Oakeshott. However, he believed it would be 
impossible for each mode so to limit itself. Each mode 
tends to assert its validity absolutely; to do otherwise, it 
would have to be aware of its shortcoming or partiality, 
which would mean it was already on the way to passing out of 
modality into philosophy. From the standpoint of totality, 
each of the modes is incomplete and contains an element of
137-167, and in "Three Essays on History," in On History and 
Other Essays (Totowa, N. J.; Barnes and Noble, 1983), 1-118.
®Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes. 311-315.
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self-contradiction. Philosophy must assert itself against 
the modes when they attempt to assert themselves outside 
their realms of limited validity. This obligation of 
philosophy holds especially with respect to the ubiquitous 
mode of practical experience.^
Politics as Practical Experience 
The practical is the one mode in which we cannot avoid 
participating. Concerned with the satisfaction of 
substantive wants, it is essential to the conduct of life. 
Although most of our mundane existence is taken up with 
practical activity, philosophy cannot abide the claim that 
practice constitutes the whole of experience, providing what 
the other modes lack.
Practice is defined by its essential concern with the 
alteration of existence. Alteration includes both change 
and the prevention of change, as in an activity of 
maintenance. Practical experience is not to be confused 
with a vulgar conception of "practicality." Even the 
religious mystic, living a life of quietism, is involved in 
the mode of practical experience. "Practice is activity, 
the activity inseparable from the conduct of life and from 
the necessity of which no living man can relieve himself."®
■7jbid., 329-330. 
®Ibid., 256-57.
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Practice depends upon a movement from a "what is" to a 
"to be" which is "not yet." The "what is" and the "to be" 
are always of the same character; the latter is implicit or 
potential in the former. (In a conserving or maintaining 
activity, threatened change belongs to the "what is.") The 
"to be," or "not yet," represents a more coherent form of 
the "what is"; it is equivalent to what ought to be. The 
activity of eliciting the "not yet" from the "what is" 
represents a reconciliation of the world of fact with that 
of value.
Practical activity requires a criterion for determining 
what constitutes a satisfactory alteration; this reveals 
that any claim on the part of practice to represent the 
whole of experience must be false. The world of practical 
fact is inherently unstable and incoherent; science and 
history at least deal with a world of unchanging fact. 
Practical activity by its nature throws truth ahead into the 
future; it seeks the criterion for a satisfactory alteration 
in a worlc of value which is not itself the world of 
practice. To look to a sphere beyond itself is intrinsic to 
practical experience; by itself, it cannot render experience 
coherent.®
Oakeshott believes that practical activity can never 
finally be satisfactory; in fact, it can be seen as 
intrinsically self-frustrating. The resolution of fact and
9jbid., 257-263.
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value attempted by practice can never fully be achieved; a 
new discord will spring up as soon as a reconciliation is 
achieved. Each resolution affords a new perspective which 
reveals new discords. Any resolution achieved by practical 
activity will always be partial and incomplete, owing to the 
character of practice as an abstract mode of experience.^® 
Oakeshott criticizes contemporary society for having 
become infatuated with practical activity; he sees practice 
as driving out other spheres of activity. In Experience and 
Its Modes he had identified poetry as a form of practice; 
later, he came to conceive it as a kind of contemplative 
imagining that yields a delight inseparable from the 
activity itself. In his essay, "The Voice of Poetry in the 
Conversation of Mankind," he represented the diverse modes 
of experience as voices in a conversation; poetry is in 
danger of being drowned out by the louder voices of science 
and practice. In a discussion of "The Study of 'Politics' 
in a University," he discusses the technical and vocational 
trend in university education, tending as it does to drive 
out the historical and literary studies traditionally 
associated with liberal education: "And consequently, in a 
society (such as ours) which has a high standard of
l®Ibid., 289-291.
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practical relevance, universities have often to be 
defended.
A technical trend can be discerned in politics as well 
as in education. Oakeshott held that an understanding of 
politics as an exclusively technical pursuit was 
characteristic of contemporary ideologies. Such an 
understanding excludes that element of tacit judgement or 
political "connoisseurship” that Oakeshott identifies as 
traditional political knowledge. Modern ideologies 
represent political "cribs" that may be necessary in order 
that newly enfranchised groups, whose members may not have 
had much opportunity to develop traditional political 
skills, may nevertheless participate in politics. Technical 
political knowledge may be formulated in terms of precise 
rules; traditional knowledge, which is more diffuse, appears 
less precise and quickly falls out of favor, at least when 
compared to the newfangled political " c r i b s ."^2
The theme of the domination of technical activity at 
the expense of all other such modes was central to 
Oakeshott's reflections on politics. An understanding of 
politics as exclusively technical is one aspect of a self- 
frustrating "hyperactivity" that manifests itself in
^^Oakeshott, "The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of 
Mankind" and "The Study of 'Politics' in a University," 
Rationalism in Politics end Other Essavs. 246-247, 310-311.
^^Greenleaf, 46-51; see also Oakeshott, "Rationalism in 
Politics" and "Rational Conduct," 1-36 and 80-110 in Rationalism 
in Politics and Other Essavs.
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societal immoderation and political "enthusiasm.” A more 
proper understanding of the political would emphasize its 
more detached, formal aspects. It would be preferable if 
politics resembled the mode of civil association, rather 
than mere technical activity, to as great an extent as 
possible.
Hobbes! Politics as Artifice 
"The rule of law denotes both a strict and an 
unexacting relationship: here there is no place for 
enthusiasm." As with other thinkers identified with the 
political right, Oakeshott diagnoses contemporary political 
disorders as manifestations of an unbridled enthusiasm, 
perhaps recalling the disenchantment of Hobbes with the 
activities of religious sectarians before and during the 
English Civil War. Oakeshott seeks to delineate the 
boundaries of "politics properly understood” in order to 
exclude such enthusiasms. Here he conceptualizes his 
preferred mode of politics as "the rule of law"; elsewhere 
he speaks of a preference for societas rather than 
universitas. Both conceptualizations are designed to 
exclude an "enthusiastic" politics of mass movements and 
charismatic leaders.
Oakeshott's determination to defeat political 
enthusiasm dictates that he disparage any reference to
^^Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law," in On Historv and Other 
Essavs. 148.
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natural law as the foundation of political authority. In 
the first place, he finds the promulgation of such doctrines 
to be attended by "enthusiasm" in the pejorative sense. 
Furthermore, for good Hobbesian reasons he sees these 
doctrines as threats to the political order, since they 
threaten to become competitors with law as established by 
duly constituted authority. He speaks of "the fanciful 
doctrine of the Declaration of Independence" and "the absurd 
device of a Bill of Rights." "National interest" has no more 
validity than "common good." His "rule of law" has no use 
for a "higher" or "fundamental" law in the sense of an 
entrenched constitution or Basic Law.
To keep the polity from being overrun by political 
enthusiasm, a detached stance toward matters political must 
be reinforced by an insistence that politics falls within 
the realm of artifice, not nature. In his introduction to 
the Leviathan. Oakeshott stresses that for Hobbes "civil 
society is an artifact; it is artificial, not natural. . . . 
The word 'civil', in Hobbes, means artifice springing from 
more than one will." Whereas Plato was the philosopher of 
Reason and Nature, and Hegel was the theorist of Rational 
Will, Hobbes provided the "master-conceptions" of Will and
Artifice. 15
14"Talking Politics," National Review. 5 December 1975, 
1424-1427; "The Rule of Law," in On Historv. 158-9.
^^Introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan. ed. Oakeshott (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1946), xxviii-xxix, xii.
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Oakeshott believes that Hobbes provided a perspective 
from which modern confusion about the scope of the political 
could be overcome. Hobbes understood that the crucial issue 
was not the naturalness but the authoritativeness of rule.
In his most recent reflections, Oakeshott argues that "what 
we need to be shown is how the ingredients of such an 
association might be created and assembled; and, in 
particular, how human beings might acquire the condition of 
being obligated to observe the prescriptions of an humanus 
legislator. Among theorists of association in terms of the 
rule of law, Thomas Hobbes is, I think, one of the few who 
addressed himself exactly to this question.
In the same essay, Oakeshott speaks of Hobbes's "vision 
of a state" in such a way as to suggest that this "vision" 
closely parallels his own conception of "civil association" 
or societas. "Such a state, he [Hobbes] contended, is 
composed of personae related solely in terms of obligations 
to observe in all their self-chosen conduct certain non­
instrumental (that is moral or procedural) conditions 
prescribed by a sovereign legislative office expressly 
authorized to deliberate, make and issue such prescriptions 
which constitute the lex of the association." This vision, 
"superbly pioneered" by Hobbes along with Bodin, "is deeply 
rooted in our civilization."^^
l^Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law," in On Historv. 149-150. 
l^ibid., 157, 161-162.
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civil Association: Common Concern.
Not Common Purpose
In the second part of On Human Conduct, entitled "On 
the Civil Condition," Oakeshott feels compelled to attempt 
an exhaustive specification of the terms of the relationship 
he called "civil association." "It is a certain mode of 
association, one among others," he remarks; "I shall call it 
the relationship of civility." Whether this relationship of 
civility constitutes a distinct mode of experience. on the 
same level as the historical, the scientific, and the 
practical, is left ambiguous.
The engagement appropriate to civil association falls 
somewhere between the sphere of the legal and that of the 
political. Oakeshott defines the political as "practical 
activity concerned with the institutions and arrangements of 
an association of human beings." As a form of practical 
activity, politics is concerned with whether particular 
institutions are desirable, but civil association has a 
concern more exacting and specific than that of "mere" 
desirability. A central component of civil association is 
adjudication of the kind to be found in a disinterested 
legal court, in which "merely" political considerations are 
to be set to one side. Civil association can no more 
exclude legislation than adjudication, but legislation of a 
certain kind, which would consider the satisfaction of
^®Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, Clarendon Press, 1975), 108.
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specific interests instead of adopting a disinterested 
perspective, would remove us from civil association into the 
realm of politics in the vulgar sense.
Civitas is a condition postulating relationships 
"neither quite so narrow as those pointed to in the words 
•legal' and 'legally', nor so indiscriminate as those now 
commonly (but I  think unfortunately) understood by the words 
'political' and 'politically'." Drawing upon the discussion 
of the Greek polis in Aristotle's Politics. Oakeshott 
characterizes the civil condition as "always self-complete 
in the sense of having no extrinsic substantive purpose . .
. it is like 'friendship' but diluted or 'watery'." As 
such, it should be distinguished from a transactional 
relationship between bargainers, which pursues a common 
purpose or interest in the form of the satisfaction of a 
substantive want. This latter "enterprise association," 
which is strictly to be distinguished from civil 
association, includes but is not limited to exchange 
relationships in the economic marketplace.^0
Civil association, as an alternative to enterprise 
association, is defined as association in terms of 
subscription to a practice. Subscription to a practice 
should not be taken as equivalent to "practical engagement"
^^The above definition of the political is taken from 
Oakeshott's preface to D. J. Manning, ed., The Form of Ideoloav 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), viii.
20oakeshott, On Human Conduct. 108-117.
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or a "mode of practical experience," since these latter 
expressions designate concern with satisfaction of 
substantive wants, while the notion of a practice seems to 
be defined by the absence of just such substantive concerns.
A practice does not enjoin a substantive performance, but 
instead sets conditions to be met in the course of any such 
performance. It is a formal rather than a substantial 
relationship, similar to that among speakers of a common 
language in that it is concerned with subscription to common 
rules rather than pursuit of common purposes, akin to the 
relation "of French-speakers in respect of their language, 
not in respect of what they have to say.
Civil association is concerned with the propriety or 
authority of actions rather than their substantive 
desirability; essentially it is rule-articulated 
association. It calls only for assent, not approval or 
disapproval. All within the jurisdiction of a rule are 
obligated; obligation is not a condition that one can deny 
simply because one does not feel it. A rule is a 
prescription or standing order that remains in force for 
unknown future occasions. Rules do not enjoin particular 
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The rules of civil association are rules of a 
particular kind. An enterprise association may have its 
constitution or bylaws, but the enforcement of these rules 
does not constitute the substantive purpose of the 
enterprise. Similarly, the rules of a game do not have the 
same status as those of civil association; players are in 
the game to win, not just to follow the rules. Civil 
association begins and ends in terms of rules; the rules of 
civil association, called lex or "law," define a 
relationship among formal equals or gives. Laws are the 
sole terms in which cives are related. Gives may be 
understood as "fictional persons," and their creation by lex 
may be understood as a "legal fiction"; no man is a "civic 
person" and nothing else. Men are cives only from the 
perspective of civil association, the "mode of civility."
The rules of civil association go together to form a svstem 
for the enforcement of norms of human behavior; they are 
related to each other argumentatively. not merely 
incidentally. This system must specify conditions for 
ascertaining its own authenticity and specifying its 
jurisdiction, since there are no extrinsic standards for 
doing so; lex specifies relations among cives who are not 
otherwise related.
An essential feature of cives is that they may be 
related to each other as suitors to a judicial court; civil
23ibid., 129-130.
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association sustains itself by means of continuous 
adjudication. Such adjudication is not a "managerial" 
device; decisions are to be rendered and claims made only 
with respect to general normative considerations derived 
from lex. Ideally, there should be no "interested" parties 
in a judicial proceeding; not only the court, but also the 
"plaintiff" and the "defendant," should be concerned with 
the articulation or illustration of lex, with coming to a 
conclusion that is acceptable to lex, rather than with the 
satisfaction of a particulier substantive interest.24
Although adjudication is at the heart of lex, resort to 
legislation cannot be avoided absolutely in the civil 
condition. This follows from the character of civil 
association as a product of human artifice. However,
Oakeshott cautions against a too hasty resort to 
legislation; where possible, it is preferable for the courts 
to articulate that which is implicit in lex as it exists 
already. Oakeshott contends that constant ad hoc 
legislation constitutes a breakdown in civil association.
He would not regard much of the legislation passed by 
contemporary legislatures as genuine lex. He remarks that 
"lex cannot be a schedule of current awards designed to 
promote the achievement of some satisfactions at the expense 
of others . . . .  Legislative opinion is concerned with the 
desirable composition of a system of moral, not
24ibid., 130-138.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
182
instrumental, considerations and therefore it cannot be 
concerned with the claims or merits of interest in procuring 
substantive satisfactions."25
Civil association can no more avoid an element of 
rulership and administration than it can forego completely 
the passage of legislation. Lex makes the issuance of 
injunctions consistent with civil association by authorizing 
specific offices wit:' — fficient authority to enjoin 
performances that do not conform to legal conditions. To 
perform this enforcement function, the ruler requires an 
enforcement apparatus; he cannot avoid entering into 
managerial and administrative relations. Judicial rule is 
preferable to administrative edict, but both are necessary. 
However, it should not be the case that the ruler becomes 
nothing but a manager; in that case, civil association would 
have disappeared, having been replaced by enterprise 
association. "Rulers may employ clerks but they rule 
subjects." Otherwise, "rulership" will have been supplanted
by "lordship."26
The comprehensive conditions of civil association 
consist of the enforcement of a manifold of rules, not the 
pursuit of a common substantive purpose or interest.
Civitas is concerned with law, not policy; the contemporary 
understanding of government as the adoption of . .'.'public
25lbid., 138-141. 
26ibid., 141-147.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
183
policy” constitutes a vulgarization of civil association. 
Governmental authority should not be understood as a 
derivative of the desirability of policies adopted; in civil 
association, government is recognized as authoritative 
solely because of a common recognition that it is duly 
authorized. Appeal to "natural law" or a "common good" is 
ruled out. Lex may include rules for testing what purports 
to be authoritative, but such a "constitution" does not have 
the status of a "higher law" of superior status, according 
to which other law may be validated or invalidated; such a 
constitution is no more immune to inquiry or interpretation 
than the remainder of the law. Civil association knows no 
other "justice" than the "inner justice" of a legal
system.27
Civil association admits considerations both of 
authoritativeness and of desirability. However, a certain 
danger arises when the latter considerations are involved. 
"Politics" for Oakeshott takes on a double meaning, the 
first of which is consistent with civil association, the 
second of which is inimical to it; we may speak of "politics 
properly speaking" and "vulgar politics." The proper sense 
of politics is the consideration of the conditions of civil 
association in terms of their desirability; this is not an 
undifferentiated engagement concerned with satisfying wants, 
whatever they may be. Ruling should be concerned with
27ibid., 147-154.
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authoritativeness, not persuasiveness; it has no place for 
techniques of persuasion which present the ruler as a 
charismatic figure who exercises an amorphous kind of 
"leadership." The requirements of electioneering threaten a 
vulgarization of the civil condition. If the ruler must 
engage in electioneering, he should at least distinguish his 
rulership from his participation in this vulgar kind of
politics.28
Oakeshott understood civil association, or "politics 
properly speaking," as an exacting relationship which 
demands a high degree of detachment. Much of what is 
described with the adjective "political" in contemporary 
times would be excluded. Civil association requires a 
"disciplined imagination"; one must exercise a critical 
intellect while accepting the requirement of assent to 
authority. Oakeshott remarks that his conception may appear 
to "impose upon politics an implausibly circumspect 
character," but he stipulates that he is articulating an 
ideal form, not an account of just whatever happens to be in 
the head of a typical politician. As such, "it calls for so 
exact a focus of attention and so uncommon a self-restraint 
that one is not astonished to find this mode of human 
relationship to be as rare as it is excellent."29
28ibid., 161-168. 
29lbid., 163-165, 180.
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Oakeshott*s Reading of Hobbes; Philosopher 
of Civil Association
Oakeshott invokes the authority of Hobbes in defence of 
his conception of civil association as the proper 
understanding of politics. To make this case, he must 
defend his interpretation of Hobbes as the philosopher of 
politics-as-artifice against any suggestion that the author 
of the Leviathan was a natural-law theorist. Such is the 
purpose of Oakeshott*s essay, "The Moral Life in the 
Writings of Thomas Hobbes," in which he sets out to 
establish his favored interpretation of Hobbes over two 
alternatives. The first alternative he attributes to 
Strauss in The Political Philosophv of Hobbes. On 
Oakeshott's reading, Strauss holds that Hobbes's political 
obligation is binding because it is rational. Man is 
compelled to endeavour to preserve his own existence; his 
behavior is rational so long as he does not venture beyond 
this. It is rational for man to seek peace, which is 
necessary for self-preservation. To make war against others 
is to claim more than a person is naturally entitled to; as 
such, it is irrational and a violation of one's political 
obligation.
Oakeshott presses several objections against this 
reading. First, he holds that Hobbes claimed for man more 
than an obligation or compulsion to self-preservation; man
3®0akeshott, "The Moral Life in the Writings of Thomas 
Hobbes," in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essavs. 264-266.
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had a right to such. Further, the Straussian interpretation 
excludes the essential feature of moral conduct as 
disinterested ; this reading would make all peaceful 
endeavors equally just, however interested. Finally, this 
reading goes astray by equating obligatorv conduct with 
rational conduct. "On no plausible reading of Hobbes is the 
Law of Nature to be considered obligatory because it 
represents rational conduct. . . . 'reason' for Hobbes 
(except where he is being unmistakably equivocal) has no 
prescriptive force." Fear of death may be our motivation 
for action consistent with our obligation, but it is not 
necessarily a justification for doing so.
A second interpretation that Oakeshott seeks to defeat 
is that put forward by Howard Warrender and others to the 
effect that Hobbes is indeed a natural-law theorist. The 
Law of Nature enjoins us to "endeavour peace," and according 
to Warrender the author of this Law of Nature is none other 
than God. Oakeshott objects that Hobbes could not admit 
knowledge of God as the author of natural law as included 
among our natural knowledge. Acknowledgment of God is a 
matter of belief, not knowledge. Hobbes speaks of God as 
"ruler" in a metaphorical sense only; God is the "ruler" 
only of those who acknowledge him. The duty to observe 
political obligation is not apprehended naturally; the Law 
of Nature lacks an authentic interpretation. Oakeshott
31ibid.
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argues that for Hobbes political obligation can emerge only 
by choice or covenant, not by direct apprehension of a 
natural law ordained by God.
Oakeshott's preferred interpretation is that there is 
no natural law for Hobbes. Obligation is binding neither 
because it is rational nor because it is natural, but only 
because it is made by a duly constituted authority. "The 
question. Why am I morally bound to obey the commands of the 
sovereign of my civitas? (which, for Hobbes, is the 
important question) requires no other answer than. Because 
I, in agreement with others in a similar plight to myself, 
and with a common disposition to make covenants, having 
•authorized' him, know him indubitable to be a law-giver and 
know his commands as laws properly speaking." Fear of 
destruction may cause men to enter into a covenant, but 
until a covenant is entered into, there is no law and no 
obligation; obligation begins and ends with civil law.^^
What obligates men to go on keeping the covenant, once 
it is made? Oakeshott offers an intriguing answer: nothing 
does. A duty "to keep the covenant" would have to be 
imposed by a law outside the civil law; Oakeshott concludes 
that for Hobbes there can be no such law, hence no such 
duty. To continue to keep the covenant may be a desirable
32ibid., 273-279; see Warrender, The Political Philosophv of 
Hobbes: His Theory of Obligation (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, Clarendon Press, 1957).
^^Oakeshott, "Moral Life," in Rationalism in Politics. 266-269.
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action, but it is not a duty. "To make and keep the 
covenant . . . are for Hobbes (on this reading) acts of 
prudence which are reasonable and desirable to be performed 
on condition that others perform them, or acts of 'nobility' 
that make no conditions." Assent to political authority 
based on considerations of prudence or virtue would appear 
to be the only version of political "obligation" that Hobbes 
could admit; this is as obligatory as the political can be. 
There is no general political obligation; there are only 
duties to obey specific civil laws. Outside of specific 
laws, there is no obligation.
We find in Oakeshott a consistent denial of natural-law 
content in the Hobbesian theory. Why, then, do we find such 
frequent references to natural law in the Hobbesian corpus? 
Oakeshott argues that Hobbes was conducting an argument at 
two levels, one for "initiates" and another for "the 
ordinary man." Strauss's doctrine of the esoteric reading 
is recalled. At one level we have an exercise in political 
persuasion, conducted in language inoffensive to the settled 
beliefs of the common people; at the philosophical level, we 
have a strict logical deduction. Roughly speaking, we may 
identify the logical exercise with the first and second 
parts of the Leviathan, and the polemics with the third and 
fourth parts, especially since in those parts Hobbes is 
concerned to convince the typical believing Christian of the
34ibid., 266-273.
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day that he need not feel a conflict between his obligation 
to his God and to his sovereign; the two endeavors probably 
cannot strictly be separated from each other, however. 
Oakeshott mentions that this interpretation by no means 
makes Hobbes unique in the history of political theory; he 
cites Plato, Machiavelli, and Bentham as authors who 
combined esoteric and exoteric doctrines in a single 
document.
Since Strauss held that Hobbes placed Right before Law, 
Oakeshott and Strauss would seem to be as one in denying 
that Hobbes is a theorist of natural law. Nevertheless, 
Oakeshott takes some exception to Strauss's claims about 
Hobbes ; he elaborates his objections in an article entitled 
"Dr. Leo Strauss on Hcbbes." In particular, Oakeshott 
denies that Hobbes inaugurated a decisive break in the 
history of political thought (a claim which Strauss finally 
withdrew); Oakeshott holds that the Hobbesian theory has a 
longer and more honorable pedigree than Strauss allows. 
Oakeshott attributes the genesis of Hobbes's theory to the 
Stoic-Christian as distinct from the Aristotelian tradition, 
and also to the Epicurean tradition as it was revived in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Previously, in his 
introduction to Leviathan. he had elaborated the lineage of 
the Hobbesian theory in more detail:
35ibid , 286-288.
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But this theory of Hobbes has a lineage that 
stretches back into the ancient world. It is true that 
Greek thought, lacking the conception of the creative 
will and the idea of sovereignty, contributed a 
criticism of the Rational-Natural theory which fell 
short of the construction of an alternative tradition: 
Epicurus was an inspiration rather than a guide. But 
there are in the political ideals of Roman civilization 
and in the politico-theological ideas of Judaism strains 
of thought . . . which may be said to constitute 
beginnings of a tradition of Will and Artifice. . . .
The skepticism and the individualism, which are the 
foundations of his [Hobbes's] civil philosophy, were the 
gifts of late scholastic nominalism; the displacement of 
Reason in favour of will and imagination and the 
emancipation of passion were slowly mediated changes in 
European thought that had gone far before Hobbes wrote.
While Oakeshott asserts several intellectual sources for
Hobbes in the above and in the article on Strauss, he
discusses none of them in great detail. Nevertheless, he
must have felt that he had suggested enough potential
sources to dispose of the notion that Hobbes could not have
had any intellectual precursors. Furthermore, just as
Hobbes did not mark the beginning of all skeptical-
nominalist theorizing, neither did he mark the conclusion of
natural law theory; "The natural law theory did not die at
once, even otherwise 'modern' thinkers such as Locke have it
embedded in their theories, and it did not die without
resurrection.
Oakeshott attributes to Hobbes an elevated status
within the Western political tradition; furthermore, he
^^cakeshott. Introduction to Leviathan, liii-liv; "Dr. Leo 
Strauss on Hobbes," in Oakeshott, Hobbes on Civil Association 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), 
144-47.
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seeks to downplay the despotic or authoritarian implications 
often attributed to the Hobbesian theory. He affirms that 
for Hobbes there can be no unjust law; however, "This does 
not mean that the legislative office is magically insulated 
from making 'unjust' law." It means only that whatever law 
is made is authoritative; law can be inequitable or 
unnecessary while still being authoritative. The crucial 
question is whether the law, if inequitable or unnecessary, 
may be criticized openly as such by the subjects of the 
Hobbesian sovereign. The criticism traditionally put 
forward is that Hobbesian sovereignty obviates the 
possibility of political life on the part of the subjects; 
for the sovereign to admit criticism would appear to be to 
admit challenges to his authority.
It might be supposed that, were the Hobbesian sovereign 
to determine that dissent was not to be allowed, this could 
not be criticized as unjust; however, he might not deem it 
necessary to do so. Discussion may be admissable so long as 
disobedience is not countenanced. "The absolutism 
attributed to the sovereign authority implies no frenzy for 
regulation or passion for interference. The silence of the 
law will brood over large tracts of the subject's life." 
Furthermore, Oakeshott argues that an absolutely regulated 
society is contrary to the spirit of rule of law; since law
^^Oakeshott, "The Rule of Law," in On History. 157-158. See 
also Introduction to Leviathan. xli-xlii.
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stipulates abstract conditions to be met, rather than 
specific performances, command always implies a degree of 
liberty in execution on the part of the subject.^8
Societas and Universitas; Alternative Conceptions 
of Politics in the Modern European State
Oakeshott asserts that the European conception of the 
state has now become a global phenomenon. How faithful has 
European civilization been to the ideal of politics proposed 
by Oakeshott as the essence of the Hobbesian political 
theory— the notion of civil association as rule of law? Has 
the opposing notion of "enterprise association" come to 
predominate in the contemporary European state? Or, is the 
European state now a confused, ambiguous mixture of these 
two concepts? In exploring this issue, Oakeshott introduces 
the terms societas and universitas as rough equivalents of 
"civil association" and "enterprise association." The fate 
of these opposing conceptions of politics in the 
contemporary world is the subject of the third part of On 
Human Conduct, entitled "On the Character of a Modern 
European State."
Oakeshott contends that the emergence of the concept 
"state," as it emerged by the sixteenth century from the 
breakup of the medieval realms, is marked by confusion. The 
new paradigm emerged from older forms of political 
association, some of whose features pointed to the analogy
^^Oakeshott, Introduction to Leviathan. xliii-xliv.
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of societas. others to universitas. The character of the 
new regime and the understanding of the office of government 
that it implied were not specified exactly. Each of the two 
available analogies offered its own loosely knit collection 
of characteristics; a state could be defined as an 
unresolved tension between the two.
Societas corresponds roughly to Oakeshott's "civil 
association." Citizens of societas accept its authority 
under formal conditions described as "legality," which is 
not equivalent to a common substantive purpose or interest.
It is a formal relationship with rules, not a substantive 
relationship of common purpose or common action. The office 
of the ruler is to stipulate and enforce conditions of 
conduct, not to adopt policies concerned with the 
satisfaction of substantive wants. Alongside societas is 
the alternative conception of universitas. or what Oakeshott 
calls "teleocratic" government. It is an association of 
persons which is itself like a person; individuals are 
comparable in status to the organs of a larger body, united 
in the pursuit of a common purpose or substantive end.
These two analogies may point in different directions, but 
they are not mutually exclusive.
Oakeshott holds that the analogies of societas and 
universitas were already being applied to reflection about 
the political during the Middle Ages; they were "already in
^^Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. 201-206.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
194
use to denote some actual associations and communities. The 
human race was often reckoned to be a societas and so was a 
civitas or regnum; while an imperial city, a gild, a 
cathedral chapter, or a 'university' were recognized as 
universitates." Soon the two expressions were appropriated 
for learned argument about politics. While Oakeshott holds 
that an actual state may partake of both analogies to some 
extent, he believes that they should be kept distinct as 
concepts; regrettably, he argues, their meanings have become 
hopelessly muddled. For instance, the terms societas and 
universitas were translated into English respectively as 
"partnership" and "corporation," which are now used 
indifferently. When we refer today to "law," "ruling," and 
"politics," these terms partake of both the societas and 
universitas analogies in a muddled fashion.
Oakeshott maintains that there is much to suggest that 
the late medieval realm can be understood in terms of 
societas. It was constituted in judicial terms. The 
monarch was not a lordly proprietor but a ruler of subjects, 
concerned with keeping the peace. Revenue was collected, 
but the realm was not treated as a piece of real estate to 
be exploited. The realm was not understood as a landed 
estate, a commercial enterprise, or a military association, 
but an association in terms of legal relationships.^^
40jbid., 199-201. 
41lbid., 206-213.
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At the same time, some features of the late medieval 
realm suggested the analogy of universitas. The distinction 
between the govern-ient oi a realm and the management of a 
manor never emerged conclusively. An element of lordship 
survived from the medieval realm to the European state, 
making it eligible to be understood as a kind of 
universitas. This was most convincing with respect to the 
ruler's sacerdotal authority, in which the inculcation of 
Christian culture is understood as part of the office of 
government. The Church was coming to be understood as one 
among many corporate associations within the state; the 
special authority once held by the Church passed to the
r u l e r .
Over the course of the sixteenth century, kingdoms with 
pretensions to being modern states began to emerge. Their 
identifying marks were clear; their concern was to exclude 
"rule from without" in the form of papal or imperial 
authority. Rulership was concerned primarily with 
"pacification" aimed at encroachments from outside powers.
The character of rule changed from personal management by a 
manorial lord to the formal relationship of ruler and 
subject. The new arrangement provided a liberation from the 
threat of civil disorder, but the liberation was not 
received without reservations; Oakeshott remarks that "this 
liberating civil authority was seen also to have a menacing
42ibid., 214-224.
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aspect: it evoked misgivings commensurate with its 
magnitude.” Institutional arrangements were constructed to 
guard against this potential menace, but by the nineteenth 
century the pressure of circumstances led to a breakdown of 
the notion of postulated limits on government.
The self-understanding of a particular state could 
consist of a mixture of the societas and universitas 
conceptions in any proportion, depending on the extent to 
which the office of government is understood as being either 
to rule or to manage. The concept of the modern European 
state partakes of ambiguity on this crucial question. 
Oakeshott, for his part, makes it clear that persons of a 
certain disposition will prefer the societas conception. 
Furthermore, he suggests strongly that he holds this 
disposition to societas to be morally superior; he calls it 
"the strongest strand in the moral convictions of the 
inhabitants of modern Europe." This disposition understands 
human conduct in terms of self-enactment, self-disclosure, 
or self-actualization; it understands human conduct in terms 
of its authenticity. For persons of this disposition, the 
conduct of life consists of a dramatic, contingent 
engagement by intelligent beings rather than the completion 




Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
197
Circumstances have arisen during modern European 
history that have given rise to a disposition opposed to 
that of self-enactment and self-disclosure. Several factors 
have contributed. The development of an administrative 
apparatus, indispensible though it may be, inclines us to 
conceive of government as an enterprise association. 
Furthermore, the recurrence of warfare compelled states to 
undertake activities inimical to civil association.
However, the most crucial such development was the emergence 
of the so-called "problem of the poor," in which Europe saw 
the emergence of a mass mentality incapable of undertaking 
the demands of detachment and disinterest required by civil 
association.
The individual manqué had suffered not only 
substantive loss but also moral defeat. The morality of 
respect for individuality and of virtuous self­
enactment was certainly not without competitors in the 
world of emerging European states, and it was soon to 
encounter a resurgent (though somewhat rickety) morality 
centered upon the pursuit of a so-called 'common good', 
but it had swept aside both what was valuable and what 
was not so valuable in the morality of communal ties.
And the weight of this moral victory bore heavily upon 
the individual manqué. . . .
He had feelings rather than thoughts, impulses 
rather than opinions, inabilities rather than passions.
He required to be told what to think, to ask for, and to 
do, and in the course of time his natural submissiveness 
prompted the emergence of 'leaders' to perform this 
service for him.
Contemporary politics thus comes to partake of "mass
movements" composed of "mass men" or "anti-individuals" who
gravitate around politicians who use techniques of mass
persuasion, advertising, and propagandizing to exercise a
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charismatic "leadership” which would have no place within 
the more constrained understanding of politics provided by 
civil association. If the charismatic "leader" is 
sufficiently unscrupulous, he may take on the character of 
the totalitarian dictator.
The concluding passages of "On the Character of a 
Modern European State" consist of a complaint about the 
compromised character of contemporary polities, in which 
societas and universitas have become so badly conflated.
One commentator observes that Oakeshott subjects the 
universitas conception to "restrained abuse." We read that 
modern states have become "development corporations" in 
which the people are to be "made one in devotion to a 
pattern of 'enlightened' conduct." Government has become an 
indiscriminate enterprise in pursuit of "well-being" or 
"welfare"; education has been transformed from an initiation 
into a moral and intellectual inheritance to the provision 
of an apprenticeship in technical skills so that the people 
may become assets to the state in pursuit of its enterprise. 
Government takes on the character of a "therapeutic state" 
intent upon remedying an ill-defined alienation, 
frustration, insecurity, guilt, or anomie, at the expense of 
all vestiges of civil association.'*®
45jbid., 263-279, esp. 277-278.
^®Ibid., 296-297, 306-310; see also Maurice Cowling, 
Religion and Public Doctrine in Modern England (Cambridge, 
England: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 274.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199
The character of modern European government would 
appear to be hopelessly equivocal; the conceptions of 
societas and universitas have been contingently joined and 
thus confused. The character of the people suffers under 
this arrangement. "The member of such a state enjoys the 
composure of the conscript assured of his dinner. His 
•freedom' is warm, compensated servility." Nevertheless, a 
glimmer of a superior conception of political association 
survives in European cultuie; "But, while those who are 
disposed to take the other path are, perhaps, fewer and are 
often denigrated as frivolous individuals merely out for the 
walk, no European alive to his inheritance of moral 
understanding has ever found it possible to deny the 
superior desirability of civil association without a 
profound feeling of guilt."^7
Oakeshott•s complaint about the character of modern 
European government could be characterized as nothing more 
than a visceral revulsion at the growth of the state and at 
the spiritual condition of man under welfarism. However, in 
an essay in Political Studies, which appeared in a more 
popularized version in National Review, he argues that the 
confused self-understanding of contemporary polities 
represents a threat to the very authority of government. In 
these two articles, he conceives the state as composed of an 
office of authoritv. an apparatur -f power, and a mode of
^^oakeshott. On Human Conduct. 317-325.
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association. By an office of authority is meant the 
constitution by virtue of which we take governmental 
authority to be legitimate; the vocabulary invoked here 
includes that of "democracy," "republicanism," "monarchy," 
"autocracy," "tyranny," and the like. The apparatus of 
power is the administrative bureaucracy which government 
cannot avoid constructing. The mode of association is 
either societas. universitas. or some mixture of the two. 
Contemporary confusion is most acute with respect to the 
office of authority, argues Oakeshott. Government authority 
ought to be affirmed on the basis of whether it has been 
duly authorized, but the vocabulary of authority has been 
appropriated for the evaluation of the performance of 
government policy concerning some substantive purpose, 
usually the pursuit of general economic prosperity. We hear 
talk of democratic and autocratic economies rather than 
democratic and autocratic constitutions. This may indicate 
that the popular understanding of the legitimacy of 
government is based on evaluation of substantive performance 
rather than due authorization. Indifference to government 
authority may be the result; order may be endangered 
whenever economic performance suffers a significant 
decline."^®
Oakeshott, "The Vocabulary of a Modern European State," 
Political Studies 23(1975): 197-219, 409-414; "Talking Politics," 
1345-1347 and 1423-1428.
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Politics as "Second-Best Deliverence”
Oakeshott argued that several features of the medieval 
realm anticipated the ideal form of societas. As he 
describes them, the duties of the ruler under this medieval 
realm are "to provide courts in which all his subjects might 
find redress for wrongs suffered and recognition for those 
of their actions which subscribed to authoritative 
procedures, to guard the realm against its enemies, and to 
collect the revenue needed in these undertakings." Is 
societas therefore to be identified with the "night-watchman 
state" of libertarianism, in which courts, police, the 
military, and the collection of sufficient revenue for these 
functions are stipulated to be the only legitimate functions 
of government?
Typically, political theorists are quick to deny that 
their reflections partake of ideology or partisanship. 
Nevertheless, Oakeshott would appear to admit to a favorable 
disposition to the laissez-faire position. How does 
Oakeshott distinguish his attitude from an "ideology" in the 
pejorative sense? We must "read between the lines" to 
determine his attitude on this matter, since he does not 
address it explicitly. We might begin by examining one of 
the few instances in wnich he addresses "the issues of the 
day."
^^Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. 212.
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In the June 1951 Cambridge Journal. Oakeshott discussed 
a British government report on the activities of the B. B.
C. We would expect that a partisan of the "night-watchman 
state" would call for the abolition of the B. B. C., leaving 
broadcasting to private entrepreneurs. Actually,
Oakeshott's criticism stopped far short of this. He did 
treat with "restrained abuse" the notion of "social 
purpose," especially the concern to raise the level of 
public taste, which the B. B. C. has always taken as part of 
its mandate.^®
Oakeshott did not hold the concern with broadcast 
standards to be illegitimate. "Of course there must be 
attention to standards; but it is not unreasonable to ask 
whether these particular standards and this particular, 
over-heated pursuit of a narrowly conceived social purpose 
is the proper object for broadcasting, or whether what is 
desirable is something less highfalutin'. For if we are 
bidden choose between broadcasting conducted in the manner 
of the B. B. C. and the supposed standardless bedlam of 
commercial broadcasting we are offered an incomplete range 
of alternatives." He did not oppose the continuation of the 
B. B. C.'s broadcast monopoly; he conjectured that 
commercial competition might result in less diversity rather 
than more. He objected to the B. B. C.'s manner of pursuing
50oakeshott, "The B. B. C.," Cambridge Journal 4 (June 1951);
545.
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its "social purpose” because it struck him as a form of 
"enthusiasm" in the pejorative sense. In particular, he was 
concerned that the B. B. C.'s movement toward "around-the- 
clock" broadcasting was threatening to turn radio into a 
kind of "background noise." He favored "monopoly joined 
with a less grandiose purpose than that which guides the B.
B. C."51
Philosophically, Oakeshott placed concrete practice 
above abstract theory. His approach to the broadcasting 
issue reveals a political practice characterized by a 
particular sensibility or disposition, rather than the 
application of a programmatic ideology. We might conjecture 
that he would argue that it is this feature which saves his 
position from becoming an "ideology" in the pejorative 
sense. He praised the University of Chicago economist Henry 
Simons for the non-abstract character of his libertarianism: 
"The freedom which he is to inquire into is neither an 
abstraction or a dream. He is a libertarian, not because he 
begins with an abstract definition of liberty, but because 
he has actually enjoyed a way of living (and seen others 
enjoy it) which those who have enjoyed it are accustomed (on 
account of certain precise characteristics) to call a free 
way of living, and because he has found it to be good." On 
the other hand, he criticized Hayek for turning 
libertarianism into a "politics of the textbook” which
Sljbid., 550-554.
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reflected the kind of political "enthusiasm" which he 
opposed. "A plan to resist all planning may be better than 
its opposite, but it belongs to the same style of
politics."52
Oakeshott's "man of conservative disposition" "believes 
that the more closely an innovation resembles growth (that 
is, the more clearly it is intimated in and not merely 
imposed upon the situation) the less likely it is to result 
in a preponderance of loss." Gradual change is preferable 
to a programmatic politics that would begin from a "blank 
slate" and attempt to construct a political association ex 
nihilo. The preference provides the connecting link between 
the "traditionalism" of the Rationalism in Politics essays 
and the elaboration of civil association or societas in On 
Human Conduct and "The Rule of Law." In these later works 
he was attempting to put into the form of postulates what 
were, in fact, the working traditions of British political 
practice as he understood them: a network of interlocking 
institutions, developed over centuries of practice rather 
than imposed on the basis of an ideologist’s doctrines, 
which provided for a way of life in which overwhelming 
concentrations of power were avoided.53
52oakeshott, "The Political Economy of Freedom," 39-40, and 
"Rationalism in Politics," 21, in Rationalism in Politics and 
Other Essavs.
53Oakeshott, "On Being Conservative," 172, and "The 
Political Economy of Freedom," 40-41, in Rationalism in Politics 
and Other Essavs.
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Such a network of institutions provided for a îsarket 
economy, but not for what Oakeshott calls an "imaginary" 
laissez-faire program. His political prescriptions vary 
from those of an "absolutist" libertarianism at several 
points. For instance, he discusses Simons's advocacy of 
suppression of private monopoly; public operation may even 
be necessary in case of gross market failure. Rule of law 
may not be sustainable without certain qualifications; it is 
not necessarily compromised fatally if, for instance, local 
authorities provide certain substantive services to be paid 
for by a "rate.
It could be that just about any "qualification" of 
societas might be acceptable to Oakeshott, as long as it is 
put forward in the proper spirit; he is disturbed not so 
much by the substantive content of certain proposals as by 
the temperament of those who advocate them. Politics 
requires of us a "disinterested acknowledgment of all others 
as one's equal"; such disinterestedness may, given certain 
contingent conditions, require us to consider such 
"qualifications" of civil association as welfare measures. 
Proposals for such measures may originate in a want or a 
felt grievance, but Oakeshott insists that they "must lose 
this character and acquire another (a political character) 
in being understood, advanced and considered as a proposal
^'^Oakeshott, "The Political Economy of Freedom," in 
Rationalism in Politics. 55-58; "The Rule of Law," in On History. 
162-163.
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for the amendment of the respublica of civil association.”
Do the myriad proposals and demands put forward in 
contemporary polities have this specifically political 
character, or do they resemble "payoffs" to preferred 
interests or powerful voting blocs? Do political advocates 
have the capacity for detachment and deliberation to be 
expected of those to whom we would describe as statesmen, or 
do they more nearly resemble the charismatic leader around 
whom great masses of "anti-individuals" have been known to 
coalesce? The answers will determine whether these 
proposals and movements reflect the moderation that 
Oakeshott thought appropriate to politics, or whether they 
threaten to turn politics into an instrument of the
passions.55
The above considerations suggest the possibility that 
Oakeshott's exacting effort to distinguish societas from 
universitas in On Human Conduct constitutes a diversion from 
the main current of his thought. Here he may have deviated 
from his general intention of capturing the essence of the 
living political traditions of British civilization, 
providing instead a pair of definitions according to which a 
society may be judged to have conformed to or deviated from 
an abstract ideal of political propriety. The discussion of 
societas and universitas may be the closest that Oakeshott
55oakeshott, "Moral Life," in Rationalism in Politics, 265; 
On Human Conduct. 169-170; "On Being Conservative," in 
Rationalism in Politics. 191-193.
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comes to providing a political "crib," an abridged account 
of the British tradition for those who are not conversant 
with it. He may have felt compelled to provide that which 
he criticized Hayek for proposing, an "ideology of freedom." 
Elsewhere, he seems more concerned with the spirit or temper 
characterizing a political tendency or proposal than its 
conformity or lack of same to an abstract definition of 
societas. The former concern predominates in most of 
Oakeshott's briefer essays on politics as opposed to the 
meticulous distinction between societas and universitas tc 
be found in On Human Conduct.
Oakeshott's mention of the "World State (of H. G. Wells 
or anyone else)" recalls Strauss's concept of the "universal 
and homogeneous state." However, Oakeshott's opposition to 
such a project is not rooted in a concern for 
constitutionalism or for natural law as with Strauss, but 
in the perception that such a proposal does not display the 
sobriety that he thinks appropriate to politics. One 
measure of this sobriety (or its absence) might be the 
nature of the "salvation" or "deliverance" to be expected 
from politics. For Oakeshott, politics could only provide a 
"second-best" deliverance. In his introduction to 
Leviathan, he argued that while politics might provide 
something instrumental to "the good life," the achievement 
of this good was not to be equated with "the good life" 
itself. "We may, then, enquire of any political philosophy
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conceived on this plan, whether the gift of politics to 
mankind is, in principle, the gift of salvation itself, or 
whether it is something less, and if the latter, what 
relation it bears to salvation. . . . the achievement in 
politics is a tangible good and not, therefore, to be 
separated from the deliverance that constitutes the whole 
good, but something less than the deliverance itself." For 
the Greeks, the end of politics was to make possible 
something beyond itself, the contemplative, intellectual 
life. The end of politics for Hobbes was more mundane than 
for the Greeks; it was not contemplation but felicity, "a 
negative gift, merely making not impossible that which is 
desirable," promising "neither fulfillment nor wisdom to 
discern fulfillment, but peace, . . . the only thing in 
human life, on Hobbes's theory, that can be permanently 
established." Hobbes brings sobriety to politics by 
stipulating that the political realm is to seek something 
less than an ultimate deliverance; Oakeshott, therefore, 
sees in him an ally where Strauss sees an opponent.^®
SGoakeshott, "Rationalism in Politics," in Rationalism in 
Politics. 6-7; Introduction to Leviathan. Ixiv-lxvi.
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CHAPTER 6: HANNAH ARENDT AND ERIC 
VOEGELIN— FRAGMENTS ON HOBBES
A survey of commentaries on Hobbes in twentieth- 
century political thought would be incomplete without a 
comparison and contrast of the brief but provocative remarks 
offered by Hannah Arendt and Eric Voegelin. Arendt, 
Voegelin, and Strauss are often categorized by American 
political theorists as the three great twentieth-century 
critics of modernity; the three are often spoken of as 
"backward-looking" thirlcers who recall a "golden age" which 
serves as a standard in comparison with which contemporary 
disintegration is to be understood. Since they all regarded 
Hobbes with suspicion, a comparison among them may be 
instructive, although the treatments of Hobbes provided by 
the two thinkers discussed below are more fragmentary than 
that offered by Strauss.
To oversimplify, Strauss held Hobbes culpable for the 
undermining of philosophy, while Arendt implicated him in 
the degradation of politics, and Voegelin accused him of 
subverting spiritual life. According to Strauss, Hobbes had 
provided an opening for a modern, reductionistic, 
egalitarian version of natural right which endangered the 
ability of the philosopher to justify himself before the 
city. Arendt argued that Hobbes placed the right to 
material accumulation over the right to speak up in public, 
leading to a "mass society" of politically incapacitated.
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solitary individuals. Voegelin claimed that Hobbes had made 
the spiritual the mere handmaiden of the political by giving 
the temporal sovereign the sole authority to judge the 
admissibility of religious opinions and doctrines.
Arendt emphasized the centrality of the capacities of 
speech and persuasion, as exercised in political discussion, 
to man's humanity. Her theory of contemporary "mass 
society" emphasized the atrophy of political engagement in 
the modern world. She first gained prominence with The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, in which she analyzed the Nazi 
and Communist phenomena as consequences of the confluence of 
several "subterranean" streams in Western culture that had 
come to the surface over the course of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries; this work includes her criticism of 
Hobbes. In The Human Condition she presents her conception 
of human action, which she holds to have been overwhelmed in 
the modern world by the activities of labor and work. In On 
Revolution she compared the American Revolution favorably to 
the revolution in France because of its emphasis on the 
political rather than the social aspects of revolution.
Voegelin, after attempting a standard history of 
political ideas (which was partially completed and published 
under the title From Enlightenment to Revolution^^, turned 
his attention from ideas to experiences, especially what he
^Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, ed. John 
H. Hallowell (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1975).
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called experiences of transcendence. Man's humanity is most 
fully realized when he is oriented to a reality beyond 
himself, he contended. His multivolume work. Order and 
History, was a study of civilizational symbols of 
transcendence, especially those of the ancient Greek and 
Hebrew civilizations, which he considered superior. 
Contemporary disorder is to be understood as symptomatic of 
a retreat from the civilizational achievements of Israel and 
Hellas. Prior to Order and History. Voegelin provided a 
more concise statement of his perspective in The New Science 
of Politics.
Arendt on the Atrophy of the Political 
Arendt interpreted the contemporary civilizational 
crisis in terms of the eclipse of the political. She 
emphasized the human capacity for action as manifested in 
the exercise of the capacity for persuasive speech. Ancient 
Greek civilization was superior because it had taken the 
greatest care to create and preserve a space for human 
action— the polis. In Greek life, economic activity was 
confined to the household; in Aristotelian terms, economics 
was a matter of household management. To participate in the 
deliberations of the polis was one of the few reasons for 
men to leave the household, so that, to an extent, life was 
neatly divided into the economic activity of the household 
and the political life of the polis. The household may be 
identified with the private realm, the realm of necessity.
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while the polis is to be equated with public life, the realm 
of freedom.
Arendt made her reputation as a critic of contemporary 
"mass society," which is marked by the development of the 
social realm— that which is neither public nor private. The 
social may be defined as that portion of our lives that is 
lived outside the household but which is nonpolitical 
nonetheless. Arendt's interpretation of mass society is 
that the social has grown to a point at which it has nearly 
driven out both the private and the public, the life of both 
the household and the polis. We spend most of our lives in 
the workaday world of "making a living," at the expense of 
both family and community life. Such an existence is marked 
by an experience of loneliness and atomization.
Furthermore, such a mass society may become so politically 
inarticulate that it may lack the resources to face any 
political challenges which may confront it.2
For Arendt, the human condition was rooted in the 
circumstances of pluralitv and natality, in light of which 
human action is possible. Plurality is the condition of 
action; "If men were not distinct, each human being 
distinguished from any other who is, was, or ever will be, 
they would need neither speech nor action. . . .  A life 
without speech and without action . . . has ceased to be a
^Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958), 28-67.
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human life because it is no longer lived among men." The 
circumstance of natality, of our being born into the world, 
suggests the possibility of action: "The miracle that saves 
the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal,
'natural' ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which 
the faculty of action is ontologically rooted." This 
circumstance of natality suggests to man that there is hope 
that he might be able to initiate something new, including 
but not limited to a political foundation (the French and 
American instances of which Arendt would explore in On 
Revolution). Plurality, then, sets the condition for human 
action, while natality suggests its possibility. However, 
action exists alongside the parallel activities of labor and 
work, which may come to threaten it.^
In The Human Condition. Arendt elaborated upon the 
distinction among labor, work, and action, and upon the 
threat posed by the first two of these to the third under 
modern conditions, which she found increasingly inimical to 
her understanding of an existence fit for human beings.
"The human condition of labor is life itself," she remarked.
By labor she understood the continual reproduction of the 
conditions of life. Arendt would say that in the saying, 
"Woman’s work is never done," what is here meant by work 
might better be conceptualized as labor. Cooking, 
disciplining children, and cleaning up after them are tasks
^Arendt, The Human Condition. 175-176 and 247.
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that are never really finished; they may cease for a short 
interval but they must soon be done over. Agriculture, the 
cyclical process of sowing and reaping, is also a 
paradigmatic example of labor, although traditionally it has 
been considered man's rather than woman's work. "Labor is 
the activity which corresponds to the biological process of 
the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and 
eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced 
and fed into the life process by labor." Arendt contends 
that the ancient Greeks considered labor of this sort to be 
inherently slavish; they instituted slavery so that at least 
some citizens would not be bound by these necessities and 
could become the genuinely free citizens of the polis.^
"The human condition of work is worldliness." Work, as 
distinguished from labor, constitutes the fabrication of 
objects for use. Human artifice represents the sum total of 
work. Work, properly understood, is the "work of our hands 
as distinguished from the labor of our bodies." Used 
properly, the products of this work should not be used up or 
consumed, at least not immediately; work, as distinguished 
from labor, creates enduring objects. While work is 
indispensible, the danger arises that if it comes to be 
understood as the paradigmatic form of human activity, an
'̂ Ibid., 7 and 79-93, esp. 82-84.
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instrumentalist, utilitarian kind of thinking will come to 
predominate.̂
Of these three species of human activity— labor, work, 
and action— Arendt contends that the latter is the most 
truly human. It consists of the engagement of the 
intelligence of our fellows by means of our capacity for 
persuasive speech. Action is undertaken for extrinsic 
reasons— to take care of the public business— and for 
intrinsic reasons as well. Arendt contends that a life of 
action is a component of the Greek concept of eudaimonia. 
which may be translated roughly as happiness, blessedness, 
or well-being. Action consists not only of persuasion but 
also of self-revelation of one's potential or essence. By 
acting one overcomes human frailty and contingency by 
creating a public record of words and deeds that may enable 
one to attain an earthly immortality of a sort. The 
achievement of the ancient Greek polis was that it 
institutionalized a space for human action in this sense.® 
Arendt diagnosed the eclipse of the public space and 
the loss of concern with earthly immortality in the modern 
world as pathological. The public realm might be threatened 
by the private; in modernity it has been besieged especially 
by the social. The better part of most people's lives is 
occupied with neither public nor private concerns; we are
Sjbid., 7, 136-139, 158.
®Ibid., 17-21, 175-181, and 192-199.
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now a society of jobholders, so that we characterize the 
activities with which we occupy much of our time as "making 
a living," which suggests the reproduction of life in the 
sense of Arendt's labor, not action or even work. From 
political opinions to relatively trivial matters of 
"lifestyle," we see a tendency toward conformism, such that 
we tend to become behavers. not actors. Our conformity does 
not constitute true public life because the workplace is not 
a true public place; instead, it resembles a little 
"household" removed from the home. With the possible 
exception of the learned professions, our work does not 
afford us an opportunity for expression that potentially can 
be seen by everyone in our neighborhood or community (much 
less our state or nation), such that we would have to 
transcend our own partial perspective. Men's sense of 
anomie may come from a withdrawal into self, a self­
alienation from the world, dictated by the atrophy of the 
public realm, the true realm of human excellence, which 
provides a satisfaction that cannot be approximated by 
private or social life, even at their best.̂
To overcome the modern political incapacity, a 
reconstitution of the public space would be required.
Public views. rather than an undifferentiated, anonymous 
"public opinion," must be built into the structure of 
government. Arendt contended that the need for such a
"^Ibid., 38-67, 126-135, and 248-257.
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public space was well understood by the American founders:
"The Americans knew that public freedom consisted in having 
a share in public business, and that the activities 
connected with this business by no means constituted a 
burden but gave those who discharged them in public a 
feeling of happiness they could acquire nowhere else."® 
Unfortunately in Arendt's view, the American 
Constitution failed to institutionalize the public space by 
means of the town meeting or township form of local 
government that had been employed so successfully in New 
England. Without such a feature, representative government 
cannot make political participation accessible to those who 
do not wish to make politics their career. Party politics 
tends to become oligarchic, even in such stable two-party 
system as America and Britain, where an atrophy of the 
public space may be noted. She notes approvingly a letter 
written late in Jefferson's career in which the American 
statesman proposed a system of wards or "elementary 
republics" as the basic units of local government, in order 
to preserve the political ideals of the Revolution.®
Throughout her own career, Arendt remained attached to 
the ideal of a ward or council system of government. She 
saw such a system as the only way to prevent a "massified"
®Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1963), 115-116; 
see also 24-26, 23J-31.
®Arendt, On Revolution. 234-235, 271-274, 252-258.
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society that might be susceptible to totalitarianism. In 
her view, an important source of the tendency to 
totalitarianism was the appearance of a "mob" of "massified" 
men in whom political participation had atrophied, who were 
susceptible to being brought back suddenly into politics by 
being attracted to a charismatic totalitarian "leader." The 
Russian system of "soviets" may have approximated the form 
of government she preferred; ironically, the Soviet Union 
has neutralized these "soviets" in favor of rule by a 
hegemonic party. When that country invaded Hungary to put 
down a political uprising in 1956, Arendt was heartened 
nonetheless to hear reports that a council system had arisen 
spontaneously in the few weeks before the rebellion was 
suppressed. She memorialized these short-lived Hungarian 
councils in an epilogue to The Origins of Totalitarianism;
"The rise of the councils, not the restoration of parties, 
was the clear sign of a true upsurge of democracy against 
dictatorship, of freedom against tyranny.
Arendt on Hobbes 
Arendt cherished the presence of a public space in 
which public business could be conducted. Totalitarianism 
represented a horrible obliteration of the public space; as 
one survivor of the Nazi concentration camps observed,
"There are hundreds of thousands of us here, all living in
^^Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. 2d ed. (Cleveland, 
Ohio: World, 1958), 492-502, esp. 501.
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absolute solitude." Even under the most terrible tyranny 
known hitherto, martyrdom was possible; even if the tyrant 
could not be overthrown, the martyr's protest would go down 
in history. Arendt discovered that the Nazis had 
established conditions in the camps so demoralizing that the 
possibility of martyrdom was foreclosed. The inmates were 
convinced that no one would escape, hence no report of any 
protest would ever reach the world outside; it would be as 
though any protest had never happened. "To demonstrate when 
death can no longer be postponed is an attempt to give death 
a meaning, to act beyond one's own death," but "How many 
people here still believe that a protest has even historic 
importance? . . . When no witnesses are left, there can be 
no testimony." Arendt concluded that, by effectively 
eliminating the possibility even of the most desperate of 
political acts, the Nazis had constructed an environment in 
which the inmates' political capacities had completely 
atrophied.
Although the appearance of totalitarianism most 
probably involved an element of accident, Arendt believed 
that certain developments in European culture traceable back 
at least to the nineteenth century were contributing 
factors— in particular, anti-Semitism and imperialism. She 
viewed the rise of bourgeois man and bourgeois civilization
^^Arendt, Origins. 451. Reference is to David Rousset, Les 
Jours de Notre Mort (Paris, 1947), 464.
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as implicated in the development of imperialism, and hence 
implicated in totalitarianism. Bourgeois civilization gave 
free play to a drive for power in the form of accumulation, 
as exemplified by Cecil Rhodes's comment that "I would annex 
the planets if I could." Eventually this drive for power 
would be directed toward the riches of Asia, Africa, and 
America. The European state would be put in the service of 
accumulation in the drive for imperial domination and 
colonization. Bourgeois civilization required ideological 
justification for its power drive, including its imperial 
ambition; the significance of the thought of Hobbes, at 
least in part, is that it contributed to this justification. 
Justification of bourgeois civilization included 
justification of imperialism, and justification of 
imperialism was likely to include an element of race- 
thinking, since the territories to be colonized were 
inhabited by nonwhite peoples. Hobbes may not have been a 
racist thinker himself, but he contributed to a 
civilizational movement of which race-thinking would later 
become a p a r t . ^2
To Arendt, Hobbes was the paradigmatic philosopher of 
an emerging bourgeois civilization. He presented a 
political theory appropriate for a completely privatized
^2por commentary on the remark by Rhodes, see Arendt, 
Origins. 124. For a discussion of nineteenth- and early-to-mid- 
twentieth-century race-thinking with respect to South Africa and 
its parallels with twentieth-century race-thinking in general, 
see Origins, 185-207.
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mankind. The theory was based on a calculation of 
individual interests rather than the acknowledgment of a law 
or standard that surpasses particular interests. For such 
men, the fundamental political fact would be a drive for 
power rather than an orientation toward the good or the 
right. "He gives an almost complete picture, not of Man but 
bourgeois man, an analysis which in three hundred years has 
neither been outdated nor excelled. . . .  A being without 
reason, without the capacity for truth, and without free 
will— that is, without the capacity for responsibility— man 
is essentially a function of society and judged therefore 
according to his 'value or worth . . . his price; that is to 
say so much as would be given for the use of his power.
Arendt held that Hobbes presented a picture of man not 
as he was but "as he ought to become and ought to behave if 
he wanted to fit into the coming bourgeois society."
Hobbesian man is a depoliticized, atomized being whose 
connections to his fellows are strictly instrumental and 
contingent.
Thus membership in any form of community is for 
Hobbes a temporary and limited affair which essentially 
does not change the solitary and private character of 
the individual . . .  or create permanent bonds between 
him and his fellow-men. It seems as though Hobbes's 
picture of man defeats his purpose of providing the 
basis for a Commonwealth and gives instead a consistent 
pattern of attitudes through which every genuine 
community can easily be destroyed. This results in the 
inherent and admitted instability of Hobbes's
^^Arendt, Origins, p. 139. See Hobbes, Leviathan (English 
Works 3:76).
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Commonwealth, whose very conception includes its own 
dissolution . . .  an instability that is all the more 
striking as Hobbes's primary and frequently repeated aim 
was to secure a maximum of safety and stability.
Along with several other commentators, Arendt thus concluded
that Hobbes's political theory was contradictory and self-
defeating in that men as he imagined them to be could never
form a commonwealth. Hobbesian men are so dissociated from
each other that "Hobbes's Commonwealth is a vacillating
structure and must always provide itself with new props from
the outside; otherwise it would collapse overnight into the
aimless, senseless chaos of the private interests from which
it sprang.
Decisive for Arendt was her conclusion that political 
life as we commonly understand it would be wholly absent 
from the Hobbesian Commonwealth. So that he will be free to 
pursue his private interests, including the accumulation of 
wealth, Hobbesian man gives up his political rights to a 
sovereign who is to settle all political controversies by 
fiat. "Deprived of political rights, the individual, to 
whom public and official life manifests itself in the guise 
of necessity, acquires a new and increased interest in his 
private life and his personal fate. Excluded from 
participation in the management of public affairs that 
involve all citizens, the individual loses his rightful 
place in society and his natural connection with his fellow-
^^Arendt, Origins. 140-143.
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men." Such an anti-political tendency is a reflection of 
"the bourgeoisie's instinctive distrust of and its innate 
hostility to public affairs." Carried to its logical 
conclusion, however, the outcome of this hostility to the 
political would be ironic for bourgeois man, since, 
beginning from an inexorable drive to accumulate evermore 
power and wealth, this same bourgeois man ends up as a 
politically powerless subject, unable even to rise up 
against an oppressor.
Arendt's point is confirmed unwittingly by the remarks 
of the Nobel laureate in economics, James Buchanan. For 
Buchanan, the state is more nearly a necessary evil than the 
end or perfection of man's nature. He argues that "the 
ideal society is anarchy, in which no one man or group of 
men coerces another." Man balks at being governed; each 
man's ideal is a world in which he is completely and utterly 
free, even to the extent that others are compelled to serve 
his desires; "That is to say, each person seeks mastery over 
a world of slaves." However, a moment's reflection by the 
rational actor suggests that for everyone to attempt to 
attain this "ideal society" in which "each man seeks 
mastery" immediately presents a problem analogous to that 
faced by Hobbesian man in the "state of nature." Therefore 
the rational actor decides to pursue his "ideal society" "at 
one remove," such that "the anarchistic regime of free men.
l^ibid., 141-147.
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each of whom respects the rights of others, becomes the 
utopian dream." In The Calculus of Consent. Buchanan and 
his collaborator, Gordon Tullock, present a rationale for 
such an "anarchistic regime," which they contend will put an 
end to "feeding at the public trough" by insatiable special 
interests. In a foreword to Tullock's The Politics of 
Bureaucracy. Buchanan remarks: "Tullock distinguishes, 
basically, between the relationship of exchange. which he 
calls the economic, and the relationship of slavery, which 
he calls the political. I use bold words here, but 1 do so 
deliberately." For Buchanan and Tullock, the political 
realm represents the realm of slavery, whereas for Arendt 
the political represents the realm of freedom.
Buchanan puts forward a procedure from which a 
political equilibrium emerges, but he cannot establish that 
this equilibrium process justifies anything. His procedure 
sounds suspiciously like the sequence that results in the 
establishment of the Hobbesian sovereign out of a state of 
nature; in fact, at the outset of his presentation he> 
observes that "as Thomas Hobbes perceptively noted, in the
James M. Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy 
and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 92; 
Foreword to Gordon Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy 
(Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), reprinted in 
Buchanan, Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral 
Philosophy, compiled and with a preface by Robert D. Tollison and 
Victor J. Vanberg (College Station, Tex.: Texas A&M University 
Press, 1987), 202-03. See also Buchanan and Tullock, The 
Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional 
Democracy (Ann Arbor, Mich: University of Michigan Press, 1962).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
State of nature each person has a 'right' to everything."
In such a state, the distribution of "goods" will be 
determined by the distribution of "physical strength, 
cajolery, stealth," and "other personal qualities." 
Eventually an equilibrium is reached in the form of a 
"natural distribution"; employing "econo-speak," we might 
say that this is a state in which the "marginal utility" of 
further employment of physical strength, cajolery, and 
stealth approaches zero. Once everyone has had enough of 
this predatory competition, we have arrived at "a definition 
. . . from which contractual agreements become possible." 
Yet, as Buchanan notes, "This cannot properly be classified 
as a structure of rights." A detractor might suggest that 
this "equilibrium" resembles nothing so much as a peace 
settlement imposed by the stronger of two belligerents. 
Still, he claims that "It is appropriate to call this a 
genuine basis for the emergence of property rights." Such 
an appeal to the justice of pure procedure involves one in 
an infinite regress; at some point the justice of an 
"original" distribution would have to be established, and we 
have no reason to believe that Buchanan's "physical 
strength, cajolery, and stealth" might not manifest itself 
as far back as we could possibly look.
Buchanan and Tullock profess an attachment to anarchy 
as an ideal, but to establish such an ideal may require an
Buchanan, Limits. 23-25.
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authoritarian element that they do not acknowledge. If we 
push their tenets to more of an extreme than they are 
willing to, we might end up with a regime in which political 
participation plays no part, because freedom has come to be 
defined as the right to undertake voluntary economic 
exchange rather than to participate in collective decision­
making. Political agitation on behalf of collective action 
would be interpreted as a threat to undertake "political 
exploitation" and thereby to violate everyone's rights; the 
authorities might feel compelled to cut off political 
freedom as we understand it, in defense of their 
libertarian-individualist version of freedom. Such was the 
conclusion anticipated by Arendt when she conjectured that 
Hobbesian man, who is "flattered at being called a power- 
thirsty animal," ultimately would become "the poor meek 
little fellow who has not even the right to rise against 
tyranny," who "submits to any existing government and does 
not even stir when his best friend falls an innocent victim 
to an incomprehensible raison d'état."^^
Voeaelin on the Atrophv of the Spiritual 
While Arendt interpreted the contemporary crisis in 
terms of an eclipse of the political, Voegelin spoke of an 
eclipse of the spiritual. Man's humanity is to be 
understood in terms of his ability to transcend the mundane
Arendt, Origins. 146.
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world. A partial or relative transcendence might be 
attainable by means of participation in one's community, but 
this transcendence, valuable though it might be, points to 
another, higher mode of transcendence. To transcend the 
temporal and attain an experience of an eternal, absolute 
reality would constitute the fullest realization of man's 
humanity, and would furthermore provide a perspective from 
which principles of social and political order could be 
derived. Modern disorder may thus be understood in terms of 
the loss of this experience of transcendence.
A turning point in Voegelin's career came when he 
turned his attention from political ideas to spiritual 
experience; henceforth, he regarded philosophy as an 
experiential rather than an ideational matter. As Eugene 
Webb notes, for Voegelin "the ideational expression of 
philosophy is the most superficial level of the philosophic 
life." Ideational language may sacrifice the richness of 
experience for the sake of clarity. What is required is 
analogical-mythical rather than logical-propositional 
language. "Voegelin has spoken in various places of the 
necessary grounding of philosophy in meditative experience" 
rather than prepositional analysis, notes Webb.^®
Voegelin's intent was to recapture the substance of a 
fundamental meditative experience that he believed had been
^^Eugene Webb, Eric Voeaelin; Philosopher of History 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1981), 8, 26.
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lost. In order to communicate this meditative experience, 
the philosopher must have recourse to svmbolic language, 
without which this subject matter might prove utterly 
inscrutable. "Unless the spiritual substance of the order 
within the soul can be communicated through symbols, it can 
never become the ordering principle of a society," remarks 
Webb. Voegelin devoted much of his career to an exposition 
of the history of symbols of transcendence in ancient 
civilizations with the hope that he could thereby make 
transcendental experience more accessible to modern man. By 
so doing, he believed he might be able to make a 
contribution to the resolution of the contemporary 
civilizational crisis. "What may seem at times like 
abstract theory is in fact the expression of an effort to 
understand human concreteness and to offer an interpretation 
of man and his life in society that may help him to find a 
way to live less murderously with his fellows."20
Voegelin believed that contemporary tendencies toward 
positivism in political science were prejudicial toward any 
attempt to explore the implications of the transcendental 
dimension for the political sphere. By mimicking a natural- 
science model, we end up subordinating relevance to method.
A distortion of this sort could be found in the attempt of 
Max Weber to found a "value-free" social science. Voegelin 
remarked that Weber himself ended up bringing "value-
2°Webb, Eric Voeaelin. 30, 151.
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judgments" back into his projects in a "back-door” manner, 
by rechristening them as "legitimizing b e l i e f s . "21
A richer language than that admitted by Weber was 
necessary in order to render the phenomena of politics 
intelligible. Voegelin took the matter of political 
representation as an example. In Western polities we 
commonly speak of representation as an arrangement in which 
a member of a legislature elected from a particular 
geographic constituency is said to represent that 
constituency. However, this cannot exhaust the meaning of 
representation. If we reflect a moment we will note that 
this common version of representation is effective only in a 
small percentage of the nations on earth, most of which are 
either in northern Europe or have their political roots in 
northern European civilization. In a state such as the 
Soviet Union, representative institutions of this sort are 
not effective; nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the 
Soviet government effectively represents Soviet society.22 
Voegelin designated representation in the sense of 
correspondence of elected representatives to geographical 
constituencies as elemental representation. However, he 
held that any society represents itself in an existential 
sense through its governmental institutions, even if it 
lacks the institutions of elemental representation. Any
21voegelin, New Science of Politics. 1-26. 
22ibid., 27-37.
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society may be said to have articulated a representative by 
the very fact of producing governmental institutions. 
Undoubtedly, the degree of representation attained in the 
representative institutions of northern European 
civilization is a great achievement; in such societies, "the 
membership of the society has become politically articulate 
down to the last individual, and, correspondingly, the 
society becomes the representative of itself." However, 
such an achievement is the culmination of a long historical 
development, the conditions for which cannot be created on 
demand. "Our own foreign policy was a factor in aggravating 
international disorder through its sincere but naive 
endeavor of curing the evils of the world by spreading 
representative institutions in the elemental sense to areas 
where the existential conditions for their functioning were 
not given."2^
There can be representation in a transcendental sense 
as well as an elemental or existential sense; a society may 
come to understand itself as representing not just itself 
but something beyond itself. Representation in this sense 
has manifested itself in the clashes between empires 
throughout history. Voegelin discusses the clash between 
the Western and Mongol empires during the thirteenth 
century, in which neither empire was willing to acknowledge 
the legitimacy of the other; each empire saw itself as
23ibid., 27-51, esp. 40, 51.
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representing truth and the enemy as representing falsehood 
and disorder. He detected a parallel between the Mongol 
empire and the contemporary Soviet Union; "Its order is in 
harmony with the truth of history; its aim is the 
establishment of the realm of freedom and peace; the 
opponents run counter to the truth of history and will be 
defeated in the end; nobody can be at war with the Soviet 
Union legitimately but must be a representative of untruth 
in history, or, in contemporary language, an aggressor; and 
the victims are not conquered but liberated from their 
oppressors and therewith from the untruth of their 
existence."24
Ancient Greek philosophy represented a truth that 
challenged the truth of empire. Empires could represent 
themselves, but not a truth beyond themselves ; this was 
reserved to reason in Greek philosophy and to revelation in 
Christian religion. Voegelin discerns parallels of the 
deepest significance between the Greek and Christian 
civilizations. Both elaborated a set of civilizational 
symbols that represented a maximum of "differentiation" as 
opposed to "compactness." They both separated strictly the 
truth represented by empire from that represented by reason 
or revelation, as opposed to both the Roman civilization and 
the modern totalitarian mass movements, which tended to 
collapse the two truths. Christianity had accomplished a
24lbid., 52-75, esp. 59.
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radical "de-divinization" of the world; only the Church, not
a political power organization, could represent the
spiritual destiny of man. The Roman government tried to
accommodate Christianity, but the radicalism of the new
religion made it incompatible with empire in a way that
pagan religious practice was n o t . 25
In the modern world, the experience of transcendence
underlying this "de-divinization" of the world has
atrophied, and disorder has followed. The notion that our
ultimate fulfillment lies beyond this world lost its power
over men. This development was accompanied by an impressive
civilizational dynamism, but Voegelin questioned whether the
benefits outweighed what had been lost, although he conceded
that "an age that began to feel its muscles would not easily
bear the Augustinian defeatism with regard to the mundane
sphere of existence."
The historical result was stupendous. The resources of 
man that came to light under such pressure were in 
themselves a revelation, and their application to 
civilizational work produced the truly magnificent 
spectacle of Western progressive society. However 
fatuous the surface arguments may be, the widespread 
belief that modern civilization is Civilization in a 
pre-eminent sense is experientially justified; the 
endowment with the meaning of salvation has made the 
rise of the West, indeed, an apocalypse of civilization.
On this apocalyptic spectacle, however, falls a 
shadow; for this brilliant expansion is accompanied by a 
danger that grows apace with progress.
"The death of the spirit is the price of progress," Voegelin
concluded. Civilizational progress had been accompanied by
25ibid., 70-106.
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a "re-divinization” of temporal existence. Men began to 
speculate that historical laws were pointing toward a 
qualitative transformation of mundane human existence. Such 
a speculation amounted to a claim to be able to discern the 
end or eidos of history, which Voegelin held to be 
unknowable; he discerned in such a claim a parallel with 
heretical claims to privileged spiritual knowledge which the 
Church had defeated during the early history of 
institutionalized Christianity. Such is the source of the 
term for which Voegelin has become so well-known, his 
designation of the modern phenomenon as "modern gnosticism." 
This "secular salvation" came to displace the Christian 
notion of an eschatological salvation; Voegelin 
characterized it as the pursuit of a fallacious 
"immanentization of the eschaton." The millennium was now 
to be attained within history, not beyond it. The 
development constituted not a neo-paganism but a 
secularized, immanentized version of Christianity. Since 
the temporal realization of the end of history is impossible 
in principle, men were likely to become frustrated when 
reality failed to conform to their expectations. This 
frustration led to evermore fanatical attempts to make 
reality conform to such an intoxicating speculation, 
culminating in the totalitarian excesses of the twentieth
c e n t u r y . 26
2 6 j b i d . ,  107-132, esp. 119, 130-131.
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Voeaelin on Hobbes
A precursor of the modern ideological mass movements 
was the fanatical Puritanism with which Hobbes was 
confronted before and during the English Revolution, 
typified by its culmination in a fanatical insistence that 
the king be killed because this supposedly had been ordered 
by God. Voegelin acknowledged that Hobbes had been 
confronted with a genuine threat to public order that 
required a response, but he held that Hobbes's response 
itself constituted an ideological deformation.
Voegelin remarked that Hobbes's theory had "purchased 
its impressive consistency at the price of a simplification 
which itself belongs in the class of gnostic misdeeds; but, 
when a fierce and relentless thinker simplifies, he will 
nevertheless bring a new clarity to the issue." Hobbes 
perceived that to defeat the Puritans, English society 
needed a new civil theology. This new political doctrine 
employed the following argument: A "law of nature" disposes 
men to live together in peace and to obey civil government. 
However, to be effective, this "law of nature" must be 
understood as the word of God. Therefore, effective rule 
requires the establishment of an all-powerful sovereign 
whose interpretation of the law of nature shall be accepted 
as definitive. Talk of a "law of nature" put a more 
pleasant gloss on a political justification based
27ibid., 133-161, esp. 152-153.
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exclusively on men's fear of violent death; subjection to 
force on pain of death replaces any orientation to a higher 
purpose or summum b o n u m .28
A crucial tenet of the new civil theology is that the 
sovereign shall have the authority to declare any opinion 
conducive to discord untrue ipso facto. "There will be no 
freedom of debate concerning the truth of human existence in 
society; public expression of opinion and doctrine must be 
under regulation and permanent supervision of the 
government." The sovereign will have power "to decide who 
will be allowed to speak in public to an audience, on what 
subject and in what tendency," as well as to censor books. 
Voegelin agrees with Arendt, then, that the subjects of the 
Hobbesian Commonwealth will not enjoy a substantive 
political life. They will, however, be free to pursue any 
other "peaceable, civilizational p u r s u i t s ."29
The imperative to censor political debate extends to 
man's spiritual life as well. The sovereign's 
interpretation of scripture shall be authoritative; 
ultimately, scripture is to receive its authority not by 
revelation but by sovereign fiat. This must be so because 
otherwise someone might conclude that his religious duties 
conflicted with his duty to obey sovereign authority, thus 
placing the realm in the same danger that England faced from
28jbid., 152-153, 155-156, 162, 180. 
29jbid., 154-155.
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the Puritan divines. It is this that Voegelin found most 
offensive about the Hobbesian political doctrine. In the 
Hobbesian Commonwealth, Christianity would be a truth of the 
state, not of the soul. What would be required is a mankind 
devoid of the experience of transcendence that might move 
him to question the official account of the substance of 
Christianity. For Voegelin, Hobbes's cure for the 
disruption represented by the Puritans was worse than the 
disease.
"Hobbes countered the Gnostic immanentization of the 
eschaton which endangered existence by a radical immanence 
of existence which denied the eschaton," concluded Voegelin. 
His intention in constructing a devastating psychological 
portrayal of his Puritan opponents was admirable 
nonetheless: "His achievements in unmasking the libido 
dominandi behind the pretense of religious zeal and 
reforming idealism are as solid today as they were at the 
time when he wrote." However, the symbols Hobbes elaborated 
in order to defeat his opponents amounted to an ideological 
distortion; his psychology and anthropology accepted as 
normative a self-sufficient, power-hungry being that 
classical philosophy would have diagnosed as pathological, 
and his sovereign absolutism anticipated the prohibition on 
political debate that would characterize totalitarian 
regimes. "The Hobbesian principle that the validity of
3°Ibid., 154-161.
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Scripture derives from governmental sanction and that its 
public teaching should be supervised by the sovereign is 
carried out by the Soviet government in the reduction of 
communism to the 'party line,
Perspectives on Hobbes; Arendt 
and Voeaelin Compared
A recent contribution in political philosophy mentions 
an imperative "to prevent men, particularly the philosophers 
themselves, the politicians, and the theologians, from 
making politics and those disciplines that are related to it 
in the classics, especially economics, into a 'substitute 
metaphysics,' that is, into a full explanation in their own 
terms, of all that is." We are told next that "to argue 
that politics in particular is a prime, perhaps the prime 
candidate for this dangerous role, to be sure, need not 
constitute an attack on or an undermining of politics as 
such." We might wonder whether this latter statement 
represents a mere statement of fact or an expression of a 
fervent hope. A standard interpretation might be that 
Arendt is concerned with a contemporary "undermining of 
politics as such," while Voegelin's intent is to prevent 
politics from assuming a "dangerous role." Arendt opposes 
Hobbes because he undermines politics, while Voegelin
31lbid., 178-180, 184-187.
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criticizes him for usurping the spiritual on behalf of the 
political. Are these two intentions reconcilable?32
Both Arendt and Voegelin upheld the memory of the 
"Golden Age" of Periclean Athens as a standard to which 
politics ought to conform as nearly as possible. For 
Arendt, the Athenian polis represented the finest expression 
of genuine human action. According to a recent commentator, 
"Western history preserves the clear memory of at least one 
community of men who, for a brief moment, prized the web of 
human relationships— frail, frustrating, and paradox-ridden 
as it is— so highly that it can almost be said they lived 
for it alone." Athenian man "sailed forth into the polis to 
act and speak in the company of his true peers. . . . Here 
alone did the opportunity to reveal his individuality, to 
distinguish himself from all others, fully present 
itself."33
In Arendt's conception, political activity is to have 
both intrinsic and extrinsic significance. She spoke 
severely of those who would make politics into a mere means 
to some higher end, including those who conceived of the end 
of politics as the protection of the philosophers from their 
"vulgar" fellows. Her severity concerning Plato is
32james V. Schall, Reason. Revelation, and the Foundations 
of Political Philosophy (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1987), 225.
33Peter Fuss, "Hannah Arendt's Conception of Political 
Community," in Melvyn A. Hill, ed., Hannah Arendt: The Recovery 
of the Public World (New York: St. Martin's, 1979), 167.
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instructive, especially in contrast to the regard in which 
Voegelin held him.
Escape from the frailty of human affairs into the 
solidity of quiet and order has in fact so much to 
recommend it that the greater part of political 
philosophy since Plato could easily be interpreted as 
various attempts to find theoretical foundations and 
practical ways for an escape from politics altogether.
The hallmark of all such escapes is the concept of rule, 
that is, the notion that men can lawfully and 
politically live together only when some are entitled to 
command and the others forced to obey. . . . It is a 
common error to interpret Plato as though he wanted to 
abolish the family and the household; he wanted, on the 
contrary, to extend this type of life until one family 
embraced every citizen.
Arendt thus opposes conceptions of politics which depend on
a strict separation of ruler from ruled (among which we
might count the Hobbesian Commonwealth). Such conceptions
present an analogy between politics and fabrication
(Ar&rdt's "work”), rather than genuine human action. "The
substitution of making for acting and the concomitant
degradation of politics into a means to obtain an allegedly
'higher' end— in antiquity the protection of the good men
from the rule of the bad in general, and the safety of the
philosopher in particular, in the Middle Ages the salvation
of souls, in the modern age the productivity and progress of
society— is as old as the tradition of political
philosophy." To secure the acceptance of such an
arrangement, the rulers must propagate "the well-entrenched
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notions that politics need not be everyone's concern, and 
that it is a necessary evil or even a dirty business.
Arendt detected in the American founding generation a
conception of the intrinsic worth of politics that was more
appropriate than that which she attributed to Plato. The
Americans, she argued, sought something beyond what they had
known as the "rights and liberties of Englishmen."
This freedom they called later, when they had come to 
taste it, "public happiness," and it consisted in the 
citizen's right of access to the public realm, in his 
share in public power— to be "a participator in the 
government of affairs" in Jefferson's telling phrase—  
as distinct from the generally recognized right of 
subjects to be protected by the government in the 
pursuit of private happiness. . . . The very fact that 
the word "happiness" was chosen in laying claim to a 
share in public power indicates strongly that there 
existed in the country, prior to the revolution, such a 
thing as "public happiness," and that men knew that they 
could not be altogether "happy" if their happiness was 
located and enjoyed only in private life.
Unfortunately, Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence
spoke of the "pursuit of happiness" in such a way that this
happiness could be understood as entirely private,
contributing to the construction of what the world has come
to know as "a specifically American ideology."
Nevertheless, Arendt's judgement was that this talk of
private happiness carried little weight. More decisive were
the remarks of Jefferson late in his life in a letter to
John Adams, during a period in which they had begun to
^^Arendt, The Human Condition. 220-23, 229-30; Fuss, 
"Hannah Arendt's Conception," in Hill, ed., The Recovery of 
the Public World. 171.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2 41
address, at least half-seriously, the possibility of an 
afterlife. "May we meet there again, in Congress, with our 
antient Colleagues, and receive with them the seal of 
approbation 'Well done, good and faithful servants,"' wrote 
Jefferson. Arendt remarks, "Here, behind the irony, we have 
the candid admission that life in Congress, the joys of 
discourse, of legislation, of transacting business, of 
persuading and being persuaded, were to Jefferson . . .  a 
foretaste of an eternal bliss to come. . . .  It is the 
applause, the demonstration of acclaim, 'the esteem of the 
world' of which Jefferson in another context says that there 
had been a time when it 'was of higher value in my eye than 
everything in it.
As does Arendt, Voegelin speaks in glowing terms of the 
"Golden Age" of Periclean Athens. However, he speaks not so 
much of the Athens of the polis as of what he calls "the 
Athens of Marathon and the tragedy." In his discussion of 
the Suppliants of Aeschylus, for instance, he treats the 
tragedy as capturing the essence of Athenian politics. The 
ruler, confronted with a tragic choice, addresses the 
citizens in an attempt to come to a decision together with 
them, in conformity with a standard higher than (for 
example) a utilitarian calculation of losses and gains.
"The Peitho, the persuasion of the king, forms the souls of
^^Arendt, On Revolution. 123-128. References are to 
Jefferson's letter to Joseph C. Cabell of February 2, 1816; to 
John Adams, April 11, 1823; and to James Madison, June 9, 1793.
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his listeners, who are willing to let themselves be formed, 
and makes the Dike of Zeus prevail against passion, so that 
the mature decision represents the truth of the God.”
Political persuasion conducted at this level includes an 
element of conversion or movement of the soul that Voegelin 
might argue is missing from Arendt's account of the activity 
of the polis. If people's souls are in such a condition 
that they are not even susceptible to such a conversion, 
then politics will take on the character of "splitting the 
difference" between passionate, irreconcilable interests 
rather than a reciprocal persuasive engagement involving 
men's souls and intellects.^®
Voegelin's discussion of the Athenian tragedy 
represents one of his most affirmative statements about the 
value of the political. However, contemporary politics did 
not live up to the standards of the Athenian polis in his 
view. He appeared disgusted by most of what passed for 
political practice in the twentieth century. Instead of an 
engagement of men's intellects and souls, politics had 
degenerated into a passionate contest of interests, or, even 
worse, a fanatical expression of "modern gnosticism." In an 
earlier time, a proper civilizational symbolization gave men 
a sense of perspective with respect to the political and 
kept them from getting carried away with eschatological
Voegelin, New Science of Politics. 70-73. See also 
Voegelin, The World of the Polis. vol. 2 of Order and History 
(Baton Rouge, La., 1957), 243-253.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
243
political projects. Political action had now become a 
surrogate for the spiritual life in the souls of some men.
He spoke of a "volitional gnosis" which assumed "the form of 
activist redemption of man and society, as in the instance 
of revolutionary activists like Comte, Marx, or Hitler."37 
Such a perspective on political action represents a 
potential danger. Voegelin's (and Arendt's) criticism of 
the Hobbesian commonwealth for its alleged summary cutoff of 
political discussion has been discussed above. This 
criticism may afford us with a helpful perspective from 
which to consider Voegelin's attitude toward political 
reform. Recall, for instance, his praise of Hobbes's 
psychological analysis of the Puritan divines. "Under the 
impression of the Puritan Revolution one of the greatest 
psychologists of all times laid down the rule that men who 
are moved by their religious conscience to civil war . . . 
are guilty of pride, of superbia in the Augustinian sense, 
to the point of madness. . . .  A conscience may be good in 
the moral sense and nevertheless thoroughly evil in the 
spiritual sense, as Hobbes's predecessor in this question, 
Richard Hooker, had already shown in his acid portrait of 
the Puritan, in the Preface to his Ecclesiastical Politv."
From this psychological portrait of the Puritan, Voegelin 
appeared to generalize to the case of any contemporary 
reformer. His attitude suggested a summary cutoff of
37voegelin, New Science of Politics. 124.
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political discussion in the Hobbesian sense. No proposal 
for political reform can be taken at face value, because we 
are somehow entitled to assume that any reformer must 
exhibit the same psychological deformation as a Puritan 
revolutionary; discussion of reform proposals on their 
merits are to be bypassed in favor of an ad hominem attack 
to be directed against any reformer. Here we are confronted 
with the question of Voegelin's partisanship and the 
identification of him as an opponent of the party of reform 
on behalf of the conservative party; his students object 
vociferously to the characterization of his thought as 
partisan. Suffice it to say that Voegelin may not have made 
himself sufficiently clear on this point. As Webb remarks, 
"Voegelin has left comparatively undeveloped the area of 
practical political implications."^®
This much said, it may be conceded that men indeed have 
made religions out of their political doctrines, and that a 
proper politics requires an element of restraint and 
sobriety that have been missing for much of the twentieth 
century. Arendt herself assented to this in an exchange 
with Hans Jonas, who was an associate of Voegelin also.
Jonas; I share with Hannah Arendt the position that 
we are not in possession of any ultimates, either by 
knowledge or by conviction or faith. And I also believe 
that we cannot have this as a command performance
®®Voegelin, "The Oxford Political Philosophers," 
Philosophical Quarterly 3 (April 1953): 106; Webb, Eric Voegelin. 
274.
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because "we need it so bitterly therefore should have 
it."
However, a part of wisdom is knowledge of ignorance. 
The Socratic attitude is to know that one does not know. 
And this realization of our ignorance can be of great 
practical importance in the exercise of the power of 
judgment, which is after all related to action in the 
political sphere, into future action, and far-reaching 
action.
Our enterprises have an eschatological tendency in 
them— a built-in utopianism, namely, to move towards 
ultimate situations. Lacking the knowledge of ultimate 
values— or, of what is ultimately desirable— or, of what 
man is so that the world can be fitting for man, we 
should at least abstain from allowing eschatological 
situations to come about. This alone is a very 
important practical injunction that we can draw from the 
insight that only with some conception of ultimates are 
we entitled to embark on certain things. So that at 
least as a restraining force the point of view I brought 
in may be of some relevance.
Arendt: With this I would a g r e e . ^9
Postscript! The Voeoelin-Arendt Exchange of 1953 
A comparison and contrast of Arendt and Voegelin would 
be incomplete without mention of the exchange prompted by 
his 1953 review of her The Origins of Totalitarianism. 
Despite his admiration for the work as a whole, he professed 
astonishment at her remark that in totalitarianism "human 
nature itself is at stake." To make such a concession was 
to imply that a change in human nature was indeed possible. 
That assumption meant that "the author, in fact, adopts the 
immanentist ideology; . . . These sentences . . . reflect a
^^Arendt, "On Hannah Arendt," in Hill, ed., The Recovery of 
the Public World, pp. 314-315.
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typically liberal, progressive, pragmatist attitude toward 
philosophical problems."^0
Arendt did not dogmatically rule out the possibility of 
an unchanging human nature, but she held that if there is 
such a nature, man could not know what it is; only a god 
could know such a thing. She might say that for man to 
attempt to know his own nature would be hubristic. As she 
wrote in The Human Condition. "It is highly unlikely that 
we, who can know, determine, and define the natural essences 
of all things surrounding us, which we are not, should ever 
be able to do the same for ourselves— this would be like 
jumping over our own shadows." Her biographer comments that 
"Voegelin thought that Arendt's viewpoint was disturbingly 
secular, but, in fact, it was respectfully and 
nondoctrinally religious."41
Arendt objected to Voegelin's procedure— which seemed 
to her a kind of petitio princinii— of treating "'phenomenal 
differences'— which to me as differences of factuality are 
all-important— as minor outgrowths of some 'essential 
sameness' of a doctrinal nature." She viewed such doctrines 
as ideological: "Ideologies always assume that one idea is
40voegelin, review of Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, 
with "Reply" by Arendt and "Concluding Remark" by Voegelin, 
Review of Politics 15(1953): 68-85. The remark of Arendt in 
question is found in Origins. 459.
4^Arendt, The Human Condition. 10; Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, 
Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1982), 254.
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sx-fficient to explain everything in the development from the 
premise, and that no experience can teach anything because 
everything is comprehended in this consistent process of 
logical deduction.” Against Voegelin's insistence that 
totalitarianism and liberalism may "prove to be closely 
related on the level of essence,” she held that her own 
approach was more properly empirical. To present a brief 
that liberalism was somehow culpable for totalitarian crimes 
was to ignore the unique horror of totalitarianism.
"Numerous affinities between totalitarianism and some other 
trends in Occidental political or intellectual history have 
been described with this result, in my opinion: they all 
failed to point out the distinct quality of what was
actually h a p p e n i n g . ”^2
Arendt was not a "gushing optimist" about the 
possibilities of a changed and improved human nature; 
rather, she was afraid that the totalitarians would succeed 
in their project which threatened as it did those capacities 
which she held to be central to the human condition as she 
understood it. Her painstaking evaluation of the available 
evidence about life in the concentration camps, included in 
the closing chapters of the Origins. convinced her that they 
presented a danger of a "change in human nature" in the 
sense of "a change in human conditions radical enough to
42Arendt, "Reply," 80, and Origins. 470; Voegelin, 
"Concluding Remark," 85.
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make impossible the exercise of capabilities observable 
under other, less radical conditions . . . the destruction 
of any possibility for those capabilities to appear." For 
such a change to take place, "the world would have to be a 
concentration camp." We might ask, along with Arendt: Were 
the appearance of these tendencies in the camps just minor 
"phenomenal differences"? Furthermore, if the whole world 
were to be changed into a concentration camp, would nothing 
essential be changed?^^
This exchange illustrates the distinctive Platonic 
essentialism of Voegelin as opposed to the Aristotelian 
empiricism of Arendt (at least from the perspective of a 
"standard" interpretation that Voegelin might reject). 
According to Barker, a paradigmatic example of this contrast 
is the matter of the relation of the universal to the 
particular, or "the problem of the one and the many."
Barker asks, "Shall the one be destructive of the individual 
existence of the many, or shall the many retain that 
existence, while yet sharing in a common existence which 
'blends, transcends, them all'?" His view is that Aristotle 
opts for the latter alternative. "In metaphysics, he holds, 
the one does not exist above and beyond the many: it is in 
and among, in the sense that it is predicable of, all its 
individual constituents." That this contrast was evident to 
Arendt may be shown by her comment that "I think that what
^^Young-Bruehl, Hannah Arendt. 254.
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separates my approach from Professor Voegelin's is that I 
proceed from facts and events instead of intellectual 
affinities and influences . . . [there may be such 
affinities and influences,] but such affinities would only 
mean that one has to draw even sharper distinctions because 
of the fact that liberals are not totalitarians."44
^^Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and 
Aristotle (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), 232; Arendt, "A 
Reply," 80.
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CHAPTER 7: THOMAS SPRAGENS— HOBBESIANISM 
AND SCIENTISTIC POLITICS
Thomas Spragens, a political theorist of a newer 
generation than those discussed hitherto, is a party to the 
same argument about the nature of modernity as theorists of 
the era represented by Strauss, Macpherson, Oakeshott, 
Arendt, and Voegelin. He describes his most comprehensive 
work. The Irony of Liberal Reason, as "principally a work of 
synthesis and interpretation." The breadth and depth of his 
learning qualify him to attempt to adjudicate among the 
disparate interpretations of the contemporary crisis that 
are on offer. "I owe a large debt to others who have given 
us their thoughtful and provocative interpretations of the 
general problems that have concerned me," he notes; among 
these interpreters he includes Strauss, Voegelin, Robert 
Nisbet, Reinhold Niebuhr, Jürgen Habermas, and Michael 
Polanyi.  ̂ He also offers an exhaustive and provocative 
interpretation of Hobbes, to whom he attributes a central 
place in the sequence of developments that have led to the 
civilizational impasse of the late twentieth century.
Spragens has been concerned with broad questions of 
theoretical approach in political science and practice, 
especially with respect to the intellectual transformation 
associated with the "scientific revolution." He argues that 
in the wake of this intellectual transformation, the social
^Spragens, The Ironv of Liberal Reason, xi-xii.
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sciences have adopted a natural-science model as 
paradigmatic for all inquiry, leading to a theoretically 
impoverished political science and a "technocratic” 
political practice that belies the humane claims of 
liberalism.
Spragens holds that the contribution of Hobbes was 
central to the reductionistic turn in modern political 
thought. Actually, Spragens speaks as though Aristotle is 
implicated as well in this development. Both Hobbes and 
Aristotle accepted to some extent a "scientistic" 
epistemology in which scientific rigor is taken as the goal 
of all inquiry. According to Spragens, Hobbes's political 
theory preserves an Aristotelian form, but alters the 
content. Hobbes substitutes motion for Aristotelian inertia 
as a physical analogue for the political. For Aristotle, 
rest or inertia represented the end of motion; motion, not 
inertia, required explanation. Political activity, like 
physical motion, is presumed to be directed toward an end or 
telos. Hobbes's physics posits "motion without end," rather 
than inertia, as paradigmatic for the physical world; 
similarly, his political thought removes any notion of 
teleology or purpose. Such is the framework in which 
Spragens operates in his analysis of Hobbes's thought. The 
Politics of Motion. This chapter will explore Spragens's 
analysis of the scientistic corruption of liberal politics.
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including his treatment of the thought of Hobbes as both 
exemplar of and contributor to this development.
Politics. Epistemoloov. and Liberal Rationalism 
The makers of the "scientific revolution," in 
developing the techniques that have so vastly revolutionized 
our understanding of the natural world, made certain tacit 
assumptions about what constituted reliable knowledge. The 
achievements of modern science were so impressive that these 
standards of reliability were taken as the norm for all 
forms of intellectual inquiry. What could not be known with 
scientistic precision was held not to be knowable. Spragens 
contends that these assumptions are fatal to moral inquiry, 
including political theory, which differs qualitatively from 
the disciplines of the natural sciences.
Spragens detects two conceptions of value (a kind of 
"cover term" including but not limited to moral, ethical, 
and political knowledge) within the liberal rationalism that 
has developed in the wake of the scientific revolution. One 
is "value noncognitivism," which simply holds that there is 
no such thing as knowledge of value, or at least that no 
such knowledge is accessible to human reason. A common 
version of value noncognitivism is "emotivism," the view 
that value statements represent nothing more than visceral 
emotional reactions that are not susceptible to rational 
justification. An alternative to value noncognitivism is 
the "technocratic" conception, which admits rational
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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principles of value but reduces them to technical knowledge 
accessible only to a cadre of "technocrats" who are adept at 
the techniques of critical reason. Liberal rationalism 
therefore renders knowledge of principles of value either 
utterly inaccessible or accessible only to an elite. Both 
these versions of liberal rationalism are based on 
"unrealistic premises about the possibilities of human 
knowledge," Spragens a r g u e s .2
The success of the new science cut short any reflection 
about the unreality of the premises of the paradigm of 
liberal reason. Thinkers as disparate as Locke and 
Descartes adopted the new program. Despite the usual 
distinction between Locke's empiricism and the rationalism 
of Descartes, Spragens contends that the two thinkers shared 
several fundamental assumptions. The search for knowledge 
was to begin with a "clean slate"; the traditions of 
scholasticism are to be replaced with distinct, indubitable 
foundations for knowledge. A mathematical mode of inquiry, 
stipulating precise rules of method, is to be the norm 
across all disciplines. Genuine knowledge is that which is 
verifiable and explicit. Such knowledge could only be a 
boon to mankind; the new paradigm would help to inaugurate a 
vast expansion of human powers and a new era of untold 
progress.̂
^Spragens, Ironv. 15. 
3lbid, 22-23.
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Hobbes would find it convenient to adopt the program of 
liberal rationalism. It represented a weapon that he could 
employ against the Aristotelian-scholastic "pseudo- 
explanations” to which he was so vehemently opposed, which 
were of a kind with the speculations of the Puritan divines 
who represented such a threat to the English constitutional 
order during his lifetime. The new version of reason 
represented a weapon against religious enthusiasm; reason 
would never again be subjugated by authority. A 
mathematical-geometrical model of knowledge would help to 
break the "spell of words" cast by the religious 
enthusiasts. Concomitantly, any discipline that was 
incapable of producing unambiguous, precise definitions fell 
into disrepute. A monistic model was adopted to cover all 
inquiry; poetry and imagination came to be identified with 
superstition and prejudice and were shunted aside.^
An alternative interpretation would be that Hobbes did 
not seize the new paradigm with enthusiasm, but was simply 
attempting to come to grips with the implications of the 
assumptions that had come to be accepted by the European 
intellectual elite. Spragens remarks that Hobbes "saw quite 
early that acceptance of the new philosophy made morality 
and politics problematic; it required establishing a 
conception of human order on a thoroughgoing nominalist and 
materialist footing." Nevertheless, Hobbes's contemporaries
^Ibid., 23-30.
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reacted to his initiatives with revulsion. "His ideas were 
universally reviled from the pulpit and almost uniformly 
rebutted by academicians. The hunting of Leviathan became a 
popular late-seventeenth-century British preoccupation."
The more observant of his contemporaries realized that 
Hobbes was not trying to be merely eccentric or provocative; 
he was trying to face the genuine intellectual challenges 
which confronted European civilization. "If Hobbes's answer 
was not persuasive, the questions he had confronted could 
not be shunted aside so easily.
Other liberal reformers were not as perceptive about 
the difficulties as Hobbes may have been, persisting as they 
did in the pursuit of secure foundations for knowledge.
Locke, for instance, pushed forward with the construction of 
a reductionistic ontology of simple primary quantities, as 
opposed to a theory of Platonic essences or Aristotelian 
forms. "Sensations could no longer be 'of substances, for 
there were none. Sensations could, therefore, only be 
impressions of corpuscular 'data,' since that was all there 
was out there for them to register." Genuine knowledge is 
to be understood as knowledge of these "simples," which 
define the limits of the knowable. There is no knowledge 
other than knowledge of these "simples"; the theory of 
"simples" establishes a clear and distinct boundary between 
the knowable and the unknowable. Spragens remarks that this
^Ibid., 198.
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is "a conception remarkably different from the real, 
concrete, experience of everyday life, but it is 
nevertheless presented as what, at bottom, 'experience' 
really is. . . . It is not a description of experience; it 
is instead a description of what experience must be, given 
the corpuscular construction of the world.”®
The liberal reformers seemed to think that the new 
epistemology and the accompanying reductionist ontology 
would engender a "moral science" that would reinforce and 
validate traditional standards. What really happened was 
the appearance of a full-fledged reductionism that would 
threaten these very standards. Hobbes attempted to put 
forward a relatively modest version of the new moral 
science. Given human self-interest, all that was necessary 
was foresight of consequences. Knowledge of consequences 
would enlighten those in power, who could use the new 
knowledge on behalf of the existing order. Such was the 
substance of the "politically conservative liberalism" that 
Spragens attributes to Bacon, Locke, and Descartes as well 
as to Hobbes.̂
This "politically conservative liberalism" was not the 
only political doctrine that could follow from the new moral 
science, however. Spragens identifies at least three other 
possibilities. One would be the "democratic natural-right
®Ibid., 209. 
■7jbid., 66-76.
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liberalism" of Concordet, Jefferson, or Paine. Here, the 
source of political improvement was to be not merely an 
enlightened ruling class but an enlightened public opinion, 
filtered through the institutions of representative 
government. Another version might be the "natural- 
reconciliation-of-interests liberalism" of an Adam Smith, 
although in Smith's own thought it appears that social order 
is to be generated from man's "moral sense" as well as from 
natural equilibrating forces. Finally there is the 
"artificial-reconciliation-of-interests liberalism" 
represented by the intricately balanced governmental 
institutions constructed by Madison in the Federalist 
Papers, in which institutional artifice is to generate the 
general interest out of the confluence of private interests. 
Spragens contends that this artificial reconciliation could 
take a more sinister, less limited form; if the new science 
promises us the domination of nature for the sake of 
progress, why could not human nature itself be included 
within the nature to be dominated? The result might be a 
politics of domination that could be tyrannical as well as 
beneficent. "For the beneficent and scientific legislator, 
human nature should present no more of an obstacle to the 
construction of the good society than would any other part 
of the cosmic mechanism. His knowledge would enable him to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
divine the requisites of social order and to shape men 
accordingly."®
Hobbes and Liberal Empiricism;
The Politics of Motion
Spragens suggests that Hobbes's "politically 
conservative liberalism" may not be sustainable. Others, 
working from the same assumptions as does Hobbes, might 
produce a politics of domination and manipulation. Spragens 
holds that Hobbes made a crucial contribution to the 
development of a political paradigm that inclines 
contemporary polities toward just such manipulation and 
domination. An elaboration of the sources and implications 
of Hobbes's assumptions was Spragens's intent in The 
Politics of Motion.
Spragens insists on a consideration of Hobbes's thought 
as a coherent whole. He breaks with the thesis of Taylor 
and Warrender, which holds that Hobbes's political thought 
and his cosmology are independent of each other. He argues 
that this Tay1or/Warrender thesis "involves a laborious 
separation of what Hobbes equally laboriously strove to 
reconcile, namely, his psychological postulates and his 
account of the origin of political obligation." Spragens's 
view is that Hobbes's attraction to modern science 
influenced his political philosophy, although "the impact of
®Ibid., 76-90.
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Hobbes's natural philosophy upon his political philosophy is 
not the product of purely deductive derivation."®
Spragens emphasizes Hobbes's obsession with the problem 
of motion. Hobbes reacted against the Aristotelian 
conception of motion as a synapse from potential to actual. 
Aristotle assumes that an object's natural state is one of 
rest; rest or inertia represents the end, fulfillment, or 
final cause of motion. It is a teleological conception of 
motion in which motion is held to seek its end in a state of 
rest. Hobbes in his theory of motion would eliminate this 
element of tension between the potential and the actual.
Aristotle presents a universe of beings (including both 
physical and human phenomena) who desire to become what they 
essentially are. In the physical world, it is movement that 
requires explanation; movement is expected to terminate 
itself in a state of rest or inertia. However, the account 
of the motion of projectiles proved to be the "Achilles' 
heel" of this Aristotelian physics. The modern physics 
initiated by Galileo proved to be its downfall. "This 
impressive conceptual framework concerning the phenomenon of 
motion was totally abandoned as a piece of unintelligible
®Spragens, The Politics of Motion; The World of Thomas 
Hobbes (Lexington, Ky.: The University Press of Kentucky, 1973), 
31, 37.
^Ogpragens, Motion. 57.
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and obscurantist nonsense by the principal thinkers of the 
seventeenth century," remarks Spragens.
Hobbes followed Aristotle in making motion the key to 
reality, but he broke with Aristotle in disposing with rest 
or inertia as the end of motion, making motion the whole of 
reality. Where Aristotle turned to biological growth,
Hobbes adopted a geometric model as the paradigm of motion. 
Teleology disappears; final and formal causality are 
abandoned in favor of efficient causes only. We are left 
with a "rest-less" world in which motion lacks an end. In
this monism of motion, life is taken to be nothing but 
motion, which tends to persist; life's motion lacks any 
telos other than striving to persist. Will, intellect, and 
emotions are all held to be reducible to motion; even 
knowledge and the intellectual faculties are understood as, 
at bottom, nothing but motion. Motion admits of no 
qualitative distinctions; it is nothing but a vector,
lacking form or substance.
Not only did Hobbes replace inertia with pure motion, 
he also substituted mere bodv for the Aristotelian concept 
of substance or ousia. Aristotle's ousia is a broad concept 
designating that which makes something what it is. On this 
basis, Aristotle constructs what might be taken as an 
incipiently materialistic world of "nesses." His procedure
lllbid., 59-61. 
12ibid., 63-71.
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is to anthropomorphize the physical. Hobbes reverses this, 
physicalizing the human realm at the expense of politics.
Once the Aristotelian conception of movement is lost, 
substance is converted into the "empty vehicle" of body. A 
world of undifferentiated body is a world of Hobbesian 
nominalism, in which definitions lose their explanatory 
function. Order is now to come from motion, not 
substance.
The Hobbesian universe overthrows the Aristotelian 
sense of the orderliness and coherence of nature. Lost is 
any sense of man as having a social nature that could serve 
as a source of obligation; also lost is any sense of the 
polity as prior to the individual in the sense of being the 
individual's final cause, completion, or fulfillment.
Nature is characterized by enmity, not sociability; ruthless 
egocentrism is understood to be natural. Simple, 
dissociated components, rather than a state of fulfillment 
or coherence, are taken as the starting points for reasoning 
about politics.
Although Spragens disagrees with Macpherson in holding 
that a certain degree of "power-lust" is part of human 
nature, rather than being specific to capitalist society, he 
agrees that Hobbes's "natural man" is an abstraction from 
civilized man as Hobbes knew him; Hobbes arrives at his
l^ibid., 77-92. 
l^ibid., 97-106.
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state of nature by speculating about how a society of 
typical seventeenth-century men would behave if political 
authority were suddenly removed. In general, for Hobbes we 
arrive at nature by performing an act of analytical 
dissolution on the whole, "resolving" the whole into its 
fundamental components. The whole is not natural; nature is
intrinsically dissociated.
Spragens acknowledges the importance of Macpherson's 
insight into Hobbes's "disassociationism" with respect to 
its implications for the political. Hobbes can speak of 
"meer nature," which, as Spragens notes, would have been 
unthinkable to the Aristotelian tradition. If nature is 
essentially dissociated rather than holistic, then it cannot 
be the source of ethical or political injunctions. Order 
will have to be a wholly artificial creation of the 
sovereign. Ethical statements will be understood only as 
expressions of will or preference. As Spragens notes, "The 
ramifications of this position extend into Hobbes's 
doctrines in the area of political economy and economic 
justice."
Viewing economic activity as only one aspect of a 
broader human order, the Aristotelian tradition placed 
certain limitations upon it which followed from the 
larger order. The demands of economic justice were 
expressions of the belief that commerce must be 
integrated into a wider framework of human nature, and 
these demands had been elaborated in theories of just 
price, commutative justice, and distributive justice.
Here, as elsewhere, however, the concept of justice is
l^ibid., 106-107.
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an ontological one, and Hobbes's destruction of the 
classical ontology leaves him no basis for these 
traditional theories of economic justice. Hobbes 
therefore concludes, again quite logically from his 
premises, that the only criterion of value is 
•appetite,' and hence there is no distinction between 
value and market price.
When the tenets of laissez-faire capitalism were pushed to
their logical conclusion, an anguished response was provoked
in the form of the Marxian theory, Spragens argues.
"Marxian economics . . .  is actually a systematic
restitution of economics to a contingent place within the
entire human economy and has a root affinity with the
classical concepts of just price and distributive justice."
Hobbes's premises left no basis for the limitations on
economic activity that Western polities had inherited from
the Aristotelian tradition. Whereas the Marxian system "was
normative in the classical sense, that is, anchored in a
humanized ontology," Hobbes's position represented "a
complete relinquishing of moral control over the market.
Rather than being a contingent facet of human social life,
economic relations become the autonomous standard to which
all other facets of political order must conform.
^^Ibid., 107-111. On the relation between Marx and 
Aristotle, see also Richard W. Miller, "Marx and Aristotle: A 
Kind of Consequentialism," in Kai Nielsen and Steven C. Patten, 
eds., Marx and Morality. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 
Supplementary Volume VII, 1981, 323-352; Arendt, The Human 
Condition. 254, n. ("Incidentally, the influence of Aristotle on 
the style of Marx's thought seems to me almost as characteristic 
and decisive as the influence of Hegel's philosophy"); and George 
Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism, 
Carleton Library No. 50 (Ottawa, Canada: Carleton University 
Press, 1982), 56 ("Marx is not purely a philosopher of the age of
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We might conclude, then, that Aristotle would have been 
repulsed by Hobbes's conclusions regarding the relation of 
the economic to the political. According to Spragens, 
however, there are some aspects of Aristotle's thought that 
leave his system susceptible to reversals of content at 
certain crucial points, allowing Hobbes to draw the 
conclusions he does. Both Aristotle and Hobbes are 
antidualistic thinkers, insisting on the unity of the world. 
Both conceive the world as a universe. conferring no special 
status on man. Furthermore, they both agree that science 
should aim at certain, demonstrable knowledge. Both seek 
definitions, but they disagree on the nature of the 
definitions.^^
Aristotle is a realist who believes that the universe 
is susceptible to real definitions. Hobbes replaces this 
realism with nominalism. There are no essences, just 
explications of names. Aristotle deals in the induction of 
natural essences; Hobbes, in the resolution of nature into 
its smallest components. To arrive at a natural state, we 
first resolve it into its components, then recompose it into 
an artificial whole. The resolutive-compositional procedure 
puts Hobbesian science in a better position to claim 
precision than does the approach of Aristotle. "That is.
progress; he is rooted in the teleological philosophy that 
predates the age of progress").
^^Spragens, Motion. 129-139.
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for Hobbes, unlike for Aristotle, political science is a 
theoretical science— a form of knowledge which can be 
precise because it deals with necessary truths." Hobbesian 
science yields pleasures which are not purely intrinsic; it 
is oriented toward action— action that will help the 
sovereign ruler to manipulate the realm so that violent 
disorder may be avoided.^®
In sum, Spragens's view is that Hobbes preserved an 
Aristotelian form, but reversed the substance of Aristotle's 
theory at certain crucial points. Both thinkers insisted 
that nature is an integrated whole. Furthermore, both of 
them adopted the "externalizing" perspective of modern 
science to some extent, with the scientist as a detached 
outsider looking down upon nature. Both took motion as 
their starting point. However, whereas Aristotle's motion 
was analogous to biological growth, Hobbes employed the 
analogy of a mere vector, a quantity rather than a quality, 
tending only to persist rather than to grow. While the 
circle was the symbol of the Aristotelian universe, for 
Hobbes the symbol was a line. The Hobbesian model of 
motion, taken as an analogy for politics, led to the 
rejection of any intelligible end or summum bonum. Lacking 
an intelligible fulfillment or completion, politics becomes 
concerned with passion rather than reason. Men are taken to 
be naturally antisocial rather than social; they act
l®Ibid., 139-158.
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politically to avoid meeting their natural end, that of 
violent death. In a state of irremediable anxiety, men must 
seek an excess of power to stay ahead of others. Politics 
consists of the management of passion; ironically, passion 
leads men toward disaster, up to a point at which a latent 
passion (fear of violent death) is awakened, bringing 
salvation.
How Liberal Reason Corrupts Politics 
According to Spragens, this Hobbesian reversal of the 
substance of Aristotelianism constituted a philosophical 
reductionism that set the stage for a vulgarization of 
politics. Instead of understanding the political on the 
basis of an Aristotelian analogy with biological growth and 
development, Hobbes presents a mechanistic model for 
politics. The political mechanism could be understood as a 
self-regulating machine that operates according to its own 
law, or, in a potentially sinister interpretation, as a 
machine to be manipulated from outside itself. This 
manipulative model for politics opens the possibility of a 
"technocratic” politics of "social engineering.
For instance, in Locke's doctrine of sensationalism we 
have a close analogy to a Hobbesian universe of "mere" body 
rather than Aristotelian substance. The mind at birth is to
l^Ibid., 163-197 and 203-204. 
20spragens, Irony. 91-93.
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be understood as a "white paper," its content determined 
strictly by the sensations it receives. Aristotle also 
suggests the analogy of the tabula rasa, but for him the 
mind at least contains a potentiality that awaits 
actualization; at least there were limits to the ways in 
which this potentiality could be actualized. The moderns 
understood the emptiness of the mind as constituting utter 
plasticity. Locke was not able to carry this line of 
thought through to its logical conclusion. Spragens notes 
that he leaves a "ten percent residual category" of men who 
were "self-made" rather than being completely the products 
of their environment.
The modern version of the mind-as-tabula rasa theory 
was a development concomitant with the modern reversal of 
the Aristotelian concept of nature. Where Aristotle 
understood the nature of something to be its end in the 
sense of a final cause, the moderns associated nature with 
origin or beginning. Sensationalist or other reductionist 
doctrines of mind merely involved emptying the mind's 
origins of all content. When Hobbes and Locke traced the 
origins of political man to a state of nature, the 
inhabitants of this natural state were still recognizably 
human, but by the time the process they initiated was
2 1 i b i d . ,  94-101.
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complete, man's nature was understood as nothing more than 
the mere capacity to receive sensation.22
Sensationalist conceptions of mind notwithstanding, it 
would be argued that some people were capable of breaking 
out of the deterministic circle suggested by the new 
theories. While most men might be mere "objects" who 
inhabit the realm of necessity, those in possession of the 
knowledge provided by the new sciences were "subjects" who 
could attain the realm of freedom. Spragens suggests that 
this development amounts to "the fashioning by a well- 
intentioned power-seeking intellectual class of their own 
legitimacy myth." When enthusiasts of the new sciences 
claim that "we" can put science in the service of human 
progress, they may only be revealing their ignorance of what 
Spragens calls the "'we, who?' problem" of "technocratic" 
politics.
Who is this "man" who is nothing more than the product 
of his education?" And who, then, is the producer? Who 
are the "they" whose hands will hold "the instrument of 
their greatness and felicity"? Who are the "we" who 
"may learn how to cherish and improve" some passions and 
a i fe e Lions while "checking and rooting out" others?
Who, in short, are the educators and who the educated?
Who are the knowers and who are the known? Who controls 
and who is controlled?
Although the solution to these problems is rarely 
clear (since it remains cloaked in the rhetoric of "man 
making himself"), it seems clear that we are not really 
talking about the same people in each case. Instead, 
one "class" of man is envisaged as educating or 
improving another "class." And this difference provides 
the escape from fatalism.
22ibid., 101-104.
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The possessor of positive science becomes the "ideal 
legislator" whose task it is to fabricate the good political 
order. "Rousseau stated the qualifications of the 
technocratic Legislator; Helvetius declared them attainable; 
and Bentham applied for the job," remarks Spragens. He 
argues that this "technocrat" represents a "sentimentalized 
version" of the Hobbesian s o v e r e i g n . 3̂
The "technocratic" conception makes politics into a 
science of rewards and punishments. As Spragens notes, all 
polities must engage in the application of rewards and 
punishments to some extent--in the application of a criminal 
code, for instance. What distinguishes the technocrat is 
the unbounded scope given to such scientistic reasoning. 
Technocracy attempts to control the environment for the 
purposes of education and character formation; in so doing, 
it runs the risk of becoming morally reductionistic, 
rendering liberty meaningless. Social control replaces 
political interaction. Malleable man would seem incapable 
of holding politically accountable the technocrats who are 
able to so thoroughly manipulate him. The moral content of 
the traditional understanding of politics becomes 
unintelligible. Technocratic leanings may be seen in the 
conservative, liberal, or radical varieties of modern 
politics. Spragens thinks that the reason that
23 j b i d . ,  105-109.
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"technocracy" has not developed into a full-fledged ideology 
is simply that its assumptions are so ubiquitous.
In technocratic politics, social-scientific techniques 
are endowed with an authority sufficient to override the 
requirements of democratic consent. Social scientists such 
as Lester Frank Ward and B. F. Skinner sought a scientific 
"cure" for "pathological" social dynamics; they professed to 
be baffled by the "irrational" resistance they sometimes 
encountered in their "subjects." Such "technocrats" tend to 
make optimistic assumptions to the effect that their schemes 
will require a minimal amount of coercion. Dr. Karl 
Menninger's discussion of the "crime of punishment" could be 
taken as an exemplification of technocratic tendencies. 
Menninger seeks to mitigate the cruelties of the penal 
system by converting the criminal into a deviant to be 
treated rather than punished. He fails to realize that in 
so doing he has converted the criminal into a mere "object" 
to whom responsibility cannot be attributed. Society, not 
the criminal, is spoken of as responsible, but this 
evocation of societal guilt is followed by an arrogation of 
power. This conceptual shift culminates in the abuse of 
psychiatry, in which psychiatric "treatment" becomes 
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It will be recalled that in Spragens*s presentation the 
major modern alternative to a "technocratic” conception of 
value is "value noncognitivism." One exponent of 
iioncognitivism was David Hume, whose political thought 
Spragens characterizes as degenerating into emotivism and 
irrationalism. His phenomenalism parallels Locke's 
sensationalism in that it holds that there is nothing to 
reality but impressions. Such a philosophy can provide 
nothing more than a conventionalist moral theory in which we 
are to accept habit and custom because they are safe; the 
desire for stability corresponds to Hobbes's fear of violent 
death. Standards of value were to be found only in such 
internal standards, not the external world. Hume spoke of 
an internal moral sense "which nature has made universal in 
the whole species"; evidently, "moral taste" was to do the 
work of Aristotelian substance. However, a reductionistic 
metaphysics of impressions could not account for a 
phenomenon so complex as moral taste. Immanuel Kant would 
try to save ethics by appealing to the radically free will 
as a standard of value, but Spragens asserts that neither 
Hume nor Kant could avoid "importing" traditional moral 
content into his theory.
It turns out, then, that the only alternative available 
to the scientific rationalist who wishes to avoid a
26ibid., 213-255. At 227, Spragens refers to Hume, 
Principles of Morals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon 
Press, 1975), sec. I.
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technocratic politics of domination is a skeptical denial of 
the possibility of a rational standard for political life. 
Scientific "value noncognitivism" places the political 
outside the realm of the rationally apprehensible, 
culminating in political irrationalism. Such a skepticism 
can affirm nothing positive; debunking and critique are its 
strong suits, but Spragens thinks that this "animus against 
enthusiasm is itself an enthusiasm." In its conservative 
form, such an irrationalism appeals to custom in opposition 
to affirmative political standards. Liberal irrationalism 
denies metaphysical holism or transcendentalism, seeing 
appetite or desire as the only reality. Radical 
irrationalism appeals to imaginative fantasy in a romantic 
reaction against pretensions to rational political 
discourse. Spragens remarks that "the radical irrationalist 
may turn out to be anything from a relatively amiable 
absurdist to a furious nihilist— from a Yippie to a 
terrorist."27
A Non-Reductionistic Standard 
for Political Knowledge
Spragens concludes that neither the technocratic nor 
the value-noncognitivist conception of value can provide us 
with an adequate theoretical framework for political 
science. Both these versions of modern rationalism rule out 
any recourse to norms of completion or fulfillment in an
27gpragens, Irony. 256-261.
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Aristotelian sense, without which politics cannot be 
rendered intelligible. The influence of positivistic 
rationalism has had a deformative effect on several 
otherwise fruitful theoretical developments in contemporary 
political science. Without any reference to political 
purposes, an Eastonian "systems model" may generate nothing 
more than a universalized "pork-barrel" politics. Robert 
Dahl's version of democratic theory preserves Madison's 
concern with "constitutional engineering," but it eliminates 
Madison's intent to limit the "mischiefs of faction," since 
on its assumptions the term "faction" cannot be 
"operationalized." Perhaps the most poignant instance of 
positivistic theoretical impoverishment has been in the area 
of development theory, the very mention of which carries 
Aristotelian overtones. A truly profound theory of 
development would have to refer to a substantive standard 
for a good societv to which development ought to contribute. 
Lacking a theoretical framework that can speak of "the good 
society" intelligibly, development theory has, in Spragens's 
view, lapsed into a kind of ethnocentrism in which 
"development" is taken to be equivalent to conformity to the 
patterns of the Western industrialized world.^8
From Sptagens's perspective, a wholesome intellectual 
development has been the rise, and especially the fall, of
2®Spragens, The Dilemma of Contemporary Political Theory; 
Toward a Postbehavioral Science of Politics (New York: Dunellen, 
1973), 73-106 and 127-28.
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logical positivism in the twentieth century. Logical 
positivism represented a radicalized, unsentimental version 
of the program of liberal reason; it may be considered the 
culmination of the development initiated by Hobbes, Locke, 
and Descartes. The logical positivists' standard of 
"verificationism" parallels the Hobbesian procedure of 
"resolution." However, logical positivism quickly 
encountered difficulties. For one thing, on the basis of 
the verification principle, logical positivism appeared 
incapable of giving an account of itself. The verification 
principle insists that only empirical statements are 
admissible, but the principle itself appears to be normative 
or regulative, purporting as it does to settle questions 
about what uses of language are "proper," the protests of 
positivists to the contrary notwithstanding. It appears, 
then, that the verification principle is not self-reflexive. 
Furthermore, protests were heard to the effect that 
positivistic verificationism gave a distorted account of 
investigative procedures in the natural sciences.
Scientists objected that scientific statements are 
universally context-laden; there is no such thing as a 
completely theory-neutral observation. Representative of 
all these developments was Wittgenstein's shift from the 
program of the Tractatus to that of the Philosophical 
Investigations ; in the latter work he rejected the "picture
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theory" of language and its implication of a radical 
separation of observer and object.29
Wittgenstein initiated a version of linguistic analysis 
that was not reductionistic. The notion of "simples" was 
abandoned; it was accepted that language represents an 
irreducibly complex reality. Language was seen as not 
susceptible to purification; an absolute boundary between 
the knowable and the unknowable could not be drawn. This 
Wittgensteinian shift was soon reflected in a new turn in 
the philosophy of science on the part of thinkers such as 
Michael Polanyi and Thomas Kuhn. Knowledge was now seen as 
contingent and subject to interpretation. Scientific 
knowing contains an ubiquitous element of tacit judgment. 
Science can attain "warranted beliefs," not "positive" 
knowledge. Any verification of scientific knowledge is 
necessarily intersubi ective and therefore less than totally 
certain. The new philosophy of science puts forward a 
"lower” standard for knowledge in that it stipulates that 
not all ambiguity and uncertainty can be eliminated.^0
Spragens characterizes the new philosophy of science as 
part of a quiet intellectual revolution. Ironically, 
political science embraced positivism just as it was being 
discredited. In any case, the political implications of the 
more modest conception of scientific rationality are clear.
29gpragens, Irony. 319-332. 
30lbid., 347-356.
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On the one hand, it becomes obvious that a degree of 
humility is appropriate to politics. If the natural 
sciences cannot obtain absolutely certain knowledge, it is 
clear that all claims in an area such as politics must be 
regarded as dubitable. "Technocratic" politics loses its 
warrant; we may be able tentatively to identify some people 
as mistaken, but within a proper understanding of politics 
it will be stipulated that the mistaken are to be persuaded, 
not coerced. On the other hand, if our "post-liberal" 
understanding dictates that the aims of politics are to be 
somewhat modest, this understanding also rehabilitates 
politics in an important respect, because we are freed from 
the constricting dogma of the fact-value dichotomy and may 
make evaluative statements with a clear conscience. "Value 
noncognitivism" and its concomitant political irrationalism 
may be set aside.
In adopting the model of the natural sciences as 
paradigmatic for the study of man and society, modern 
liberals failed to realize that the successes of modern 
science have been due to its political institutions as well 
as its technical virtuosity. The "scientific republic" 
enforces norms of consensus, authority, and freedom, just as 
a well-ordered polity does. The scientific enterprise is 
predicated on a consensus on behalf of the pursuit of truth; 
it accredits scientific authorities who are charged with
31lbid., 357-368.
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determining what does or does not constitute a legitimate 
advance in scientific knowledge. Within this context, 
science affirms the competence of the human mind to 
apprehend truth, and so it enforces norms such as those of 
academic freedom in order that free inquiry may proceed. 
Political enterprises are of a different order from those of 
science, but both undertakings attempt a "progressive 
adaptation"; science seeks to narrow the gap between 
observation and theory, while politics attempts to adapt 
extant institutions to the requirements of human existence 
properly understood. Reason is not simply equivalent to 
either science or politics, but according to Spragens it is 
reason that makes science "scientific" and politics 
"political," rather than "military": in either undertaking 
it is reason that allows us to arbitrate between competing 
claims of authoritativeness. Spragens hopes that a more 
appropriate understanding of reason and its role in politics 
will enable our political enterprises to attain their 
legitimate ends. "Perhaps a revised appraisal of human 
understanding will permit us to escape the strange 
oscillation between pride and despair that has characterized 
political life in the modern West— to replace that unhappy 
pattern with a more felicitous dialectic of hope and
h u m i l i t y . "32
32ibid., 368-395.
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Fallibilism and Absolutism; An Uneasy Coexistence?
Spragens offers a provocative interpretation of the 
philosophical vulgarization of liberal politics and of the 
role of thinkers such as Hobbes in this development. To 
save liberalism from itself, in the sense of preserving its 
better rather than its worse tendencies, is his intent. His 
view is that the most defensible tenet of modern liberalism 
is its epistemological fallibilism— the view that certain 
truths are apprehensible only imperfectly. A fallibilist in 
the realm of ethics, for instance, would argue that there 
are ethical truths to be known, but that our minds can 
apprehend them only imperfectly— in opposition to the view 
of a relativist who would argue that there are no such 
ethical truths that the mind is capable of apprehending. 
Fallibilism argues from the fallibility of all views, not 
their equivalence or parity. "The strongest part of the 
relativist and empiricist justifications of liberal and 
democratic institutions is their common focus on 
epistemological fallibilism. . . .  if the limitations of the 
human mind are such as to render all moral beliefs somewhat 
uncertain, then the case for the politics of freedom and 
toleration improves dramatically.
This epistemological fallibilism represents something 
of a two-sided philosophical coin. On the one hand, what 
can be known is only known with some uncertainty, but, on
3 3 l b i d . ,  285-286.
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the other hand, there is definitely something to be known.
The latter consideration apparently has prompted Spragens to
become attracted to philosophical absolutism of a sort.
The accreditation of "objective" values can contribute 
and has contributed to the ethos of liberal democracy, 
especially when this absolutism is transcendentalist (or 
at least sees perfection as an unreasonable expectation 
for historical existence) and includes an appreciation 
of the contingencies of human knowledge— if, for 
example, it realizes that these absolute goods are 
perceived "through a glass darkly". . . . Indeed, the 
argument for toleration may be based on theological 
grounds, . . . [ i. e.] in the contention that the
claim to know God's will is a sinful presumption. While 
it respects the pluralist element in democracy, 
moreover, this kind of philosophical "absolutism" can 
also provide the basis for insisting on the justice, the 
human dignity, and the intrinsic limits on the 
legitimate scope of government that are the essence of 
political constitutionalism— which is, in turn, a 
crucial element in Western liberal democracy.
Can Spragens have both absolutism of this or any sort and
also epistemological fallibilism? One could probably come
up with any number of absolutists who were unwilling to
admit any uncertainty regarding their absolutist tenets.
One might even argue that the two requirements of absolutism
and fallibility are contradictory. If one claims for one's
tenets the status of absolutes, why admit that their truth
is known with anything less than absolute certainty? If
there is uncertainty, are the absolutes really absolute?
For science, the nearest thing to a philosophical
absolute is the disinterested inquirer's commitment to the
truth. This commitment requires an affirmation by the
34ibid., 290.
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inquirer of the ability of the mind to apprehend reality; 
such an affirmation is not susceptible to the empirical 
verification demanded by the logical positivist. According 
to Spragens, "we must confess our faith in this 
complementary rationality of known reality and knowing 
person to be finally just that— a faith," albeit a "not 
unreasonable faith." Such faith must underlie the 
"uneliminable act of intellectual judgment on the part of a 
responsible knower" which is a component of any inquiry.
The irreducible necessity for this intellectual judgment 
reveals the "tacit coefficient in all knowledge" in light of 
which the project of the logical positivist is rendered 
obsolete.
Talk of "faith" may suggest that the commitment of the 
disinterested inquirer is to be equated with religious 
commitment, but that this is Spragens's intent is not clear.
He speaks, for instance, of the political theorist's 
attaining transcendence, but this transcendence is 
explicitly described as a relative transcendence. The 
theorist is to be aware of his own personal and social 
milieu so that he can move beyond his own limited 
perspective and take into account the viewpoints of others.
In so doing, the theorist's perspective "reaches what might 
be called a relative transcendence of its origins; it can 
move beyond its partiality to a more comprehensive vision.
^^Spragens, Dilemma. 148-149.
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but it can never escape from its grounding in the 
contingency of historicity.''^^
The import of Spragens's critique of liberal reason is 
that liberals have failed to acknowledge the tacit component 
of human knowledge and have, as a result, pursued either a 
discredited verificationism or a politically nihilistic 
value noncognitivism. The influence of thinkers such as 
Hobbes was crucial to this development. Spragens sometimes 
speaks as though the thought of Aristotle were also 
implicated; it will be recalled that he detects continuity 
as well as divergence in his comparison of these two 
theorists. Both thinkers insisted upon "the demonstrative 
character of scientific knowledge." The movement toward an 
insistence on radical certitude may be traced back to 
ancient Greek thought: "Once one has apprehended the ousia 
of anything, he may feel confident that his understanding 
will retain its validity forever, because the lines of 
substance, the species of being, are assumed to be eternal. 
. . .  It was conceivable to Aristotle that the entire cosmos 
could be exhaustively represented by a complete set of 
univocal definitions."^^
Spragens may have jumped to a conclusion in drawing 
such a close parallel between Hobbes and Aristotle. Not all 
his statements concerning Aristotle on this matter are
36ibid., 153.
37gpragens, Motion. 138-139; Dilemma. 139-141.
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consistent. Any claim of certain knowledge on the part of 
Aristotle would have to refer to theoretical reason only, 
not practical reason, as Spragens acknowledges. Perhaps the 
fairest statement by Spragens on this matter is his 
observation that the "Aristotelian claim that the first 
principles of science are known 'with certainty' is either 
mistaken or else it simply refers to a quality of belief— to 
strength of conviction."^®
®Spragens, Motion. 156-157; Irony, 143, 351-353.
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CHAPTER 8; HOBBES AND ARISTOTLE— IMPLICATIONS 
FOR CONTEMPORARY POLITICS
That the mention of Hobbes continues to arouse fear and 
suspicion is testified to by the enduring tendency of 
political partisans to hurl the epithet "Hobbesian" at their 
opponents. The accusation of Hobbesianism is not entirely 
neutral in its political implications; Hobbes's title 
"Leviathan" has been appropriated by those who wish to 
portray the contemporary state as monstrous in its 
proportions, as in discussions of "the Leviathan state." 
"Hobbesianism" thus has become a weapon of the libertarian 
right against the "collectivist" left; those who would 
shrink the state point their fingers at those who would 
maintain or expand it, calling them Hobbesians.^
Two of the commentators on Hobbes discussed herein 
present themselves as critics of the proportions of the 
contemporary state. Strauss, a critic of Hobbes, portrayed 
modern governments as moving inexorably toward the 
establishment of a "universal and homogeneous state," a goal 
acknowledged tacitly and almost unanimously, as though it 
had been enacted as official doctrine by a Hobbesian 
sovereign. It may have been an embarrassment to Strauss to 
find that Oakeshott, an admitted admirer of Hobbes, agreed 
nevertheless that the contemporary state had overextended
^See, for instance, Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan: 
Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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itself, that it resembled a universitas that tiireatened to 
smother individuality rather than a societas that left 
people free to pursue their own life plans and projects. 
Macpherson, who sympathized somewhat with Strauss as a 
critic of Hobbes, should be considered a critic of the 
contemporary state only in a highly qualified sense, because 
of his Marxian leanings; given a choice between maintaining 
the contemporary state and limiting it in the way that an 
Oakeshott might, he would probably take the former option. 
Strauss considered Macpherson an advocate of the "universal 
socialist society," a thinly veiled equivalent of the 
"universal and homogeneous state"; it will be suggested 
below that Macpherson may indeed have left himself open to 
such a sinister portrayal.^
In considering whether a thinker ought to be acquitted 
or convicted of the charge of Hobbesianism, not only his 
stance toward the contemporary state but also his position 
regarding the openness of political discussion and debate 
should be considered.^ Voegelin's remarks about the 
Hobbesian proclivity to censor political discussion should 
be recalled, as should Arendt's contrast between the 
classical Greek emphasis on political action and the 
Hobbesian tendency toward subjection to an absolute
^Strauss, review of Macpherson, The Political Theorv of 
Possessive Individualism, in Studies in Platonic Political 
Philosophy. 231.
^See chapter 2, 46 above.
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sovereign. Such concerns are shared by Macpherson in his 
criticism of the passive consumer society that has driven 
out participatory democracy, and by Spragens in his 
observations about the danger that technological 
manipulation will come to supplant politics. Hobbes and 
Aristotle, to whom Hobbes so often set himself in 
opposition, provide an instructive contrast for the 
illumination of the issues of the place of the state and of 
open political discussion. For instance, passing 
consideration at least should be given to the attitudes 
toward Hobbes and Aristotle of contemporary classical 
liberal "anti-statists," who so effectively have 
appropriated the Leviathan symbol for polemical purposes.
Aristotle. Hobbes, and the Latter-Dav Hobbesians
In Spragens's presentation, Aristotle puts forward a 
holistic metaphysics, whereas Hobbes propounds an atomistic 
ontology in which everything is to be resolved into its 
simplest components. Borrowing from biology, Aristotle 
speaks of motion in terms of growth, which points toward a 
natural state of full development or completeness. Hobbes, 
taking his inspiration from Galilean mechanics, identifies 
the natural not with development but with origin or 
beginning; his motion amounts not to growth but to mere 
persistence, a never-ending "motion after motion" within an 
"end-less" universe. The Galilean model eventually 
supplanted the Aristotelian conception as a more successful
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explanation of the motion of physical bodies, "What is 
absurd in the context of physical motion is not so absurd in 
the context of human action, however," Spragens argues.^
Hobbes presents a universe in which motion is devoid of 
termination. The opposing Aristotelian metaphysics contains 
a principle of inertia. Motion is not expected to continue 
without end; it requires explanation. Motion is presumed to 
terminate in a state of rest, which represents the final 
cause or telos of motion. The Hobbesian universe disposes 
of such talk of an end or telos. constructing instead a 
universe in which the Aristotelian formal and final causes 
are subsumed under either material or efficient cause.
Hobbes thus constructs a purposeless universe, devoid of 
ends, both in the sense of termination and the sense of a 
goal or purpose toward which things tend and in terms of 
which they may be explained.^
The Hobbesian metaphysics implies a political theory 
that a devotee of Hobbes would probably describe as 
realistic and unsentimentalized; others find it stark and 
demoralizing. Men in the state of nature are capable of 
doing to their fellows absolutely anything that their 
strength and guile permits them to get away with; at this 
stage, there exists nothing to provide a basis for a 
sanction against unprovoked violence, for instance. To
4Spragens, Dilemma. 133. See also Motion. 97-110 and 189-97. 
^Spragens, Motion. 53-74.
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escape from such a state, men rush for the cover to be 
provided by the Hobbesian sovereign, but even after the 
sovereign is acknowledged, they may not be sanguine about 
their circumstances. In return for the sovereign's 
protection, men must place themselves at their mercy. No 
matter what burdens the sovereign places on his subjects, no 
rebellion is legitimate— unless, of course, a successful 
rebellion takes place, in which case it may be spoken of as 
legitimate "after the fact."
Contrastively, Aristotelian politics places natural 
limits on both rulers and their subjects (including limits 
on the accumulation of wealth). Men as well as natural 
objects have an end, the polis, which is the appropriate 
environment for an existence fit for human beings. That a 
political community is man's natural setting is revealed by 
his natural capacity for speech, which makes possible 
discussion, persuasion, and political action generally. 
"Nature, according to our theory, makes nothing in vain; and 
man alone of the animals is furnished with the faculty of 
language." There is a sense in which the community is prior 
to its members, just as a hand or foot cannot perform its 
natural function when severed from the rest of the body. 
Genuinely human existence cannot be achieved outside of the 
political community; it would be perverse for a man to 
insist on living in isolation. "The man who is isolated—  
who is unable to share in the benefits of political
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association, or has no need to share because he is already
self-sufficient— is no part of the polis, and must therefore
be either a beast or a god." The collective has an 
interest, but in the normal case this does not constitute a 
pretext for the sacrifice of the individual; the interest of 
the community is nothing apart from the full development and 
truly human existence of its members.®
Strauss considered Aristotle to be the source of one of 
three versions of the doctrine that he called "classic 
natural right," along with Plato and Aquinas. He thought 
that this doctrine dictated an opposition to the
contemporary tendency which he identified as culminating in
the "universal and homogeneous state." Before we accept the 
conclusion that the teaching of classical political 
philosophy requires a campaign to shrink and diminish the 
state, we should examine the attitude of other opponents of 
the "Leviathan state" concerning the issues dividing 
Aristotle and the classics from Hobbes and the teachings of 
modern political philosophy.^
It might be thought that Strauss, as an opponent of the 
"universal and homogeneous state," would be sympathetic to 
the perspective of F. A. Hayek, whose contributions have 
been the inspiration of much of the "anti-statist" tendency
®Aristotle, Politics, trans. Ernest Barker (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, Clarendon Press, 1946; reprint, London, Oxford, 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 1.2.1253a.
^Strauss, Natural Right and History. 146, 156-63.
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in recent right-of-center thought. Even a casual 
comparison, however, will reveal that Strauss and Hayek have 
little in common beyond their mutual political dislikes.
Far from hearkening back to the tradition of classical 
political philosophy, Hayek celebrates the achievements of 
modern civilization, in particular the development of an 
"extended order" featuring free economic markets and an 
interdependent network of exchange that exceeds by several 
degrees of magnitude the scale of the classical Greek polis.
In such an extended order, Aristotelian teleology has no 
place, since order emerges spontaneously, without anyone 
intending it, out of the interaction among individuals, each 
acting to attain his or her own purpose, in or out of the 
economic sphere. Each of us has an intimate, tacit 
knowledge of our own immediate environment; no single person 
or group could have access to sufficient knowledge to act to 
achieve the purpose of the entire social organization, 
conceived in Aristotelian fashion. In fact, in his most 
recent monograph. The Fatal Conceit; The Errors of 
Socialism. Hayek explicitly dismisses Aristotle and the 
Aristotelian approach to politics.
"Aristotle spoke from his instincts, and not from 
observation or reflection, when he confined human order to 
the reach of the herald's cry," claims Hayek at the outset 
of The Fatal Conceit. He objects to any attempt to impose 
limits on the scale of human organization or economic
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accumulation based on teleological considerations foreign to 
the rational calculator of economic theory. He has no use 
for a world-view in which, according to Barker's 
description, "everywhere things are regarded as determined 
towards an end." Indeed, he blames such a Weltanschauung 
for a corruption of political language, due to its tacit 
assumption that where there is order there must be an 
orderer. He argues that "the naive or untutored mind . . . 
tends to assume the activity of mind or spirit wherever it 
imagines that there is purpose." He goes so far as to 
attribute to Aristotle "a naive and childlike animistic view 
of the world," comparable to that described by Jean Piaget 
(The Child's Conception of the World). For Hayek the 
Aristotelian "postulated perfection of social life" 
mentioned by Spragens is inadmissable. In his earlier 
statement on politics. The Constitution of Libertv, Hayek 
remarked that "it has been perfectionism of one kind or 
another that has destroyed whatever degree of decency 
societies have achieved."®
John Gray, an Oxford political philosopher, has 
attempted to synthesize the contributions of Hayek and other
®F. A. Hayek, The Fatal Conceit; The Errors of Socialism, 
vol. 1, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek. ed. W. W. Bartley III 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 11; Barker, The 
Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. 219; Hayek, Conceit. 
106-110, 47; Spragens, Dilemma. 45; Hayek, The Constitution of 
Libertv (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960; Phoenix 
Edition, 1978), 8. Hayek's reference to Piaget in Conceit (at 
47) is to The Child's Conception of the World (London: K. Paul, 
Trench, Trubner & Co., 1929).
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contemporary right-of-center theorists such as James 
Buchanan, along with borrowings from thinkers as diverse as 
Kant, Rawls, and John Stuart Mill, into a coherent 
libertarian-individualist outlook that would destroy the 
pretensions of the intellectual left. Gray, along with 
Hayek and Buchanan, affirms a "modern” idea of freedom in 
which political participation plays little part. The 
ancient Greek and Roman idea of freedom "rarely connoted any 
immunity from control by the community, but only an 
entitlement to participation in its deliberations. The 
ancient idea of freedom is so far in sharp contrast with the 
modern one." However, there does appear an intimation of 
modern liberal freedom at one crucial point in ancient Greek 
history; Gray cites the Funeral Oration of Pericles as "a 
statement of liberal egalitarian and individualist 
premises." The liberal outlook of Pericles was shared by 
others of the "Great Generation" of Periclean Athens, "which 
encompasses the schools of the Sophists, Protagoras and 
Gorgias, and of Democritus the atomist." In Gray's view,
Plato and Aristotle form a reactionary opposition to this 
"Great Generation." "In the works of Plato and Aristotle, 
we find, not the further development of the liberal outlook 
of the Great Generation, but instead a reaction against 
it. "9
9John Gray, Liberalism. Concepts in Social Thought 
(Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 1-3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
292
A theory of justice based on this "liberal outlook," in 
which justice is based not on nature but on convention or 
agreement, is offered by economist James Buchanan. Buchanan 
equates justice strictly with the outcome of agreement among 
men, independent of any substantive evaluation of the terms 
of agreement. To "offer a description of the 'good society'
. . . often promotes intellectual and moral arrogance," he 
remarks. "By contrast, my natural proclivity as an 
economist is to place ultimate value on process or 
procedure, and by implication to define as 'good' that which 
emerges from agreement among free men, independently of 
intrinsic evaluation of the outcome itself." Buchanan 
further affirms his affinity with a political theory of 
"conventionalism" when, in an appendix to his and Tullock's 
The Calculus of Consent, he remarks that "initially we look 
to Glaucon in Plato's Republic, to Thomas Hobbes, and to 
Benedict Spinoza.
Strauss was familiar with a political science which 
identified justice and the public good with "the rules of 
the game,” but he identified such an approach with the 
pluralist democratic theory of contemporary political 
scientists such as Robert Dahl rather than with free-market 
economics. He thought that this approach emptied the notion 
of 'common good' of any substance, such that "even if an
^°Buchanan, Limits. 167, and "Appendix I: Marginal Notes on 
Reading Political Philosophy," in Buchanan and Tullock, The 
Calculus of Consent. 312.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
293
objective is to the interest of the overwhelming majority, 
it is not to the interest of all. . . . Everyone is by 
nature the sole judge of what is to his interest: his 
judgment regarding his interest is not subject to anybody 
else's examination on the issue whether his judgment is 
sound.” Such a perspective was not original to contemporary 
political science, observed Strauss; "it was stated with the 
greatest vigor by Hobbes.
A prohibition on intersubjective evaluation of 
individual judgments of self-interest is a feature of the 
principles of justice stipulated with economistic precision 
by Buchanan and Tullock in The Calculus of Consent. These 
principles are subsumed under the rubric of a term of 
technical economics, "Pareto optimality." Under the Pareto 
criterion, the "welfare" of the whole group of individuals 
is said to be increased if either "(1) every individual in 
the group is made better off, or (2) if at least one member 
of the group is made better off without anyone being made 
worse off." Buchanan and Tullock observe that the standard 
of "Pareto optimality" is "a criterion that is implicit in 
the individualist conception of the State itself"; to be 
precise, no one is to be "made worse off" (i. e., taxed) for 
the sake of anyone else. Such a criterion for political and
^^Strauss, "An Epilogue," in Political Philosophv: Six Essays 
bv Leo Strauss, ed. Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis, Ind.: Pegasus, 
Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), 123-24; reprinted from Herbert J. Storing, 
ed., Essays on the Scientific Study of Politics (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart, and Winston, 1962).
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economic "betterment" enables the economist (or the 
political scientist) to be "scientific" in the strict sense.
To adopt any other criterion would be presumptuous and 
intellectually arrogant; the economist, unlike the 
"collectivist" intellectual, "cannot play at being God, no 
matter how joyful the pretense; hubris cannot be descriptive 
of his attitude." The social scientist can at least avoid 
the subjectivity inherent in "interpersonal comparisons of 
utility"; "No external observer is presumed able to make 
comparisons of utility among separate individuals." Such 
talk of a prohibition on "interpersonal comparisons of 
utility" represents a restatement in economists' jargon of 
the Hobbesian premise identified by Strauss, that no 
evaluation may be made of individual judgments about self- 
interest. The Pareto criterion implies, in Buchanan and 
Tullock's interpretation, that majority rule in politics 
ought to be replaced, at least in principle, by a rule of 
unanimity, in order to prevent "deliberate political 
exploitation." As a practical matter, they concede that to 
enforce a unanimity rule in a modern nation-state would 
render collective action impossible; in their terms, the 
"decision-making costs" would be astronomical. They are, in 
a magnanimous concession to reality, willing to replace the 
unanimity rule in practice with a requirement for a 
"supermajority" rule— the closer to unanimity the better— in
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order at least to place limits on "political exploitation"
of the taxpayer.
Buchanan and Tullock's refusal to make "interpersonal 
comparisons of utility" is a reflection of their acceptance 
of the "fact-value distinction" that has come to predominate 
in modern social science under the influence of Max Weber.
As Buchanan writes, "Positive science is concerned with the 
discovery of 'what is'; normative science, with 'what ought 
to be' . . . . Political economy has a non-normative role in 
discovering 'what is the structure of individual values.'" 
Economists are charged with the collection of empirical data 
in the form of the preferences expressed by persons. It may 
not be possible to eradicate a degree of subjectivity in 
drawing a conclusion about what a person's preference is, 
but "the presence of subj ective evaluation of the outside 
world (which includes the preference fields of other 
individuals) does not imply the infusion of an individual 
value judgment concerning the 'goodness' of the proposal 
presented.
Strauss addressed the fact-value distinction in several 
of his books and essays; he regarded it as a tenet of a 
degenerate modern political science which was
^^Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus. 171-74, 13-14; Buchanan, 
Limits. 1; Calculus. 43-46.
Buchanan, "Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and 
Political Economy," in Economics. p. 16; reprinted from Journal 
of Law and Economics 2 (October 1959): 124-38.
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constitutionally incapable of understanding political 
phenomena. To continue to study politics while under the 
spell of the fact-value distinction, the political scientist 
must draw parasitically upon the fund of commonsensical, 
pre-scientific political knowledge possessed by the citizen 
or statesman; in fact, such common-sense knowledge is 
probably involved even in Buchanan's assumption that the 
economist is entitled to make a "subjective evaluation" of 
what persons actually prefer. "The citizen does not make 
the fact-value distinction. . . . The distinction between 
facts and values is alien to the citizen's understanding of
political things."^4
It should be clear by now that the radical curtailment 
of the state proposed by the libertarian-individualists 
cannot be reconciled with Strauss's Aristotelian natural 
right. For example, Foster argues that when Aristotle 
remarks that "the end of the state is not mere life; it is, 
rather, a good quality of life," he initiates an argument 
directed against the radical "limitation of the state's 
functions," in Lockean or Hobbesian fashion, contemplated by 
Hayek, Buchanan, and Gray. Buchanan goes so far as to 
compare the collective unconstrained by unanimity or 
"supermajority" rules to a thief. Barker identifies this 
"taxation-is-theft" argument with the teachings of the
^^Strauss, "Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., Post- 
Behavioral Era. 225.
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Radical Sophists, which were rebutted by Aristotle. "The 
State is no artificial construction, whereby the weak have 
defrauded the strong of the right of their might, and 
defeated Nature's intentions; it is the natural supplement 
of the weakness of us all, which has grown inevitably out of
our needs and i n s t i n c t s .
According to both Barker and Foster, this anti- 
Sophistic posture follows directly from Aristotle's most 
fundamental metaphysical tenets. When he asserts in the 
Politics that "the polis belongs to the class of things that 
exist by nature, and that man is by nature an animal 
intended to live in a polis," and that political 
participation is natural to man because "nature, according 
to our theory, makes nothing in vain; and man alone of the 
animals is furnished with the faculty of language," his 
basic metaphysics of natural movement toward an end, of the 
actualization of natural potential, is reflected. In 
Aristotelian metaphysics, "everywhere things are regarded as 
determined towards an end," remarks Barker. In contrast to 
Hobbes, the final state or condition is regarded as more 
natural than the origin, so that the polity is viewed as 
more natural than whatever primeval condition might have 
preceded it. "While he holds primitive society to be
^^Aristotle Politics 3.9.1280a; Michael B. Foster, Plato to 
Machiavelli. vol. 1 of Masters of Political Thought. 3 vols. 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1941), 127 (see also 122); Buchanan, Limits. 
42-43; Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 272.
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natural (like Hobbes), he also holds the final State to be 
natural, and still more natural (whereas Hobbes would regard 
it as artificial).'*^®
Against Strauss on the "Universal 
and Homogeneous State"
From a Straussian perspective, it might appear that 
Hayek, Buchanan, and Gray have committed a litany of sins 
against "classic natural right." It would seem strange, 
then, that Harvard philosopher John Rawls has been selected 
for a "fire-breathing" Straussian attack while the 
individualist-libertarians have been passed over; the 
admiration for Rawls expressed by both Buchanan and Gray 
suggest the affinities among them. The explanation must be 
that Rawls provides a wedge by means of which the 
redistributive state may slip in, and this places him on the 
side of the "universal and homogeneous state" in the eyes of 
the Straussians. In fact, the critique of the "universal 
and homogeneous state" represents only one of several 
objections (on the part of Voegelin and Oakeshott as well as 
Strauss) to an apologetic on behalf of the contemporary 
state, the Aristotelain rationale offered above 
notwithstanding.
l®Aristotle Politics 1.2.1253a; Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 
218-222.
^^See Buchanan, Limits. 175-77, and Gray, Liberalism. 54-56, 
for laudatory remarks about Rawls. The Straussian attack on 
Rawls is found in David Lewis Schaefer, Justice or Tvrannv? A 
Critique of John Rawls's "A Theorv of Justice" (Port Washington,
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Talk of the "universal and homogeneous state" tends to 
partake of mystification. Apparently, Strauss has been 
gifted with an intuitive understanding which allows him 
immediately to "see" the parallel between the tyranny of 
Hiero and the modern welfare state; those incapable of 
perceiving this connection simply lack the appropriate 
intellectual gifts. As Gourevitch has remarked, "Strauss's 
interpretations enjoy an immunity not enjoyed by 
interpretations of Strauss," as Kojève and others have 
discovered.
At no point in Strauss's discussion of "the universal 
and homogeneous state" do we find reference to the 
discussion of the preservation of kingships and tyrannies 
offered by Aristotle in book 5 of the Politics, the content 
of which closely parallels Xenophon's Hiero. This 
discussion does not present the difficulties of 
interpretation due to dramatic setting that so occupied 
Strauss with respect to the Hiero. since Aristotle speaks 
straightforwardly for himself. Furthermore, Aristotle's 
presentation is obviously moral. A tyrant might pursue one 
of two courses of action to preserve his rule; the first of 
these comprises measures which we would consider 
authoritarian, but by pursuing the second course "his rule
N. Y.: Kennikat Press, 1979).
^®Victor Gourevitch, "Philosophy and Politics, I," Review of 
Metaphysics 22(1968): 62-63.
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will be a nobler and more enviable rule . . . and he will 
himself attain a habit of character, if not wholly disposed 
to goodness, at any rate half-good— half-good and yet half- 
bad, but at any rate not wholly bad.
It is not clear that the political program recommended 
to the tyrant by Aristotle can be placed precisely along the 
contemporary left-right spectrum. The tyrant is to "plan 
and adorn his city as if he were not a tyrant, but a trustee 
for its benefit," but at the same time "he should levy taxes 
. . .  in such a way that they can be seen to be intended for 
the proper management of public services. . . .  He should 
act in the role of a guardian, or steward, who is handling 
public revenues rather than private income." A tyrant, 
then, could be either frugal or a spendthrift; so might a 
legitimate ruler. Neither course is intrinsically 
tyrannical. In matters of expenditure, the tyrant and the 
legitimate king might pursue the same policies. In fact, it 
is Aristotle's view that while authoritarian measures "plumb 
the depth of wrongdoing," the tyrant who pursues the 
Stagirite's second, preferred course "should be the opposite 
of nearly everything which we have previously described as 
characteristic of tyrants."20
A tyrant might be a spendthrift, but to be a 
spendthrift is not intrinsic to tyranny; the tyrant could
l^Aristotle Politics 5.11.1315b. 
20Aristotle Politics 1314a-1314b.
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just as easily adopt a program in which he would, in the 
words of Barker, "tax lightly and spend rightly."
Aristotle's non-authoritarian tyrant is to pursue aims which 
"exactly correspond to the general principles for the 
preservation of constitutions which we have already 
studied." To follow such principles would make the tyrant 
less of a tvrant. either by acting to "adorn the city" or to 
"tax lightly." Aristotle's treatment of this matter does 
not indicate that he attributes to it the same central 
importance given by Strauss to Xenophon's Hiero. in spite of 
the similarity in subject matter. The scale of government 
expenditures is not Aristotle's measuring rod for judging 
whether a regime is tyrannical. One is left to wonder 
whether the whole stream of speculation stemming from 
Strauss's development of the concept of "the universal and 
homogeneous state" is not illicit. In any case, there is no 
reason to believe that, given his generally affirmative 
attitude to the political community and his disinclination 
to narrow the sphere of government, Aristotle would accept 
that a more extensive state which "adorns the city" is 
tyrannical ipso f a c t o .21
Strauss is forced to admit that not every extension of 
the state represents a step in the direction of the 
tyrannical "universal and homogeneous state." Suppose, for 
instance, that there were to come into existence a worldwide
2^Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 494-96.
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federation of nations for the sake of preventing a 
thermonuclear war. Such a federation would not qualify as a 
"universal and homogeneous state" because it would preserve 
the existence of the individual states, whose boundaries 
would be accepted tacitly as legitimate, within the 
federation. Similarly, not every expansion of the domestic 
state represents a step toward universal tyranny; some such 
initiatives are undertaken in order to preserve an existing 
state with respect to some of its crucial particulars.22 
The anthropologist Karl Polanyi emphasized the 
Aristotelian insistence on a natural limit to trade and 
accumulation in economics. When Aristotle remarks that "it 
is the business of nature to furnish subsistence for each 
being brought into the world; and this is shown by the fact 
that the offspring of animals always gets nourishment from 
the residuum of the matter that gives it its birth," he 
offers us an alternative to the "scarcity postulate" of 
modern economics. We are provided with subsistence 
naturally, and our economic arrangements should do no more 
than augment the abundance that has been provided for us by 
nature. When, instead, those arrangements become positively 
destructive to us, that is a perversion of the natural 
limits of the economic against which political authority may 
legitimately be invoked. Therefore, Aristotle (paraphrased
22gtrauss, "Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., Post- 
Behavioral Era. 220-221.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
303
by Polanyi) stipulates that "trade that served to restore 
self-sufficiency was 'in accordance with nature'; trade that 
did not, was 'contrary to nature' . . . prices should be 
such as to strengthen the bond of community; otherwise 
exchange will not continue to take place and the community 
will cease to exist." Keeping such strictures in mind, what 
might Aristotle say about a proposal to throw a nation's 
borders completely open to international trade, regardless 
of the effect on stable communities of textile, steel, or 
automobile workers, for instance? Do these policies 
"strengthen the bond of community"? Of course, to enforce 
restrictions on trade, government bureaus will have to be 
created and officials appointed in order, perhaps, to 
collect import duties, but these measures are taken not in 
order to construct a universal state but to preserve our 
particular communities because we value them as they are. 
Polanyi contends that these considerations apply to the 
entire program of economic protection (broadly interpreted) 
that contemporary states have enacted. If contrary policies 
are pursued, this is due to (paraphrasing Aristotle once 
again) "a misconceived notion of the good life as a desire 
for a greater abundance of physical goods and enjoyments," 
for which we ought to hold responsible not the state but the 
seductive appeal of advertising and the market.23
23Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Dicccvcrs the Economy," in 
Primitive. Archaic, and Modern Economies; Essavs of Karl Polanyi, 
ed. George Dalton (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), 98-100.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
304
Aristotle's insistence on a natural limit on trade and 
accumulation represents a defense of the "micro-order" 
against the "extended order" upheld by Hayek, who often 
during his career has encountered a visceral reaction 
against the requirements of this "extended order"; "That 
this tradition arouses great resistance we already know and 
will witness again repeatedly." His "extended order"
"requires further restraint on the innate feelings of the 
micro-order . . . for these instinctual feelings are often 
threatened" by it. If we may speak of such a thing as human 
nature, these "innate feelings of the micro-order" may be a 
constituent part of it, such that Hayek is in the position 
of placing himself in opposition to human nature, or at 
least to a deep-seated human tendency; Polanyi argued that a 
spontaneous protective reaction always accompanies any 
attempt to establish a self-regulating market order. Is it 
the critic or the advocate of an "extended order" who comes 
nearer to the advocacy of a "universal and homogeneous"
condition?24
Tvrannv and Technoloov 
A more subtle line of argument suggests that the modern 
state partakes of tyranny as a result of its efforts to free 
its citizens from the constraints of physical necessity.
Indeed, the Aristotelian political theory holds that while
^^Hayek, Conceit. 31-37; Polanyi, The Great Transformation 
(New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1944), 83.
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the polis is the realm of freedom, the household is the 
realm of necessity; it would therefore be unsuitable for the 
free man who is to participate in politics to be required to 
perform household labor. The Athenians sought to secure 
this freedom for a portion of the population— those 
designated as citizens— by having the more menial tasks 
performed by slaves. Moderns have attempted to secure for 
everyone the freedom of the Athenian citizen by means of an 
economy of affluence. In large part, this affluence has 
been attained through the exploitation of technology; 
critics of technology argue that the very means by which we 
have achieved a partial "freedom from want" have contributed 
to the perfection of techniques of control and regulation to 
such a degree that they now threaten our political freedom.
As George Grant, Canadian political theorist and follower of 
Strauss, argued, those who "want both high standards of 
spontaneous democracy and the egalitarian benefits accruing 
from technique . . . share, with those who appear to them as 
enemies, the deeper assumptions which have made the 
technological society." While the ancient Greeks enslaved 
some of their fellow men, we have attempted to subjugate 
nature, argues Grant; the techniques that have enabled the 
subjugation of nature are so powerful that they may turn out 
to be the means of our own enslavement.
^^George Grant, Technoloov and Empire; Perspectives on North 
America (Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969), 31.
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The argument appears to be that the contemporary state
is tyrannical because it seeks to subjugate and enslave
nature, just as the ancient polis enslaved certain men;
furthermore, the conquest of nature may permit the
enslavement of men in a far more efficient fashion than was
available to ancient regimes. If the argument is meant to
imply that the ancient Greek polis was itself tyrannical by
virtue of its institution of slavery, its exponents may have
misperceived the nature of ancient Greek slavery. The
Athenian practice was different enough from the institution
of the ante-bellum American South that the same term perhaps
ought not to be applied to both. As Barker describes the
conditions under which slaves lived in Attica;
Their lot was comfortable; there were no features of 
dress to distinguish them from the ordinary citizen. . .
. Legally as well as socially, they were not degraded; 
they were protected from ill-usage by the State; and 
they could not be punished by death except by its 
tribunals. . . . The Athenian policeman was a slave; and 
slaves also filled the lower posts in the civil service. 
Emancipation was not difficult; the slave might even 
purchase his own freedom. . . . One feels, too, the 
difference between this domestic slavery, in which the 
slave is not separated by a gulf from his master, and 
the slavery of the modern plantation, with its deep 
lines of demarcation, and its exploitation of the slave 
to the uttermost farthing.
A summary condemnation of Athenian slavery neglects the
moral dimension of the Greek version of the practice. As
Foster notes, "slavery is justified from the point of view
of the master. . . . But it is also justified from the point
of view of the slave." A natural difference in capacity
between the master and the slave is assumed here. The slave
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working in a master's household could at least share in 
Athenian cultural and political life in a way that the 
mechanical laborer who was not a slave could not.
Furthermore, to be a master is justified only insofar as one 
utilizes one's slaves to attain moral and intellectual 
excellence; virtue, not wealth, is the end of the 
institution.̂  6
The Greeks believed in the relevance of natural 
differences. They may have assumed more of a clear and 
distinct difference between the capacities of slaves and 
masters than was justified. If so, this may be attributable 
more to a failure of Greek political science, sociology, and 
anthropology than to a broader moral failure. In any case, 
it appears that the substantive conditions to which the 
Greek slave was subject were certainly no worse than those 
of the menial laborer of the present-day world. It should 
also be remembered that Aristotle's defense of slavery 
condemned the practice as it often existed, as when slaves 
were taken as part of the spoils of military conquest. In 
justifiable slavery there should obtain "a community of 
interest . . . between master and slave," but this will not 
be present when "slavery rests merely on legal sanction and
superior power.ii27
2^Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 360-61; Foster, Plato to 
Machiavelli. 134-35.
Z^Aristotle Politics 1.6.1255b.
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Arendt acknowledged the problematic of necessity, 
slavery, and technology when she wrote that "man's wish to 
emancipate himself from life's necessity . . . was the core 
of slavery." In fact, when Arendt argues that "it is only 
the rise of technology, and not the rise of modern political 
ideas as such, which has refuted the old and terrible truth 
that only violence and rule over others could make some men 
free," she might appear to leave herself open to the 
accusation that she shares the assumptions of Grant's 
"technological society." For instance, the category of 
necessity was central to Arendt's analysis of the difference 
in outcome between the French and American Revolutions. In 
the former case, impoverished masses manifested themselves 
in the political realm, primarily not for the sake of 
political freedom but rather to relieve their misery. The 
poor carried with them as they entered the political sphere 
an irresistible force and a violent rage which culminated in 
terror; "The result was that necessity invaded the political 
realm, the only realm where men can be truly free." Thus it 
would appear that Arendt's political philosophy might 
embrace the power of technology to overcome necessity and 
establish the conditions under which men can participate 
freely in politics.28
In fact, it was not technology alone but the existence 
of the vast frontier that enabled America to overcome the
28Arendt, On Revolution. 108-110.
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poverty of the European masses and avoid the excesses of 
French revolutionary politics. Arendt stresses that the 
American founders upheld public, political freedom, not 
private wealth, as the justifying principle of their 
revolution. They insisted on frugal ways and simple manners 
not out of prudishness but because they thought luxury 
incompatible with freedom. "For abundance and endless 
consumption are the ideals of the poor; they are the mirage 
in the desert of misery. In this sense, affluence and 
wretchedness are only two sides of the same coin; the bonds 
cf necw:3sity need not be of iron, they can be made of silk.” 
Indeed, the American notion of republican virtue would come 
under pressure with the closing of the frontier and the 
arrival of millions of European immigrants seeking material 
prosperity. The development of American mass society raises 
the possibility that affluence and consumption may supplant 
public freedom, as people come to conceive freedom as the 
right to be left alone in the pursuit of private wealth.
Arendt remarked hopefully that "There exist today as many 
signs to justify hope as there are to instill fear.
As it turns out, Arendt is far from an uncritical 
enthusiast of technology. Technology presents a temptation 
to withdraw from public freedom into private happiness, at 
the same time that it may help to secure the necessary 
conditions for the exercise of that freedom.
29lbid., 134-37.
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The American dream, as the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries under the impact of mass immigration came to 
understand it, was neither the dream of the American 
Revolution— the foundation of freedom— nor the dream of 
the French Revolution— the liberation of man; it was, 
unhappily, the dream of a "promised land" where milk and 
honey flow. And the fact that the development of modern 
technology was so soon able to realize this dream beyond 
anyone's wildest expectation quite naturally had the 
effect of confirming for the dreamers that they really 
had come to live in the best of all possible worlds.
However, despite her reservations about its temptations, we
should not attribute to Arendt the view that a renunciation
of technology would be appropriate. She probably would hold
that the virtues of Aristotelian moderation and of practical
wisdom or phronesis would provide a sufficient framework for
the supervision of technology. Such wisdom and moderation
would probably require that some technologies be judged to
be so intrinsically dangerous that they should not be
exploited. Arendt would not go so far as such critics of
the "technological society" as Grant and Jacques Ellul, for
whom technology appears as a diabolical force whose
utilization to any extent at all involves a violation of
sacred restraint. Ellul himself was not willing to accept
the full implications of such an attitude, as he reveals in
his remark that "the book of Revelations says that the glory
of nations will enter the New Jerusalem. The glory of
nations also includes technology. Hence, our attitude is
not antitechnological; rather, it is a critical acceptance
of technology." It would be Arendt's view that as long as
we retain a sense of the priority of public freedom over
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private affluence, our perspective will be broad enough to 
sustain a sufficiently critical attitude toward technology.
It was for his reversal of this priority that she criticized 
Marx, who believed that developments in the sphere of 
"relations of production" would eventually supersede the 
political realm. As she remarked before a 1972 conference 
in her honor, "I do not share Marx's great enthusiasm about 
capitalism."^0
Teleological Politics and the Bios Theoretikos 
Even if the above considerations are taken as decisive 
against the view that the modern regime must inevitably take 
the form of an irresistible "universal and homogeneous 
state" in the service of an ever-expanding "technological 
society," those who would uphold the centrality and 
integrity of the political are faced with yet another 
challenge founded upon philosophical premises opposite those 
of the libertarian-individualist "neo-Hobbesians," which 
nevertheless may give aid and comfort to the "anti-statist" 
position. The political realm is "caught coming and going" 
between one school which holds that man's strivings have no 
telos and another school which holds that such a telos lies 
entirely outside the sphere of politics. The latter view.
^Ojbid., 136; Jacques Ellul, Perspectives on Our Age: 
Jacgues Ellul Speaks on His Life and Work, ed. William H. 
Vandenburg, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York; Seabury Press, 
1981), 108; Arendt, "On Hannah Arendt," in Hill, ed., Hannah 
Arendt: The Recovery of the Public World. 334.
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that the justification of the political lies solely in its 
enabling the solitary philosopher to live the bios 
theoretikos or contemplative life, was criticized 
vociferously by Arendt.
Short of an exhaustive discussion of such a position, 
which has been attributed to both Strauss and Voegelin, a 
few preliminary remarks may be offered. In the Politics we 
find the remark of Aristotle that "the end of the state is 
not mere life" but rather "a good quality of life." He 
contrasts the genuine state with a mere alliance for common 
defense or commercial intercourse, in which "neither of the 
parties concerns itself to ensure a proper quality of 
character among the members of the other." Based on the 
interpretation offered by Strauss and Voegelin (or at least 
by some of their followers), it would appear that whenever 
we encounter reference in Aristotle to "the end of the 
state," "a good quality of life," "a proper quality of 
character," or, in general, human happiness or eudaimonia. 
we are to understand that what is meant is onlv the solitary 
contemplation of the philosopher or the mystic. An 
alternative interpretation of eudaimonia is that it 
signifies the development of a talent or excellence that 
varies from person to person, the action of each in 
accordance with his own spirit or daimon. be that the
^^Arendt, The Human Condition. 220-330; see also 
chapter 6, 238-40 above.
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excellence of a philosopher, a statesman, or an artisan. 
(According to Arendt, eudaimonia "has the connotation of 
blessedness, but without any religious overtones, and it 
means literally something like the well-being of the daimon 
who accompanies each man throughout life, who is his 
distinct identity, but appears and is visible only to 
others.") That Aristotle affirms the "imperial" status of 
the solitary mystic is not immediately obvious to most 
readers. As Strauss admitted, a reading of Aristotle's 
discussion of happiness in the Rhetoric indicates that "our 
ordinary notion of happiness is not different from the 
ordinary notion analyzed by Aristotle." Such happiness 
consists of no more than a "reasonable contentedness," 
consisting of good friends and children and a reasonable 
degree of health and wealth.^2
In Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics we do find a passage 
that appears to uphold the "imperial" claims of the 
contemplative over the active life by virtue of its being 
more "self-sufficient." The controversy revolves around 
whether the authority of this passage can be established 
over and above those remarks which appear to confirm the 
"common-sense" notion of happiness. The "standard" 
interpretation points to an apparent difference of attitude 
between the Aristotle of the Nicomachean Ethics and the
^^Aristotle Politics 3.9.1280a-1280b; Arendt, The Human 
Condition, 193; Strauss, "Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., 
Post-Behavioral Era. 234.
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author of the Politics. As Barker remarks, "While we leave 
the Ethics with the feeling that in the speculative life of 
each man lies the height and depth and breadth of his being, 
we begin the Politics with the sense, that, the individual 
being essentially a citizen, his essential life is that of 
civic actir;n." It should be remeizoered that by the height 
of Aristotle's career we are removed by about a century from 
the peak of the "Golden Age" of Periclean Athens, which was 
followed by a period that both Plato and Aristotle regarded 
as an era of decline and corruption, such that the passage 
to which Voegelin and Strauss attribute so much authority 
may represent the single most pessimistic, defeatist passage 
in the Aristotelian corpus concerning man's political 
potential. In any case. Barker's view is that the active 
and the contemplative life are not mutually exclusive:
"Active thought on the deepest of moral questions is 
necessary to the political life, and the statesman is a 
philosopher as well as a politician." Therefore, "Man may 
either find his happiness in a political life . . . or, if 
his capacities are not for such a life, he may look for 
happiness to a philosophical life of active thought.
Despite his awareness of both Voegelin's and Strauss's 
perspectives, Spragens concurs with Barker insofar as he 
depicts Aristotelian politics as derived from the
^^Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald 
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, Library of Liberal Arts,
1962), 10.7.1177all-1178a8; Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 250, 290.
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observation that "the immanent strivings of human nature 
depend upon a political setting for their fulfillment." He 
is so bold as to claim that for Aristotle "the strivings of 
political action were not considered to be adequately 
explicable without such a postulated perfection of human 
life." Here Spragens recalls the image of Aristotle the 
empiricist, the zoologist to be precise, despite Hobbes's 
disparagement of his metaphysical speculations. Both 
Aristotle's zoology and his politics are derived from 
empirical observation, with the difference that he could 
explain the immanent strivings of the animals without 
reference to political organization, whereas this was not 
possible with respect to human strivings.
Spragens's mention of a "postulated perfection" raises 
the issue of the perfectability of man, the impossibility of 
which is a central tenet of some political theories. Talk 
of human "perfectability" carries with it an ambiguity about 
the extent of the perfection being contemplated.
Aristotle's universe is full of potentialities being 
actualized; the actualization is a more perfect state of 
being than the potential. However, no such actualization 
brings about a perfect world, strictly speaking; 
furthermore, instances of failure of actualization abound.
This account of actualization is no less applicable to human 
striving. For instance, if I develop my musical talents,
3'^Spragens, Motion. 99, and Dilemma. 45.
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then once I become an accomplished musician I am a more 
perfect being than before, because I have actualized what 
was merely potential. I have "perfected" myself, but I have 
not thereby brought about a simply perfect world. Such 
efforts at "perfection," properly understood, should be no 
more out of bounds in the political realm than in the 
musical. Trading on the observation that "all progress is 
not positive," some political theories go too far in denying 
that anv positive political progress is possible in the 
sense of the development, indeed the perfection, of our 
political potential, stopping short of an unattainable 
absolutely perfect world. Unsuspecting political activists, 
no doubt unclear in their own minds about the extent to 
which human perfectability, have unwittingly left themselves 
open to being classified as proto-totalitarians with their 
loose talk of the "perfectability of man."
If we may include "magnanimity" within the catalogue of 
Aristotelian virtues (as listed in Nicomachean Ethics, book 
4), we might question whether the attitude of Strauss's 
philosopher is properly magnanimous. Is it worthy of the 
philosopher to regard all other excellences as rivals of 
philosophy? Such a stance smacks of immoderation, while 
Gourevitch tells us that "moderation is quite literally 
central to the classical political philosophy that Strauss 
wants to restore." That the polity ought to be judged 
solely according to its ability to sustain the philosophers'
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solitary reflections may be an absolutism that may have to 
be set aside, at least tentatively, lest it prove a 
destructive assumption for the guidance of our actions in 
the political realm, in which we most assuredly will not 
enjoy solitude. If it is feared that to affirm the 
political excellences will threaten those solitary virtues 
which are most excellent of all, we might offer by way of 
reconciliation the remark of Grant that "it is of the nature 
of things that we come to know and to love what is good by 
first meeting it in that which is our own— this particular 
body, this family, these friends, this woman, this part of 
the world, this set of traditions, this country, this 
civilization." His understanding of the excellences is not 
that they are rivals of each other, but that they are 
arranged in a hierarchical "great chain of virtues," such 
that we must engage ourselves in those excellences that 
occupy the lower ranks of the chain before we can ascend to 
the higher ones.^^
Human Nature and Institutional Reform 
For both Strauss and Voegelin, the primacy of the bios 
theoretikos implies the unchangeability of human nature, a 
tenet which forms the Archimedean point of their politics.
For Strauss, the ubiquity of natural inequality suggests 
that the many can never become philosophers; the imperative
3^Gourevitch, "Philosophy and Politics, II," Review of 
Metaphvsics 22(1968): 320; Grant, Technolocrv and Empire. 73.
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of the "universal and homogeneous state" to provide a 
condition of equal advancement, material and otherwise, for 
all amounts to an implicit denial of this common-sensibly 
obvious natural inequality, such that the attainment of the 
"world-state" would be concomitant with a change in human 
nature. For Voegelin, the experience of Christianity meshed 
perfectly with the implications of the primacy of the 
contemplative life. Man is but a creature, created with an 
unchanging nature; otherwise he would be subject to an 
infinite malleability. Man realizes his creatureliness by 
virtue of his capacity contemplatively to attain 
transcendent experience, which is the highest capacity 
natural to him.
Such a perspective inclines both Strauss and Voegelin, 
as well as Spragens, to oppose adamantly Macpherson's 
suggestion that power lust or libido dominandi differs for 
different men and can be affected by institutional 
arrangements. "Hobbes's model of human vainglory and lust 
for power . . . has more perennial relevance than 
MacPherson's analysis tends to imply," Spragens remarks.
"For example, contemporary ethological investigations into 
the sources of aggression in animal and human behavior would 
indicate that the libido dominandi is neither confined to.
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nor predominantly the product of, any particular form of 
social organization.
Macpherson, for his part, purported to have 
demonstrated that is was the view of Hobbes, no 
sentimentalist about the pacific tendencies of human nature, 
that the lust for domination was not innate to all men. 
Admittedly, the issue turns on ambiguous passages in the 
Hobbesian corpus. For instance, we find in chapter 11 of 
Leviathan the statement that "a perpetual and restless 
desire of power after power" is "a general inclination of 
all mankind." Immediately afterward, however, we find that 
"the cause of this, is not . . . that he cannot be content 
with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the 
power and means to live well . . . without the acquisition 
of more." According to Macpherson's interpretation, Hobbes 
holds that while all men require at least "a moderate 
power," and some men seek ever more power, it is only when 
free rein is given to predation that all men are compelled 
to protect themselves by seeking an excess of power over 
others. Macpherson holds that market society is just such a 
"predatory" society, in which one's man's power is 
constantly being invaded by another's.^7
3®Spragens, Motion. 35; see also Strauss, review of 
Macpherson, in Strauss, Platonic Political Philosophy. 230 
(see chapter 4, 132-33 above).
^^Hobbes, English Works 3:85-86; see also Macpherson, 
Possessive Individualism. 38-45, and chapter 4, 133-34 above.
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Voegelin would object to Macpherson's interpretation 
because for him it points the way all too quickly to a 
program of institutional reform of the "predatory" society. 
Such "reformism" suggests that man is an utterly malleable 
product of his environment, lacking freedom, which is a 
reductionist degradation of his true nature. Voegelin 
argues that Aristotle's criticism of Plato's communistic, 
scheme centered on "lack of consistent reliance on the 
educative process and in his short circuit into 
institutional remedies." According to Webb's reading,
Voegelin argues that "progressive" thought misses "the 
irresolvable mystery of human freedom and the concomitant 
limitations of institutions."^®
Voegelin overdraws the distinction between the 
"educative process" and "institutional remedies," as can be 
seen from Salkever's discussion of Aristotle's views on the 
stability of democracies. According to Salkever's version 
of Aristotle, the good democracy, or for that matter the 
good regime generally, is one which inculcates "a certain 
opinion about the good life" among the citizens. The regime 
secures this opinion by education of a sort, but not by 
didacticism; "The easiest way of securing this opinion is 
not by direct instruction," but by recrulations. As an 
example of the kind of "instruction" engaged in by the good
38Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, vol. 3 of Order and History 
(Baton Rouge, La.: 1957), 323; Webb, Eric Voegelin. 247.
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regime, Salkever cites Aristotle's "Jeffersonian" defense of 
agrarianism as the most stable form of democracy:
It is evident that this form of democracy [the form 
based on a farming populace] is the best; and the reason 
is also evident— that the populace on which it was based 
possesses a definite quality. In the creation of such a 
populace some of the laws which were generally current 
in earlier ages may all be of service— laws, for 
example, forbidding absolutely the acquisition of 
property in land beyond a certain amount, or, at any 
rate, forbidding it within a fixed distance from the 
city centre or the city boundaries.
Salkever's point is that institutions educate, albeit
indirectly. If he is correct, it may be that the
justifications usually given explicitly for many of our
institutions are not the genuine ones: "Welfare spending is
not a mode of economic efficiency; universal suffrage not a
way of electing the best people, jury trials not a means for
reaching the best verdicts." Criminal sanctions are among
the best examples of educative institutions, at least
according to the deterrence theory of punishment, in which
punishment is not directed primarily a the criminal but as
an example to the public at large.
Voegelin equates "educative measures" with man's
spiritual side, and he sees institutional reforms as
directed strictly against material ills; thus, a program
devoted completely to institutional reforms suggests that
^^Aristotle Politics 6.4.1319a; Stephen G. Salkever, "The 
Crisis of Liberal Democracy: Liberality and Democratic 
Citizenship," in Kenneth L. Deutsch and Walter Soffer, eds., The 
Crisis of Liberal Democracy: A Straussian Perspective [Albany, N. 
Y.: State University of New York Press, 1987), 254-63, esp. 262- 
63.
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man is not a spiritual but a material being. However, if
Spragens is correct in suggesting that man is neither
"autonomous" nor "heteronomous" in a Kantian sense (that is,
neither completely free nor completely determined), then the
relationship between the spiritual and the material will be
a reciprocal one, and the legislator in his function as an
educator will not be able to disavow all concern with
institutional reforms. Barker's discussion of Aristotle's
criticism of Plato's communism recalls that of Voegelin; "No
material cure will heal a spiritual evil; only spiritual
means will produce a spiritual result. To heal disunion and
division of spirit, one must employ a common education,
which will put all men on the same spiritual level, and
initiate them into the same spiritual community." In
bringing about this spiritual result, however, the
legislator will not be without a role.
Private property is not simply pronounced right by 
Aristotle: it is pronounced right when, and in so far 
as, it subserves the moral end. It is not to be simply 
retained; it is to be retained when it has been 
"improved and perfected by proper customs and proper 
legislation regulating its use." And thus in practice 
it will come to pass that property, being used as such 
an instrument, and as a means to charity and 
munificence, will become public as well as private, and 
common as well as individual. . . . Private possession 
will bring its economic and moral advantages: common 
use, not merely dictated by law, but flowing from a 
proper spirit, will issue in that unanimity which Plato 
so greatly desired.
Aristotle criticized Plato's communism, but he did not hold
that private property was to be left completely unregulated;
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there is, he believed, a natural limit beyond which the 
accumulation of wealth should not proceed.^0
Despite their disparagement of the "micro-order," 
thinkers such as Hayek and Buchanan do acknowledge in their 
discussion cf what may he called the "scalar problems of the 
modern economy" that Aristotelian natural limits on the size 
of our communities and the dynamism of our economy may have 
been breached. These problems are concomitants of the 
growth of our communities to such a scale that they exceed 
the natural boundaries of the individual's moral actions.
Hayek mentions that "modern developments, especially the 
development of the large city, have destroyed much of the 
feeling of responsibility for local concerns which in the 
past had led to much beneficial and spontaneous common 
action." Buchanan observes that person now find themselves 
inhabiting an "extended community of arbitrary and basically 
amoral size." He asks, "What can a person be predicted to 
do when the external institutions force upon him a role in a 
community that extends beyond his moral-ethical limits?" He 
speculates about the causes of this development:
The generalized public-goods dilemma of politics can 
be kept within tolerance limits only if there is some 
proximate correspondence between the external 
institutional and the internal moral constraints on 
behavior. This century may be described by developments 
that drive these two sets of constraints apart. An 
increase in population alone reduces the constraining 
influence of moral rules. Moreover population increase
^^Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 394-95. For Spragens's 
remarks on freedom and determinism, see Irony. 356-61, esp. 360.
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has been accompanied by increasing mobility over space, 
by the replacement of local by national markets, by the 
urbanization of society, by the shift of power from 
state-local to national government, and by the increased 
politicization of society generally.
As a solution to these scalar problems, Buchanan proposes a
revival of federalism, if not of secession: "Where is the
Quebec of the United States? . . . Who will join me in
offering to make a small contribution to Texas Nationalist
Party?" However, if Aristotelian political science is
correct, an entity the size of Quebec or Texas still does
not meet the requirement of being, in Strauss's words, "not
too large for man"; Aristotle, as Hayek remarked, "confined
human order to the reach of the herald's cry." We are left
to consider whether a revived federalism would be adequate
to offset the effects of Buchanan's "increasing mobility
over space," "replacement of local by national markets," and
"urbanization of society." Are not all these developments
the outgrowths of the workings of Hayek's "extended order"?
Would not an Aristotelian limitation upon economic dynamism
and accumulation be a more appropriate remedy?^^
Where, then, is Voegelin left with respect to the
preference he stipulates for "educative measures" over
"institutional reform"? What will it profit us to undertake
"educative measures" once the scale of our institutions has
^%ayek. Constitution. 83-84; Buchanan, "Markets, States, 
and the Extent of Morals," in Economics. 272-74 (reprinted from 
American Economic Review 68[1978]: 364-68); Strauss, "Crisis," in 
Graham and Carey, eds., Post-Behavioral Era. 236; wayek. Conceit. 
11.
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exceeded the moral capacities of human nature? Voegelin, 
along with Hayek and Buchanan, has not heeded the strictures 
on the size of the state laid down by Aristotle in Politics 
7.4:
Experience shows that it is difficult, if not indeed 
impossible, for a very populous state to secure a 
general habit of obedience to law. . . . States, like 
all other things (animals, plants, and inanimate 
instruments), have a definite measure of size. . . .
These considerations indicate clearly the optimum 
standard of population. It is, in a word, 'the greatest 
surveyable number required for achieving a life of self- 
sufficiency '.
These Aristotelian strictures suggest that our contemporary 
urban commercial civilization is, in some important 
respects, unfit for human beings in that its scale is 
disproportionate to the capacities of human nature. If we 
cannot escape urban civilization entirely, we have no 
alternative but to attempt to manage its most deleterious 
effects by means of "institutional reforms" that are 
marginally coercive in that they require the collection of 
taxes and other restrictions on the absolute right to free 
economic exchange. That the state must expand to a scale 
corresponding to the civilization it is to govern is no 
objection. We are attempting to adjust ourselves to an 
expensive way of living, and our tax bill is just one of the 
costs that this way of life exacts. To say, for instance, 
that it would impede "individual responsibility" to enact 
"institutional reforms" in the form of measures of economic 
protection on behalf of steel, automobile, or textile
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workers in communities affected unfavorably by foreign trade 
would be to ask the individual worker to take responsibility 
for worldwide economic trends which even the most 
sophisticated Wall Street analyst can predict only with 
limited precision; such trends manifest themselves over a 
range far in excess of Buchanan's "moral-ethical limits.""*2 
The Aristotelian objection to the Sophistic limitation 
of the state's functions has been mentioned above.
Aristotle's most decisive statement of this objection occurs 
in Politics 3.9, where he stipulates that the state is not a 
mere commercial or security alliance; "But the end of the 
state is not mere life; it is, rather, a good quality of 
life." When Voegelin distinguishes between permissible 
"educative measures" and illicit "institutional reform," 
does he not slip into the same distinction between permitted 
"persuasion" and impermissible "coercion" drawn by vulgar, 
"Sophistic" libertarianism? While he aligns himself 
explicitly with Aristotle and especially with Plato, he has 
at least given aid and comfort to a more vulgar doctrine by 
letting libertarianism slip in "through the back door." 
Strauss, for his part, is compelled to concede that "if 
restraint is as natural to man as is freedom, and restraint 
must in many cases be forcible restraint in order to be 
effective, one cannot say that the city is conventional or 
against nature because it is coercive society." Strauss,
^^Aristotle Politics 7.4.1326a-b.
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incidentally, would appear here to be the best critic of his 
own strictures against the supposedly "universal and 
homogeneous state.
The most compelling textual evidence Voegelin can 
provide for an Aristotelian warrant for his position is to 
be found in the criticism of Plato's communism in Politics 
2.5, where Aristotle suggests that the evils to be remedied 
by Plato's schemes are due not to the absence of communism 
but to "the wickedness of human nature." The conclusions 
drawn by Voegelin from this passage are not, however, 
incorrigible. Barker ecnoes Voegelin's position when he 
mentions the injunction of the Gospels to "mend your hearts, 
and not your governments" in connection with this 
discussion, but he also recalls the Aristotelian insight 
that "the State, as a compound, varies as its constitution 
varies. For that is it scheme: that is the way in which the 
citizens, who form the parts of the State, are arranged in 
relation to each other." The relevance of this latter 
consideration to the present problem is that the prospect of 
a great accumulation of wealth can have a seductive appeal.
If this seductiveness is left unchecked, the citizens may 
come to look upon each other only as either potential 
partners in a lucrative "deal" or potential "suckers" to be 
taken advantage of to the maximum extent possible. In that
43Aristotle Politics 3.9.1280a-1281a; Strauss, Natural 
Right and History, p. 132. See also chapter 3, 65-66 above.
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case, the practice of what Polanyi (echoing Aristotle) 
called "hucksterism” would drive out fellow-feeling and 
public-spiritedness. If the regime does not undertake 
"institutional reforms" to restrain this "hucksterism," 
subsequently it may find that the citizenry has been ruined 
and that government requires far harsher measures that may 
have been necessary at one time, because the polity is now 
"constituted" by "hucksters" instead of public-minded 
citizens.
The Common Good and the Contemporarv State 
In stark contrast to his usual Hobbesian disparagement 
of the active political life, Buchanan acknowledges the 
human capacity to articulate a public-spirited conception of 
the common good when at one point he makes reference to the 
ennobling tendencies of democracy. "Voting choice does 
provide individuals with a greater sense of participation in 
social decision making, and, in this way, it may bring forth 
the 'best' in man and tend to make individuals take somewhat 
more account of the 'public interest.'" He must have in 
mind here considerations of the same sort that prompted the 
remark of Oakeshott about how "a proposal which may begin in 
a want . . . must lose this character and acquire another (a 
political character) in being understood, advanced and 
considered as a proposal for the amendment of the respublica
^^Aristotle Politics 2.5.1263b; Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 
395, 302; Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," 101.
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of civil association.'' Oakeshott here invokes that feature 
of political discussion in which we achieve objectivity in 
an intersubiective process. A want may prompt us to put 
forward a political proposal, but in so doing we must make 
an argument in general terms in which we attempt to persuade 
others that our proposal is in the general interest. In so 
doing we are forced to take into account perspectives other 
than our own, so that our proposal takes on a character 
opposite to that of a sheer childlike demand for want- 
satisfaction. We may begin with a simple individual want, 
but the requirements of political discussion compel us to 
adopt a broader perspective.^^
The implications of the discussion of the educative 
function of institutions presented above are recalled. 
Particularly apt is Strauss's evocation of the discussion of 
citizenship and constitutions in the early chapters of the 
Aristotle's Politics. The theme of this discussion may be 
summarized by Strauss's remark that for Aristotle "the 
regime gives to the city its form." The presentation 
emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between political 
institutions and the character of the citizens, and in so 
doing it captures the true meaning of the observation that 
political remedies, to get to the root of things, must be
^^Buchanan, "Individual Choice in Voting and the Market," in 
Economics. 193 (reprinted from Journal of Political Economy 62 
[1954]: 334-43; see also "Politics, Policy, and Pigovian 
Margins," in Economics. 89-90 [reprinted from Economie. n. s. 29 
{1962}: 17-28]); Oakeshott, On Human Conduct. 170.
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spiritual, not material. For instance, "If we take a simple 
view of democracy, it looks up to equality, and this gives 
it its character." What, then, is the character of a state 
which is conceived as nothing but a framework for economic 
exchange, and what will be the political character of the 
people born, raised, and educated to be inhabitants of such 
a state? Buchanan and Tullock invoke the authority of the 
economist Sir Dennis Robertson on behalf of the tenet that 
the state ought to "economize on love"; the other-regarding 
virtues, such as love, are so precious that we ought to be 
sparing in or dependence on them. However, if institutions 
teach, what is taught by an arrangement in which we depend 
on voluntary private exchange to the maximum extent, instead 
of on the public virtues? What is taught is; "We depend on 
the other-regarding virtues for little or nothing in this 
regime; you will almost never be called upon to manifest 
them." We should not be surprised when the people 
acculturated to such a regime bring the same self- 
interested, calculating tendencies of the economic side of 
their lives into whatever political culture they might have. 
Such considerations may explain the remarkable "empirical 
fit" which Buchanan and Tullock claim for their approach; if 
people inhabit a regime in which rewards are reserved almost 
exclusively for the self-regarding virtues, we should expect
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 3 1
that these will be the only virtues that will manifest 
themselves in public as well as in private life.^®
Oakeshott, acknowledging an affinity between the 
thought of Hobbes and his own highly restricted account of 
the political, makes no provision for the cultivation of the 
character of the citizens as part of the engagement of 
politics. Oakeshott holds that his version of Hobbesian 
sovereignty need not partake of authoritarianism; it 
"implies no frenzy for regulation or passion for 
interference" in any sphere including that of political 
discussion. However, as Voegelin pointed out, the Hobbesian 
regime permits no freedom of debate, at least not in 
principle; freedom of debate would be permitted only at the 
pleasure of the sovereign. In a regime conforming to the 
constraints stipulated by Oakeshott, in which so little of 
substance is accorded to the political engagement, it might 
be that political discussion would become superfluous.^^
Gray notes the preference shared by Oakeshott and Hayek 
for a "nomocratic" regime, with its disavowal of "common 
good" or "public interest," over a "teleocratic" regime.
Indeed, Hayek wants to purge the word "social" from the 
political vocabulary, suggesting as it does in its use in
46gtrauss, "Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., Post- 
Behavioral Era. 236-39; Buchanan and Tullock, Calculus. 28, 143- 
45, 299-300.
4^Oakeshott, Introduction to Leviathan. xliii; Voegelin, New 
Science of Politics. 154-55.
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such phrases as "social justice" a teleological standard for 
the evaluation of the economy; he blames Plato and Aristotle 
for providing a pretext for the admissibility of such a 
"weasel word." However, the early Oakeshott objected only 
to an "overwrought" conception of public purpose.
Apparently, it was only after several decades of 
"ideological hardening" that he formulated the strictly 
drawn distinction between universitas and the preferred 
societas. He attempts in On Human Conduct to reconcile his 
views with those of Aristotle, but his remarks are 
fragmentary and unconvincing. He contends that Aristotle's 
political relationship has "no extrinsic substantive 
purpose," that it is more "diluted or 'watery'" than either 
friendship or the "'household' relationship," and that the 
"end" of the political relationship is "not for him a 
substantial purpose but a formal condition."^®
Coates remarks that Oakeshott's civil association is "a 
kind of fidelity more 'watery,' urbane and moderate than 
those of a tribe, race, nation or religion, or the 
'political friendship' of the polis (itself formed from 
tribes or villages)." Corroborating Coates's account,
Arendt argues that the very Latin terminology used by 
Oakeshott to specify his "watery" relationship— terms such
4®Gray, Hayek on Liberty. 2d ed. (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), 67; Hayek, Conceit. 106-119; Oakeshott, 
"The B. B. C.," in chapter 5, 202-03 above; Oakeshott, On 
Human Conduct. 110-111 and 118, n. 1.
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as societas and lex— actually convey a more intimate 
connection when properly understood. For instance, we read 
that the word societas originally "indicated an alliance 
between people for a specific purpose," suggesting a 
connection of the kind Oakeshott specified by the term 
universitas rather than societas. Elsewhere we find that 
"the original meaning of the word lex is 'intimate 
connection* or relationship, namely something which connects 
two things or two partners whom external circumstances have 
brought together," as when two former enemy peoples are 
reconciled to each other within a single regime upon the 
conclusion of a war. In such a circumstance, the warring 
parties "now become partners, socii or allies, by virtue of 
the new relationship established in the fight itself and 
confirmed through the instrument of lex, the Roman law."^^ 
Spragens and Strauss both argue that appeal to the 
public interest, incorporating the more intimate connection 
discussed by Arendt, is an irreducible element of the 
political, at least if any element of the non-reductionistic 
classical understanding is retained. Recalliny Plato's 
mention in the Republic of the existence of an "honor among 
thieves," Spragens argues that the felt necessity of even 
the most authoritarian, repressive rulers to resort to an 
appeal to the common good is evidence of the inescapability
^^Wendell John Coates, Jr., "Michael Oakeshott as Liberal 
Theorist," Canadian Journal of Political Science 18(1985): 778; 
Arendt, The Human Condition. 23, and On Revolution, 187-89, 211.
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of such a concept. Strauss remarks that "the consistent 
denial of the common good is as impossible as every other 
consistent manifestation of the break with common sense.
The contemporary liberal state does not require the 
absolute subjection of the individual to the common good, 
but it does place some limits on the pursuit of self- 
interest . The liberal state might appeal to Aristotle's 
discussion of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics for a 
rationale for the balance it attempts to achieve between 
self-interest and the common good. The true egoist has the 
same regard for his friends that he does for himself. From 
this it follows that genuine self-interest implies a due 
regard for others. What this "due regard" entails will 
depend on circumstances. Under certain conditions, for 
instance, an extensive state and an accompanying tax 
obligation that some may find burdensome may be required.
If the tax load is so burdensome that it becomes the 
occasion for political division, this suggests that the 
political community and the accompanying bureaucratic- 
coercive apparatus have grown to a scale greater than is 
optimal for the human good. Nevertheless, as long as we shy 
away from a back-to-the-land policy of depopulation of 
cities, after the fashion of the "agrarian policy" adopted 
by the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, we may have no alternative
SOgpragens, Irony, 383-84; Strauss, "An Epilogue," in 
Strauss, Six Essays, ed. Gildin, 123.
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but to continue to maintain the "big government" apparatus.
To refuse to do so would be the mark of a base and ignoble 
egoism. The contemporary liberal state allows a fairly 
robust pursuit of economic self-interest, but it also 
insists that due regard for others be paid in the form of 
taxes and the fulfillment of other political obligations.^^
D'Souza suggests that from the perspective of Strauss 
there is no cause for any criticism of unregulated 
capitalism: "Strauss's students say he did not spend time 
attacking capitalism because he understood there was no 
better alternative." Spragens, however, recognizes the 
half-truth upon which such a posture rests: "Western 
capitalism has, in fact, averted a Marxian cataclysm only by 
implicitly repudiating the unfettered Hobbesian theory 
through new channels of distributive justice such as the 
progressive income tax." What, then, are the purposes that 
liberalism hopes to serve by exacting the fulfillment of 
such obligations as the income tax? What ends are served?
Actually, the liberal state does not adopt as extensive 
a set of ends as it might. As Barker notes, "One of the 
saddest things in our modern life is the man who has no 
place, and who has yet full capacity and every desire to 
fill a place." The nations of the Communist bloc purport to
^^Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 9.8.
5^0'Souza, "The Legacy of Leo Strauss," 38; Spragens, 
Motion, 111.
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provide a place for everyone; the liberal state has not 
attempted this, in part out of considerations of sheer 
feasibility, reinforced by the difficulties experienced 
within the Communist bloc itself. Still less does the 
liberal state attempt to secure for everyone the "meaningful 
work" suggested by Marxian thought as a requisite of a truly 
human existence. The aims of the liberal state are more 
modest, the size and growth of its state apparatus not 
withstanding. All the liberal state attempts to do is to 
alleviate some of the highest-order violations of what it 
understands as the necessary circumstances of the human 
good. For instance, the liberal state regards some kinds of 
work as not fit for a human being, as in the case of the 
person who might find that the only work he could secure was 
that usually assigned to a "beast of burden." Common usage 
describes such work as "menial," which essentially means 
"demeaning." The liberal state tolerates a condition in 
which many people do work which partakes of servility to one 
degree or another, but it attempts to supplement their 
incomes by means of either welfare benefits or minimum-wage 
regulations, so that they can at least afford some 
amenities. Furthermore, the liberal state understands that 
the good for man includes a modicum of community stability, 
of which stability of residence and of occupation are 
components. Therefore, if the "extended order" is to be 
justified in terms of the material prosperity and well-being
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that it brings us, the liberal state reserves the right to 
regulate that order when along with (or instead of) that 
prosperity it brings the "creative destruction” mentioned by 
Gray but originally identified by Joseph Schumpeter. On 
this basis the liberal state justifies such measures as 
import duties, tariffs, quotas, price supports, labor laws, 
"social security" programs which include retirement, 
disability, and unemployment payments, and "industrial 
policy.
Contemporary liberalism insists upon a mitigation of 
the "blindness of legal justice" remarked upon by Strauss, a 
feature of law that is at the center of the debate between 
"rule of law" and "rule by the wise" in classical political 
philosophy. As Gildin remarks, even the Aristotelian 
requirement for unequal treatment of unequals may permit an 
egalitarian principle as a "rule of thumb" under the 
conditions of a dynamic market economy. The legislator of 
liberal inclinations supports measures of economic 
protection, broadly defined, out of considerations similar 
to those that led to the incorporation of principles of 
equity into the common law. Oakeshott claims the law of 
equity can be subsumed within his "considerations of lex." 
but how can this be justified apart from teleological 
appeals to mitigate the severity of the law in the name of
53Barker, Plato and Aristotle. 372-73. Gray, in 
Liberalism. 71, refers to Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism, and 
Democracv (London: Unwin University Books, 1943), 81-87.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
338
the good for man? One can easily imagine a libertarian- 
individualist "moral radical" who would urge not only that 
the legislature refuse to undertake any measures of 
regulation but also that the common law be purged of any 
principles of equity. Such an interpretation of the rule of 
law rules out any incorporation of Aristotelian phronesis or 
practical judgment of particulars; what the contemporary 
liberal regards as legitimate exercises of phronesis, the 
radical economic liberal disparages as mere "expediency.
"I do not identify necessity and goodness," remarks 
Grant in the course of an objection to the program of 
contemporary liberalism as making too much of a virtue of 
necessity. He thinks that the contemporary liberal program 
incorporates an attitude of ingratitude toward nature on 
account of her being insufficiently beneficent. On the 
other hand, it is hard to argue with Spragens's invocation 
of a "reality principle" as the test of political proposals.
If we can equate "necessity" with "reality," we can conclude 
that the contingencies of our contemporary situation, 
admittedly less than optimal from an Aristotelian 
perspective, provide sufficient justification for the 
measures we have undertaken, carping criticisms aside.
Grant, citing Strauss, seeks to restore an appreciation of
^^Strauss, On Tvrannv. 74-76; Hilail Gildin, "Leo Strauss 
and the Crisis of Liberal Democracy," in Deutsch and Soffer, 
eds., The Crisis of Liberal Democracv. 98-99; Oakeshott, On Human 
Conduct. 138-39.
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the "beneficence of nature." He seems to hold the 
contemporary liberal political program, rather than the 
dynamic market economy, culpable for an ungrateful attitude 
toward nature. Yet while Strauss describes our current 
condition as an "economy of abundance" as opposed to the 
ancient "economy of scarcity," we should recognize the 
ironic twist that is revealed when we reflect that 
Aristotle's "economy of scarcity" with its strict limits on 
accumulation was itself based on the assumption of the 
beneficence of nature, while our "economy of abundance" with 
its proliferation of products and gadgets is premised on the 
assumption of scarce resources with which to satisfy 
unlimited wants. In any case, we should recall that, 
according to Strauss, the ancients' acknowledgment of the 
beneficence of nature was consonant with a demand for "the 
strict moral-political supervision of inventions"; it is 
hard to imagine how we could be true to the ancient spirit 
while refusing to regulate that most innovative of all 
inventions, the self-regulating market e c o n o m y . ^ 5 
"In the following chapter, Karl Marx will be 
criticized," remarked Arendt as she set out to draw the 
threefold distinction among labor, work, and action in The 
Human Condition. She criticized Marx for his failure to
S^Grant, Lament for a Nation. 88; Spragens, Ironv. 12-13; 
Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli. 298-99, cited in Grant, 
"Tyranny and Wisdom," in Technologv and Empire. 101-102 
(reprinted from Social Research 31[1961]; 45-72); Strauss, 
"Crisis," in Graham and Carey, eds., Post-Behavioral Era. 231.
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acknowledge the centrality of the political, which she would 
subsume under the category of "action.” At the same time, 
she did not wish to be included among the corps of 
"professional anti-Marxists." We may surmise that her 
position was that the reasons cited by Marx for the 
justification of a revolutionary supersession of the 
political are, instead, good reasons for the moral-political 
supervision of the economy on behalf of the common good.^®
"Vanguard" Politics and Political Breakdown 
Arendt's criticism of a "revolutionary supersession of 
the political" recalls the matter of the "problem of the 
vanguard," raised and then dropped by Macpherson in a 
somewhat casual manner. His remark that "the debased people 
are, by definition, incapable of reforming themselves en 
masse" will be recalled. He mentions the problem of a 
"vanguard party," but then stipulates that "in the 
circumstances we are talking about, there seems to be no 
less dangerous way." It will be argued here that the 
"vanguard mentality" endorsed here by Macpherson provides 
the best pretext for considering the politics of 
contemporary liberal and leftist parties to be 
"Hobbesian.
S^Arendt, The Human Condition. 79.
S^Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy, in chapter 
4, 157 above.
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Voegelin spoke of the Occidental polity as having 
achieved "an articulation of society down to the individual 
as a representable unit." Arendt, commenting on the 
political achievement of the American Revolution, commented 
on "the enormous power potential that arises" from "a 
country which was articulated from top to bottom." She 
criticized the Americans for not providing for the entire 
country in the Constitution the system of political 
articulation of the New England "town meeting." She 
believed that the conditions of twentieth-century "mass 
society" required such a system in order to provide the 
ordinary citizen with an opportunity to participate in 
politics without making a career of it, although she 
provided no detailed blueprint for a reform which would 
bring such a system into existence. She professed a 
sentimental attachment for the "council system" propounded 
by European workers' parties during the nineteenth century, 
which functioned in the Soviet Union for a short time after 
the Bolshevik Revolution. She believed that an intimation 
of such a system had appeared in the form of the committees 
which formed spontaneously during the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution before they were put down by the Soviets ("When 
Soviet-Russian tanks crushed the revolution in Hungary, they 
actually destroyed the only free and acting soviets in 
existence anywhere in the world.") Her advocacy of such a 
council system stemmed from her conviction that politics
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properly understood requires us to conduct a political 
discussion to which everyone in the polity is a party—  
although under the circumstances of the contemporary nation­
state this can only be achieved "in principle.”^®
Such a political discussion involving, in principle, 
everyone in the polity is what America has most assuredly 
lacked, at least since the nineteen-sixties. The political 
breakdown can be traced back to the elevation of racial 
issues such as civil rights and school integration in the 
nineteen-fifties. The American liberal and radical 
communities determined, after almost a century of neglect, 
that the condition of American blacks constituted a 
political emergency. The measures that followed amounted to 
a supersession of the normal processes of politics. Reforms 
were initiated not by legislatures but by decisions of the 
Supreme Court. For whites (white Southerners at first, but 
this would apply eventually to whites in all sections of the 
country), what was taken for granted all their lives now had 
lost respectability almost overnight. They found spokesmen 
in the national media shaking fingers at them for opposing 
changes felt to be deeply personally threatening; their 
point of view found no expression in these media. Suddenly, 
it was as though a large fraction of the population had been 
banished from the national political discussion. Arendt
5®Voegelin, New Science of Politics, 40-41; Arendt, On 
Revolution. 175-76, 234-35, and Origins. 492-502, esp. 498.
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contended that those questions that a polity declines to 
discuss publicly provide a wedge by means of which 
totalitarian propaganda could enter public consciousness and 
become plausible; "From these sore spots the lies of 
totalitarian propaganda derive the element of truthfulness 
and real experience they need to bridge the gulf between 
reality and fiction." Americans are lucky that things have 
not gotten worse than they have in this country, given the 
gap between (for example) the moralizing lessons about race 
being propagated in the mass media and the conversations on 
this matter that might take place across a typical American 
coffee table, in a barber shop, or at a gas station.
Civil rights for blacks, and, later, the Vietnam war, 
may have been legitimate political emergencies. As the 
ninaceen-sixties progressed, however, the American left 
generalized the approach of the civil-rights and antiwar 
movements to almost every matter on the national political 
agenda. The "movement politics" approach eschewed the 
normal channels of political persuasion in favor of a 
confrontational politics of "consciousness-raising." This
59Those who doubt that race has been the originating factor 
in the political upheavals that have affected America since the 
nineteen-sixties should consult Kevin Phillips, The Emerging 
American Maioritv (New Rochelle, N. Y.: Arlington House, 1969).
See also Arendt, Origins. 353; for Arendt's explicit views on 
racial issues, see "Reflections on Little Rock," Dissent 6 
(Winter 1959): 45-56; she replied to criticisms in Dissent 
6(Spring 1959): 179-81. Arendt's biographer (Young-Bruehl, Hannah 
Arendt. 315-18) notes that Arendt somewhat modified her views, 
which were taken as conservative, in a private correspondence 
with Ralph Ellison in response to a published interview with Ellison.
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politics that many have found morally condescending: the 
conviction of the activist that only he and those of his 
compatriots have a sufficiently "raised consciousness" to 
understand what is at stake. The subsequent political 
activity more nearly resembles an attempt to secure a sort 
of conversion than it does conventional political 
persuasion. This "let's-go-have-a-sit-in" style of politics 
has now been embraced by enthusiasts of a broad range of 
ideologies: radical feminism, environmentalism, pacifism, 
civil libertarianism, "gay" rights, and now even animal 
rights and anti-vivisectionism.
No phenomenon illustrates the reality of an American 
political breakdown so dramatically as the divergence of 
world views between "left-activists" and a conservative, 
mostly white middle class, whose reservations about 
liberalism are manifested most dramatically in the form of 
the "religious right"; the spirit of the warring sectarians 
observed by Hobbes during the English Civil War is recalled. 
The political scientists Carmines and Stimson distinguish 
between issue voting on "hard," technical issues and issues 
that are "easy" to take a position on because they are so 
antagonistic; liberals as well as the left have chosen to 
pick a fight with the middle class over the latter. To 
defend their positions on the "easy" issues, liberals have 
had to resort to a strategy that is in a deep sense
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apolitical, relying on the Constitution and the federal 
courts to maintain that which cannot be sustained within the 
popular branches of government. This strategy gives an 
observer such as Strauss a pretext for saying that the 
willing consent necessary to distinguish constitutional 
government from tyranny is missing. Especially with respect 
to the matters of abortion and of several closely related, 
highly sensitive matters involving education, liberals and 
the left have put themselves in the position of maintaining 
that a traditional religious perspective is inadmissable in 
public debate, giving Strauss and his followers a pretext 
for claiming that liberals are "forced to suppress every 
activity which might lead people into doubt of the essential 
soundness" of the liberal state, that they must "forbid 
every teaching, every suggestion" that might conflict with 
the program of that state. The liberal state, legitimated 
only by the constitutional courts and not the popular 
branches, interposes itself between the state and local 
governments and their constituents, as well as between 
parents and their children. In so doing it ignores Barker's 
evocation of the state as "embracing, not negating, other 
organizations," as well as Mure's advice that "You must not 
try wholly to sweep away the lower levels."®®
®®Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, "The Two 
Faces of Issue Voting," American Political Science Review 
74(1980); 78-91; Strauss, On Tvrannv and "Restatement on 
Xenophon's Hiero." in Chapter 3, 106-07 above; Barker, Plato 
and Aristotle. 228; G. R. G. Mure, "The Organic State,"
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Spragens, reflecting the influence of Voegelin, 
diagnoses the "vanguard mentality" as an instance of the 
tendency of liberal rationalism to conceive political 
knowledge as a technical science accessible only to experts, 
and thus to divide mankind into "knowers" and "nonknowers," 
as manifested by the tendency of "sophisticates" or 
"cosmopolitans" to disparage "unsophisticated," "parochial" 
opinion. Against this tendency, Spragens insists that the 
politically 'mistaken* must be persuaded, not manipulated. 
There may be political and moral experts, but their 
expertise is only tentative; they must take account of the 
point of view of the other, treating others has peers whose 
political consent must be secured. Of course, what has 
happened is not so much that the 'mistaken' have been 
manipulated as that they simply have been bypassed. As a 
result, the judgment has been rendered in some quarters that 
liberals and the left are snobbish and intellectually 
arrogant, not to mention constitutionally incapable of 
securing acceptance of the measures of economic 
"protection," broadly conceived, that it deems to be so 
irreducibly necessary. The sympathies of liberals and the 
left do not extend widely enough for either to be capable of 
securing the consent necessary to govern. What is called 
for is a religious, racial, and sociocultural "settlement,"
Philosophv 24(1949); 216 (discussed by Voegelin in "The 
Oxford Political Philosophers," Philosophical Quarterly 
3[1953]: 113-114).
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not essentially different from the settlement sought during 
the English Civil War. We shall let Kojéve have the last 
word on this matter, with his observation that it is 
tyrannical when one faction imposes its authority "without 
•coming to terms' with the others, without seeking any 
•compromises' with them, and without taking into account 
their ideas and desires.
The suggestion here, then, is that setting aside 
"vanguard" politics may enable us to win consent for the 
measures of "protection," broadly understood, that are 
upheld by contemporary liberalism. If it is Voegelin's 
argument that a spiritual conversion could obviate the need 
for any institutional reform, then we must object; but if 
his argument is that political consent for liberal reforms 
cannot be achieved apart from a process of persuasion which 
requires a "change of heart" that partakes of the spiritual, 
then we see no reason to dissent. With the accomplishment 
of such a "change of heart," our reforms will, in Barker's 
words, be "not merely dictated by law, but flowing from a 
proper spirit." To attain such a "change of heart," we need 
to reconvene a comprehensive political discussion trom 
which, in principle, no one is to be excluded. Such a 
comprehensive discussion should yield at least an intimation 
of a genuine polity; since ours is a mass nation-state of
^^Spragens, Ironv. 105-109, 361-65; Kojéve, "Tyranny and 
Wisdom," in Strauss, On Tvrannv. 153.
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hundreds of millions of people, an intimation is probably 
the best we will be able to do. We cannot escape living in 
a polity; a polity on our scale will probably partake of 
some of the "untidiness" that Hayek, Buchanan, and Gray find 
so objectionable. Such a state may indeed be a "necessary 
evil," although that would be due strictly to considerations 
of scale, if the Aristotelian approach is the correct one. 
Nonetheless, we have no choice but to live in such a state, 
no matter how untidy.
Once such a comprehensive political discussion is 
reconvened, we should reconsider those policies that have 
made the national government the antagonist of Mure's "lower 
levels." In so doing, we could bring about a qualified 
revival of "federalism" and could mitigate some of the 
deleterious effects of "large-scale" politics. The matters 
at issue here should be addressed with proposals capable of 
winning popular assent, not just "swept under the rug." At 
the same time, we should set aside our attitude that any 
exercise of political authority, especially in the economic 
sphere, is proto-totalitarian. As we have seen from our 
consideration of the individualist-libertarian "neo- 
Hobbesians," such an attitude can itself have authoritarian 
implications. Against the tendency of a thinker such as 
Gray, whose "moral radicalism" would prohibit both economic 
intervention and legal moralism, we hold that both such 
policies have costs that, utilizing Aristotelian phronesis.
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must be weighed against their benefits; unfortunately, many 
contemporary liberals and leftists have embraced just such 
an inappropriate "moral radicalism," at least with respect 
to legal moralism. They risk falling into the trap 
described by Crick, in which "we fear so much the perversion 
of the political tradition that was totalitarianism, that we 
do not dare try for the republic.
®2cray, Hayek on Libertv. 64, 129-34; Bernard Crick, "On 
Rereading The Origins of Totalitarianism." in Hill, ed., The 
Recovery of the Public World. 44.
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